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Abstract 
This thesis is a case study of the Temporary International Presence in the City of 
Hebron (TIPH). TIPH is a non-UN, multilateral observer mission, first established in  
1994, and continually operating since May 1996. Being the only city in the West Bank 
where Israeli civilians have settled in the very centre, Hebron has been ridden by 
unparalleled violence, and became the only city so far to host an international presence 
with an explicit, if somewhat unusual, peacekeeping mandate.     
 
The focal question is whether and how TIPH has affected the security of the local 
Palestinian population. In a wider perspective, the aim is to contribute to the 
cumulative understanding of violent conflict, thereby strengthening the theoretical 
basis for third-party intervention in general - and unarmed observation in particular.   
 
The first half of the thesis consists of a reformulation of the main question into several 
manageable hypotheses, whereas the second half is a condensation of the findings into 
one overall answer. Initially, the city of Hebron is introduced in its legal, religious, 
economic, demographic, and humanitarian aspects. A brief historical review of the 
TIPH missions is given, before the reader is provided with the tools of analysis and a 
description of the methods used. The main section is devoted to a description of TIPH 
in its institutional context, followed by a synthesis of the theoretical and empirical 
material in the analysis chapter.  
 
Based on qualitative and quantitative data, I conclude that TIPH enhances the security 
of Palestinians in Hebron, particularly in times of crisis. TIPH has influenced the 
Israeli security forces, primarily the army, but it has not measurably affected the 
conduct of the settlers as a group. The pathways of influence have varied over time, as 
the breakdown of the official co-operative organs of the Hebron regime has led to 
compensatory reliance on indirect pressure through diplomatic channels.   
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis evaluates the impact of the Temporary International Presence in the City of 
Hebron (TIPH) upon the security of Palestinians in that city. TIPH is a multilateral 
peacekeeping mission, consisting of unarmed observers from six different countries. It 
was initially deployed in 1994, in response to a massacre of 29 Muslim worshippers in 
the Ibrahami Mosque/Cave of Machpela, committed by an Israeli settler. The prime 
objective of the observers was to “provide by their presence a feeling of security to the 
Palestinians of Hebron” (TIPH Agreement, 1994, Art.3a). Accordingly, the focal 
question here is: Does TIPH affect the security situation in Hebron? And secondly: If 
so, in what way - and precisely by which mechanism(s) does it affect security? 
 
Three hypotheses conjoin to make a natural starting point:  
 
 
H0: TIPH has no impact on the security of Palestinians in Hebron. 
H1: TIPH strengthens the security of Palestinians in Hebron 
H-1: TIPH weakens the security of Palestinians in Hebron  
 
Theoretical arguments may support either of these hypotheses. Fortunately, the 
hypotheses are testable, in the sense that a set of observable parameters may be 
construed in order to falsify either of them. In this thesis, I apply both qualitative and 
quantitative data for that purpose. The quantitative analysis is essentially a comparison 
of the number of Palestinian casualties in Hebron during months in which TIPH has 
been present with the number of casualties in preceding months, taking the 
contemporary development in four other Palestinian cities into account.  
 
The TIPH case is interesting for a number of reasons: 
 
1: The humanitarian argument:  
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is still not resolved, and the number of conflict-related 
deaths has risen dramatically since late September 2000 (B’tselem, 2002). Any attempt 
to ameliorate the suffering of people affected by violence is worthy of attention. 
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 2: The fiscal argument: 
All forms of organisation take resources that might have been otherwise allocated. 
Therefore all organisations should be held accountable for their achievement. 
   
3: The learning argument:  
TIPH is a novel form of peacekeeping, which has several advantages over traditional 
forms.1 If it can be shown that TIPH has a positive effect, it may be used as a model 
for later peacekeeping operations. 
 
4: The theory testing argument:  
As will be argued in Chapter 3, TIPH is an extremely weak peacekeeping force, and 
might as such be taken as a critical case with relevance to several scholarly debates 
within the social sciences.   
 
5: The theory elaboration argument:  
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is asymmetric. While the concepts of International 
Politics theory was moulded in a symmetric paradigm, treating states as the relevant- 
and more or less equal actors, 2 recent history has shown that most conflicts are intra-
state, trans-national or fought between forces of vastly unequal strength 
(Smith,2000:1f ). I hope that this work will contribute to a cross-fertilisation between 
peacekeeping- and asymmetric war studies. 
Sources. 
The thesis is based on both primary and secondary sources. From 21 February to 21 
March 2002, I conducted a field trip to Hebron, with excursions to Jerusalem, Tel 
Aviv and Jericho. Unfortunately, the security situation in Hebron deteriorated, and in 
adherence to TIPH’s guidelines, I left the city. I was later able to go back, but got only 
                                                 
1 The fact that TIPH is an unarmed mission makes it easier to draw on a wide spectrum of expertise, compared to more 
narrowly military-oriented operations. Being unarmed, dangerous situations stemming from the maltreatment of firearms and 
misunderstandings related to armed posture are avoided. Armament implies administration, so disarmament saves money. 
Last, but not least, the Hebron regime was intended to facilitate frequent meetings attended by Israeli and Palestinian officials 
as well as TIPH officers. The “closeness” of this co-operation might create bonds between the parties in a way that traditional 
peacekeeping, with its emphasis on the separation of forces, could hardly achieve. For an introduction to TIPH, see chapter 2.   
2 The traditional metaphor is that of a billiard-table, where states are represented as balls. While it is clear that states are 
unequal in terms of power (the force with which one ball hits another), the focus remains unequivocally on states as the 
presumed relevant actors in International Relations. Graphically speaking, bananas and fishnets do not appear on the table.    
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six and a half days there. Still, I was able to follow a patrol on duty, and obtained 27 
interviews with civilians of both “sides” (including press workers), and representatives 
of Israel, Norway, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and TIPH. The interviews 
were complemented by 10 interviews in Norway. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs gave me access to TIPH Weekly Reports from 1994 and Periodical Reports 
from 1997-1999. Other qualitative material has been retrieved from mass media, the 
Internet and private sources. Data on the number of conflict-related deaths are courtesy 
of B’tselem – Israeli Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories. 
  
From the secondary literature I have used, two independent TIPH evaluation reports 
stand out: One was written in 1998 by Brynjar Lia at the Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment. That report was larger in scope than this one, as its unit of analysis was 
the entire Peace Process from 1993-1998. Anyhow, a substantial part of the report was 
devoted to TIPH, and Lia’s work has been extremely valuable to me.  
 
The second report was written by Anna Valve in 2000, as part of a Master’s degree at 
Lund University. Valve’s report combines a solid theoretical basis with a daring and 
committed fieldwork, as she walked around in the Israeli-controlled part of Hebron, 
under curfew, in order to talk to Palestinians. 
 
Despite the existence of those two excellent reports on TIPH, I believe this one is 
warranted. First of all, it attempts a more detailed approach than Lia, as the field is 
more narrowly defined. Secondly, time has lapsed since the other two reports were 
written, adding information and allowing for a different kind of method. I apply 
statistical analysis, which requires a certain number of units in order to yield 
significant results. Since I believe city-months are useful units for this purpose, such 
an analysis requires that TIPH has been operative for some time. That is now possible. 
Thirdly, Valve’s dependent variable was “feeling of security”, literally corresponding 
to the wording of the TIPH mandate.3 My dependent variable will be “actual 
                                                 
3 Valve discusses a number of security concepts, and it is somewhat unclear if she chooses to focus on objective or subjective 
security. It seems fair to say that she does both, with an emphasis on the latter, as indicated by the following statement: “I 
argue that security should be understood as negative (the absence of threats) and subjective (threats have to be experienced 
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security”.4 The reason for this subjective-objective shift of focus is that whether one is 
secure, arguably is a more fundamental question than how one feels.5 Moreover, I shall 
argue that, despite the formulation, TIPH was intended to strengthen security per se.  
Thesis structure. 
In chapter 2, I give a brief historical account of the TIPH missions. Chapter 3 outlines 
the theoretical framework for the later discussion of TIPH as a tool of peacekeeping. 
Chapter 4 is a presentation- and defence of method. Chapter 5 lists data relevant to the 
effect of TIPH upon the security of local Palestinians. In Chapter 6 I finally assess 
various hypotheses on the precise functioning of TIPH in light of the findings.  
Working manifesto 
This thesis is based on metaphysical realist premises.6 It applies the Hypothetical-
Deductive Method (HDM) concomitant with Aristotelian logic.7 The work may be 
                                                                                                                                                        
by individuals) and that threats have different meanings to people in different contexts” (Valve, 2000:15). Judging from her 
method, I would say that her empirical material is most relevant to threat perceptions of individual Palestinians, as opposed 
to threats objectively observed. The bulk of her data is obtained from civilian Palestinians, and focus on their subjective 
feelings. (Valve, 2000:3f;28ff). However, Valve also interviews representatives of the IDF, PPF, PNA and the Swedish 
representative office on the West Bank. Taken together, this amounts to a strategy for the evaluation of objective security as 
well. I interpret Valve to the effect that her concern has more to do with the translation of objective security into subjective 
security, and less to do with the question of whether TIPH provides objective security in the first place (Valve, 2000:28). 
Valve says that ”TIPH’s observing and reporting functions reduce the likelihood that Israeli soldiers physically abuse and 
humiliate Palestinians” (Valve, 2000:Abstract). But I can hardly see how she can reach that conclusion, not having compared 
the situation to what happened before TIPH arrived, nor to other cities where TIPH is not present. Neither does she claim to 
have observed Israeli security forces in a way that would enable her to statistically assert their alleged difference in conduct 
under TIPH observation as opposed to when TIPH is absent. In other words, the proposition above must be taken as a 
preliminary conclusion based on statements by interviewees – which are of course subjective. Often, the feeling of security 
will be an indicator, and therefore an operational definition of actual security. (Hellevik, 1997:165f) Thus one could measure 
the feeling of security in order to say something about actual security. But some people will feel insecure, even when there is 
little to fear. Also, it is speculative to assume that a feeling of security could only arise when a person is truly secure. The 
overlap of the concepts is therefore not total, as Valve pertinently points out (Valve, 2000:13).     
4 For a brief discussion of the security concept of this thesis, see chapter 4. 
5 Feeling safe in an insecure environment may indeed be fatal. Still, subjective security is interesting even in an objectivist 
perspective. I shall assess it as an independent variable. Because fascinatingly, feeling safe just might help create security!  
6 Metaphysical realism presumes that objects exist in and of themselves, i.e.: independent of the cognitive 
apparatus of the subject. Unlike within Critical Theory, it is meaningful to seek “objective truth” (Malnes 1997).   
7 HDM consists of a two-staged process with the aim of testing theories. Theories are propositions about how phenomena 
relate to each other. The first step is to ‘operationalise’ the theory, that is - identify hypothetical outcomes of particular 
situations (experiments or quasi-experiments) - given that the theory is true and complete. Such predictions are called 
“hypotheses”, and take the form “If theory A is true, then B will happen under such and such (controlled) circumstances.” 
This may be simplified to the syllogismic clause: “If A then B.” If Hypotheses shall be of any value, it is necessary that the 
outcomes they predict are unambiguous and explainable by reference to only one of the theories under consideration. The 
second stage is to compare actual outcomes (data) to the predicted ones, and to rule out theories that are incompatible with 
the result. When a theory accurately predicts an observed outcome, it is considered strengthened, but not verified in the strict 
sense of the word. That is because Aristotelian logic does not accept the following syllogism as logically valid: 
          
If A, then B  On the other hand, this one is: If A, then B 
                 B               Not B
A               Not A 
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defined as an embedded single-case study (Yin 2003:40), and as a top-down 
organisation analysis (Kjellberg & Reitan 1995). 
 
Transcription 
Those Arabic and Hebrew words that have already circulated in Western media will be 
written according to common, English, practice. Names of places correspond to the 
included map, except that I write “Abraham shrine” instead of the longer Arabic and 
Hebrew names.8 For other Arabic words, I shall use the transcription envisaged in 
Haywood | Nahmad (1990:3f), with the exception that I omit indication of emphasis. 
For Hebrew words that have not acquired a standard, English spelling, I shall use the 
letters in the “Uttale” column in Køhn (1990:16ff). Vowels will be simplified to the 
nearest Latin equivalent.9   
 
Delimitation of study 
The study is focused solely on what I consider to be security relevant aspects of the 
TIPH missions. However, as will become clear, I adopt an open-minded approach as to 
what may be security relevant. Not very intuitive topics, such as Community Relations 
projects, internal guidelines, professional and sexual composition- of TIPH, etc., are 
therefore given some reflection. 
 
Methodological individualism 
I take as an axiom, that whereas individuals exist in an a priori sense, collectives do 
not. Collectives come into existence through the assumption of a defining principle by 
a number of individuals. I thus conceive of acts by groups or institutions only as the 
sum of individual acts. This premise is reflected methodologically by a “triangulation” 
of the quantitative, aggregate, data with qualitative, individual, data, and by an effort 
to avoid formulations implying collective agency and responsibility. It is settlers, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Thus theories may be falsified, but not verified. In practice however, a theory will often linger on, perhaps in a modified 
version, even if it has failed a test. That is especially true if it fits into a larger paradigm of theories that are assumed to be 
reliable. Sometimes, a theory can be kept artificially alive by the simple fact that there is no other theory to fill the void.  
8 The Arabic name is al-Haram al-’Ibrahīmi. The Hebrew name is Ma’arat Ha-Machpeláh. On the map, the Shrine is 
denoted as Ibrahimi Mosque/Cave of Machpela, and may be found by co-ordinates S/15. 
9 Pátach and qámets will be written “a”. Tsegól and tseré will be written “e”. Qibbuts will be written “u”. Chólem will be 
written “o”. Schewa will be written “’”. Long vowels will be indicated by a “´”.   
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soldiers, observers, Palestinians who act, not the settlers, the soldiers, etc. I emphasise 
this partly out of concern that the thesis might, in effect, feed the cancer of anti-
Semitism, partly to clarify my position on collective punishment. In so far as the norm 
of precision is violated in the thesis, the reader should consider it a compromise to the 
demands of style and space only.  
 
Declaration of outlook 
In a study of conflict, explication of premises of analysis would seem extra 
appropriate. This is my lay opinion on some of the most relevant issues: 
 
I believe the presence in the West Bank of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) constitutes 
an occupation. Reason: This view is affirmed several times by the UN General 
Assembly, the Security Council, the International Commission of Jurists and many 
independent experts of law.10 In fact, although Israeli official and public discourse is 
quite dubious as to the status of the West Bank,11 rulings of the Israeli Supreme Court 
are based on the premise that this is an occupation (INSICJ 1981). 
 
I do not feel competent to conclude on the legality of the Israeli occupation on a ius ad 
bellum argument. Reason: A convincing argument requires both intimate historical 
knowledge and exquisite legal competence.12 Even prominent legal scholars refrain 
from concluding, and among those who hint at a conclusion, there are questionable 
empirical and legal premises. I therefore do not postulate that the occupation is a result 
                                                 
10 See for example, Falk and Weston (1992:130ff); NIHR (2001); ICJ (1977); Roberts (1992:25;32f); UNSCR 242 (22 Nov. 
1967),  UNGA ress. 2443 (XXIII) (19 Dec. 1968); 2727 (XXV) (15 Dec 1970);  3005 (XXVII) (15 Dec 1972); 32/20 (25 
Nov. 1977); 41/63 (3 Dec. 1986);   
11 Oral and written statements referring to the occupied territories are often formulated in a way that leaves the status of the 
territories unclear, or assert a Jewish claim to them. Common concepts are Eretz Israel, Judea and Samaria, Administered 
territories, Autonomous areas or simply the territories. Official maps in Israel do not indicate the borders of Israel as defined 
by UN General Assembly Resolution 181 or the Green line (i.e.: the Israeli-Jordanian Armistice line of 1949, defining the 
territory later known as the West Bank). Moreover, there have been many institutional reforms that would seem to further 
integration with Israel (See Shehadeh 1993).  
12 Initially, to be legal, the occupation would have to conform to the requirements of Art. 51 of the UN Charter (1945), which 
allows occupation only if authorised by the UN Security Council, or, as an act of self-defence - and in the latter case, only 
“until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” I believe an analysis 
of the resumption of hostilities in 1967, for all its complexity, would be insufficient for concluding on the legality of the 
occupation. The analysis would, in my opinion, have to deal with issues dating back at least to the Hussein-Mac Mahon 
correspondence (1915-1916), and also take into account later developments, such as UN resolutions, peace proposals and 
agreements and unilateral changes in the status of the territories. Other general issues which would appear relevant include, 
the validity of the circumscription on the right to self-defence as contained in Article 51 in the light of customary 
international law; the relationship between state rights and private rights, and; the legal implications of arms developments.  
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of Israeli aggression, and as such illegal.13 However, the practice of occupation will be 
evaluated according to the norms and laws of ius in bello.  
 
I believe the Fourth Geneva Convention (FGC 1949) is de jure applicable to the 
Israeli occupation of the West Bank.  Reason: The FGC was ratified by both Israel and 
Jordan (the previous occupier of the West Bank) before the 1967 hostilities, in a 
situation analogous to a Rawlsian original position.14 The applicability is affirmed by 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (the body entrusted with the oversight of 
the FGC), and all the above-mentioned legal authorities except the Israel National 
Section of the International Commission of Jurists, and the Israeli Supreme Court.15
 
I believe the Israeli settlements in the West Bank are illegal. Reason: FGC 1949, Art. 
49(6) reads:  
“The occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it 
occupies.”16  
 
The settlements are de facto permanent changes in occupied territory, and conflict with 
the temporary state that occupation is defined as under international law, obstructing a 
reversion to peace.17 Moreover, the settlements are justified as “part of the IDF’s 
military set-up”18 and thus blur the distinction between combatants (uniformed) and 
                                                 
13 Giving Israel the benefit of the doubt may very well be undue in light of UNGA Res. 3236 (XXIX) (1974) endorsing The 
Right to self-determination of the Palestinian People, and UNGA Ress. 32/20 (25 Nov. 1977) and 33/29 (7 Dec. 1978), 
referring to the Israeli military presence as an “illegal occupation.” Yet this formulation is sparsely used in Resolutions 
dealing with the Israeli occupation, and ‘respected publicists’ typically approach this issue cautiously. Not having read any 
firm, comprehensive and independent treatise on the subject, I shall assume the conservative position.  
14 The original position is defined as a venue of rational (mutually disinterested) actors, who are deprived of any knowledge 
of their personal identity in the real world, and yet are to define the social order applicable once their veil of ignorance is 
lifted (Rawls 1999:102ff). When Israel and Jordan ratified the FGC (1949), their leaders did not know the future capabilities 
of their respective states, and ratification of the Convention would, as the large number of Contracting Parties indicates, 
represent the general rational choice of action under risk (Elster 1986). My contention is that neither state signed the FGC 
under the threat of force, in the meaning of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969, Art. 52), which would in 
effect render the FGC invalid, in so far as the principle of invalidity of such treaties is derivable from the UN Charter (1945).    
15 On the eve of the Israeli occupation, the IDF Regional Commander issued a proclamation ordering military courts and 
court administrators to apply the FGC (1949). Later, the proclamation was amended and the order replaced (Qupty 1992:120)   
16 See Pictet (1958:283) for the official ICRC commentary on the paragraph. For opinions by independent legal scholars, see 
ICJ (1977:27ff); Roberts (1992:65ff); von Glahn (1996:675f). For the Israeli point of view, see INSICJ (1981:49ff).  
17 Machiavelli (1984:10) prescribes moving “own” civilians into occupied territory as the best out of only two possible ways 
of retaining such territory. See also Hague Regulations (HR 1907, Art. 55); ICJ (1977:27;30); Oppenheim (1992:699); 
Roberts (1992:26); von Glahn (1996:668); UN Charter (1945, Preamble and Arts. 2;51); UNGA Res/32/5 (28 October 1977). 
18 Confer the Supreme Court ruling in the famous Beit-El case (Ayyub et al. vs. Minister of Defence et al. 1978): According 
to Justice Witkon: “… it cannot be doubted that the presence in occupied territory of settlements – even civilian ones – of 
citizens of the occupying power, contributes appreciably to security in that territory and makes it easier for the army to carry 
out its task…” According to Justice Landau: “… a civilian settlement such as Beit-El is intended to be integrated into the 
regional defence which is part of the IDF’s military set-up, and it is common knowledge that, in time of need, since the IDF 
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non-combatants (civilian), a fundamental precept of customary international law. 
Conversely, if one argues that the settlers are indeed civilians, the continuing 
extraction of resources for their benefit is forbidden by the FGC (1949, Art. 55).  
 
Presuming that the occupation is legal per se, I believe the Israel Defence Force (IDF) 
is entitled to uphold a military presence in Hebron, proportionate to its obligations as 
an occupying force, and to take the necessary measures to protect its soldiers, subject 
to applicable law. Reason: Article 43 of the Hague Regulations (HR 1907) obligates 
the occupant to, 
“take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety (l’ordre et la 
vie publics), while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.”  
 
I believe that the civilian Israeli presence in Hebron constitutes an international 
delinquency, and the liability for upholding this illegal presence - thereby failing to 
enforce public order and safety - extends down to the private soldier. Reason: The 
principle that superior orders do not detract from the individual responsibility of 
soldiers to abide by the laws-of-war, was first formulated by Grotius (1583-1645), and 
was a basic principle of the Nüremberg trials (Falk and Weston 1992:147; Oppenheim 
1961:316f; von Glahn 1996:29;701f).  
 
I believe the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention are 
delinquent in acquiescing- and in some cases abetting Israeli violations of the 
Convention. Reason: Article 1 of the FGC reads,  
“The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and ensure respect for the present Convention in all 
circumstances.”  
 
The ICRC commentary states that,  
“…in the event of a Power failing to fulfil its obligations, the other Contracting Parties … should, endeavour to 
bring it back to an attitude of respect for the Convention … The Contracting parties should not be content merely 
to apply its provisions themselves, but should do everything in their power to ensure that the humanitarian 
principles underlying the Conventions are applied universally” (Pictet 1958:16f).   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
is for the most part a reservists’ army, the inhabitants  of a civilian settlement are under military command, even as 
individuals…”(quoted in INSICJ 1981:52f) 
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Chapter II: TIPH – a Brief Historical Account. 
The City of Hebron 
Hebron,19 situated 32 Km. south of Jerusalem, is the second largest city on the West 
Bank. It has a population of some 122.000 Palestinians and ca. 500 Jews - many of 
whom are immigrants from the USA.20 The Jewish settlers occupy four enclaves in the 
central Old City.21 Additionally, some 7.000 Israelis live in the settlements of Kiryat 
Arba and Giv’at Hakharsina, bordering on the city to the east.  
 
Manufacture, construction, and agriculture, has made Hebron a commercial centre of 
the West Bank. It comprises two universities, an agricultural school, a polytechnic, 
religious academies, four hospitals and two hotels. Civil society is rife with 
organisations. Hebron is characterised by high altitude, hilly terrain, proximity to the 
desert, and yet - sufficient rainfall in winter. The Old City converges on a valley 
stretching from the east to the west. Running along it, is the city’s traditional economic 
artery, Shuhada Street, which ends in a level ground that used to serve as a wholesale 
vegetable market up until the 1994 massacre. The market adjoins the largest Jewish 
settlement in the city, called Avraham Avinu. 
 
Hebron carries a particular symbolic significance. The Tomb of Abraham, considered 
ancestor of both Arabs and Jews, is located in the heart of the city.22 David, the 
illustrious King of Israel, and Prophet of Islam made Hebron his first capital. Later, 
Herod the Great built a shrine around Abraham’s Tomb, serving consecutively as 
                                                 
19 Different interpretations of the name “Hebron” exist. According to a TIPH introductory booklet, the name is derived from 
the root “Bever” meaning “union”. According to the Jewish Virtual Library (JVL), the name is derived from Hebrew 
“cháver”, meaning “friend” – a reference to Abraham, whom God through the Prophet Isaiah honours as “my friend” (Isaiah 
41:8). The Arabic name is “Madīnat Khalīl ar-Rahmān”, meaning “city of the friend of the Merciful”, often shortened “al-
Khalīl”, that is – with a sad twist of irony: “the dear friend”. 
20 Both these figures are approximate. Øverkil (2004b [interview]) and Salam (a [Internet site]), both well-informed 
individuals, estimate the Palestinian population to be far higher, i.e.: 140 – 150,000 and 200,000 persons respectively. My 
estimate is based on 7 mutually independent Palestinian studies, compiled for the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 
(1994), and is arrived at through a reckoning of the coefficients for population growth within each study, and subsequently 
taking their unweighted average. As for the settlers, their number is highly politicised, since it is relevant to the feasibility of 
evacuating/expelling them. According to Yesha (2003), the settler umbrella organisation, there were 520 Jewish settlers in 
Hebron in 1999. Palestinians often claim the number of settlers to be far lower, and emphasise, that many of them (ca. 140) 
are yeshiva students, i.e.: short-term residents (Abdel Hadi 1996). 
21 The names of the settlements are: Beit Hadassah (Established 1979), Avraham Avinu (1981), Beit Romano (1983), Tel 
Rumeida (1984). 
22 Also Abraham’s heirs (according to the Jewish tradition) Isaac and Jacob are buried in the shrine, along with the 
Matriarchs Sarah, Rebekah and Leah. The shrine also includes a separate chamber containing a footprint of Adam, father of 
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synagogue, church and mosque. Both Talmudic and early Islamic tradition count 
Hebron among their four holiest cities (Catholic Encyclopedia). The Muslim 
population is widely considered more devout than what is average for Palestinians. In 
addition to the religious significance, several massacres and other symbolic injustices 
suffered by the city’s various populations, constitute historical references for the 
discourses of nationalism.23      
 
Inter-religious coexistence remained largely peaceful and enriching up through the 
ages, but the Muslim dominance occasionally slipped over into robbery and killings of 
Jews.24 In the late 19th Century, Hassidic immigrants from Poland founded a yeshiva in 
central Hebron. Mass ethnic violence was unleashed in 1929, as anti-Zionists from 
Jerusalem instigated a massacre of 67 (mainly non-Zionist) Hebronite Jews. The 
remaining Jews, many of whom had been sheltered by Muslim neighbours and friends, 
were forcibly evacuated by the British. After 1948, The West Bank was occupied and 
annexed by Jordan, coming under Israeli occupation as a result of the 1967 hostilities.  
The Settlers 
In 1968, followers of Rabbi Moshe Levinger celebrated Passover at a local hotel and 
announced their intent to stay in the city. Defying orders to leave, the settlers were 
permitted to occupy part of the IDF compound and one year later founded Kiryat 
Arba. In 1979, settler women and children moved into Beit Hadassah, a former Jewish 
clinic in central Hebron. Under heavy IDF protection, the settlers expanded, and 
                                                                                                                                                        
all mankind. Other sites of reverence to Jews include the tombs of Othniel Ben Kenaz (The first Judge of Israel), Avner Ben 
Ner (General of King Saul) and Ruth and Jesse (Grandmother and father of King David).   
23 The earliest recorded massacre took place during the Hebrew conquest of Canaan, ca. BC. 1200, in which the entire 
Canaanite population of the city was slaughtered (Joshua 10:36f (A somewhat less bloody account is given in Judges 1:1-
20)). Judah Maccabee burnt the city, and according to some sources, expelled its Edomite/Idumean population (Jewish 
Encyclopedia). During the Jewish rebellion against Rome 65-70 AD, the city’s Idumeans were first ruthlessly plundered by 
the Sicarii of Simon Bar-Giora and then massacred by the Roman forces under Cereali[u]s (Josefus 2002:330ff). After the 
Bar-Kochba revolt of 132-135 AD, the main slave market, symbolising the beginning of the Jewish Diaspora, was located 
just outside the city (Øverland 1900:2). Sources differ over the existence of a Jewish community in Hebron after this, but 
several sources claim that crusaders banished Jews from the city in 1100 (e.g. JVL; Hebron-org). The Egypt-based Mamluks 
proved less liberal than the early Arab Caliphs had been, and in 1266, Jews and Christians were barred from entering the 
Abraham shrine. The Jews, however, maintained the tradition of praying on the seventh step outside. In 1518, one year after 
the Ottoman conquest, a violent pogrom befell the city’s Jews (Peters 1984:85). On the background of rumours of Jewish 
ritual murder in Damascus, in 1775, the Jewish community in Hebron was rocked by a “blood libel”, and forced to pay a 
heavy fine for the son of a local Sheikh of whose murder they were collectively accused (JVL; Peters 1984:179). Then in 
1834, Egyptian soldiers under Ibrahim Pasha who had entered the city to put down a local (Muslim) rebellion, also wrought a 
massacre on the city’s Jews (JVL; Peters 1984:183). Finally, in 1929 a massacre of 67 Jews was instigated by Jerusalemites, 
claiming that the Dome of the Rock was being demolished in order to rebuild the Jewish Temple (Friedland and Hecht 
1996:134). 
24 See previous footnote. For a more detailed historical account of suffering among Jews, see Peters (1984).  
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challenged the Muslim character of the Abraham Shrine through installations. The 
next year saw a steep rise in violence on both sides, after 6 yeshiva students were 
killed near Beit Hadassah (JVL; Peretz 1990:21). In 1983, masked men attacked the 
city’s Islamic College, killing 3 students. The same year, the city’s Mayor, Mustafa 
Natshe, was removed from office after filing a lawsuit against the settlers (Shehadeh 
1993:85). The city was a hot spot during the first Intifada (1987-93).  
 
The downtown settlements are illegal under international law, and initially also under 
Israeli law. As for the former, two principles are often said to be violated: 
- The occupier shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies 
(Fourth Geneva Convention (FGC 1949) Art. 49 (6)). 
- The occupier may not impose permanent changes in occupied territory that are not for the benefit of the 
indigenous population (Confer The Hague Regulations (HR 1907) Arts. 43;46-49;55).     
 
Five legal arguments are commonly advanced in defence of the settlements: 
- The West Bank was never internationally recognised as Jordanian territory, and the Israeli presence in the 
West Bank constitutes a sui generis, not an ordinary occupation. The Fourth Geneva Convention (FGC 
1949) is therefore not de jure applicable; 
- The FGC was never incorporated into municipal Israeli law; 
- The IDF is obliged to uphold public life and safety within the territories under occupation. This is a duty 
towards the Palestinian population. This task is greatly facilitated by civilian, Jewish/Israeli, settlements 
around the military installations. It is therefore in the interest of the Palestinian population that settlements 
are placed in the West Bank, in so far as they are not erected on private Palestinian land (INSICJ 1981); 
- Article 49 (6) of the FGC must be read consummate to the first paragraph, and should be taken so as to 
prohibit only settlements that are intended to displace the indigenous population; 
- The FGC prohibits transfers, but not voluntary settlement. 
 
However, all these arguments have been dismissed by competent, and presumably 
independent, experts of international law.25 The Israeli position, moreover, dissents 
with the UN General Assembly and the Security Council.26  
                                                 
25 The main argument, namely that the West Bank was not part of Jordan prior to the 1967 war, while Article 2, paragraph 2 
of the FGC reads: “The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High 
Contracting Party…” is dismissed by Roberts (1992:47) as a “technical error”, since it is the first paragraph that is relevant to 
the discussion.  See also ICJ (1977:34) and Pictet (1958:21). The argument that the FGC is not incorporated into municipal 
Israeli law may or may not be valid in the internal Israeli debate, but it is irrelevant from the point of view of Israel’s fellow 
signatories to the Convention (von Glahn 1996:40). That settlements should be in the interest of the local, Palestinian, 
population is challenged by Playfair (1992:215f), writing, “In the best of cases, an occupier, whose society, culture, and 
values may differ markedly from those of the occupied population, cannot satisfactorily stand in the shoes of the occupied 
population to determine what is in their best interests.” The restrictive reading of Article 49 (6), implying that only 
settlements that are part of a scheme of ethnic cleansing are forbidden, is dismissed by ICJ (1977:35). See also Pictet 
(1958:283f). The voluntary settlement argument is defeated by Roberts (1992:67) writing: “…even if voluntary settlement of 
nationals on an individual basis were permissible under Article 49, the ambitious settlement programme of the 1980s, which 
was planned, encouraged, and financed at the governmental level, does not meet that description... The settlement programme 
is quite simply contrary to international law.”         
 
 
11
 So how do the settlers justify their presence? According to Tysvær (2001:57), the 
discourse of Israeli settlers revolves around two rationales: 
- The Jewish people has a God-given right to the West Bank, since it is part of Torahic Eretz Israel;  
- In order to survive, Jews need a state of their own, and the state of Israel would not be defensible without 
the West Bank.   
 
Settlers in Hebron emphasise the city’s historical and religious import, see their 
presence as divinely willed, and argue that it is a moral duty to retrieve for the Jewish 
people properties that were lost after the 1929 massacre (Røislien 2002; Wilder 2002 
[interview]). Palestinians maintain that records have been kept in order to restore the 
houses to their legitimate, Jewish, owners, but that the present settlers are impostors.27  
 
The grievances of Hebron’s Palestinians with respect to the settlers may be subsumed 
under these categories: 
- They occupy and/or destroy Palestinian houses; 
- They indulge in violence and provocations in order to expel Palestinians; 
- They are the reason for the heavy IDF presence, which further complicates life, partly by illegal orders; 
- They are practically immune to Israeli law enforcement.  
 
Meanwhile, the settlers hold that they only take over originally Jewish homes, and that 
Palestinians are intimidated not to sell (Wilder 2002 [Interview]).  
 
The settlers are generally exempted from curfews, and various sources concur that this 
is the fact whether the preceding unrest was initiated by Palestinians or by Jews, and 
regardless of which side may feel itself entitled to revenge.28  
 
On 25 February 1994, during the coinciding holidays of Purim and Ramadan, Baruch 
Goldstein, an IDF reserves Captain and resident of Kiryat Arba, entered the Abraham 
                                                                                                                                                        
26 See e.g.: UNGA Ress. 3092A (XXVIII) (7 Dec. 1973); 3240B (XXIX) (29 Nov. 1974); 31/106A (1976); 32/5 (28 Oct. 
1977); 35/122 (11 Dec. 1980); 38/79B (15 Dec. 1983); 39/95C (1984); 41/63B (3 Dec. 1986) and UNSCRs 446 (22 Mar. 
1979); 465 (1 Mar. 1980); 471 (5 June 1980); 605 (22 Dec. 1987); 607 (5 Jan. 1988); 904 (18 Mar. 1994); 
27 According to Arnaout (1996), a delegation of Jews whose families had been living in Hebron prior to the 1929 massacre 
met with Mayor Natshe in 1996, expressing a wish to return to Hebron under Palestinian rule. Their spokesman stated that 
the present settlers, did not have ancestors in Hebron, and could not speak in their name. 
28 Confer B’Tselem (1995:8f; 2000:27; 2001a:10;2003h:26); HRW (2001:6f); Levy (2002); PRs V:12;18; VI:16; WS 9:1. 
See also Savir (1999:122) for the Israeli conceptualisation. 
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shrine and shot dead 29 Muslim worshippers. Some 170 persons were wounded 
(Phoenix Gazette, 25 February 1994). Goldstein was himself beaten to death. When 
IDF subsequently attempted to break up a crowd of blood-donors outside a hospital, 
clashes broke out (B’Tselem 1994b:5f). A curfew was imposed and before the end of 
March the Israeli security forces had killed 14 more Hebronites (B’Tselem database). 
This was compounded by closures of the Abraham Shrine, the vegetable market, and 
Shuhada Street, plus unprecedented strictness in the issuance of travel permits.  
TIPH I 
The Declaration of Principles (DOP), signed by Yitzhaq Rabin and Yasser Arafat29 in 
Washington on 13 September 1993 contained provisions for a Palestinian Authority to 
be established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The DOP also endorsed the idea of an 
international presence in the territories during an interim period, to be concluded by a 
Final Status Agreement. However, neither the Palestinian Authority nor the 
International Presence had been installed before Goldstein’s assault. When informed 
of the massacre, Arafat, based in Tunis, declared a suspension of talks until the settlers 
were removed from Hebron (Savir 1998:123). Meanwhile, the UN Security Council 
began drafting Resolution 904, condemning the massacre and calling for a Temporary 
International Presence to be established in the city. Rabin sent secret delegations to 
Tunis and Cairo, and aided by US pressure and Norwegian mediation a compromise 
was reached with the PLO. It included the following components:30  
1) No US veto of Security Council Resolution 904; 
2) Resumption of the talks on a Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip and the city of Jericho; 
3) Immediate establishment of a Palestinian Police Force in Gaza and Jericho; 
4) Re-institution of Mustafa Natshe as Hebron’s mayor; 
5) Allowance of the settlers to stay in Hebron for the time being; 
6) Establishment of a non-UN observer mission  – The Temporary International Presence in the City of 
Hebron (TIPH). 
 
TIPH was to consist of 160 mission members, and to last for three months. Denmark, 
Italy and Norway were asked to contribute, and Norway was given the co-ordinating 
role. On 31 March 1994 Amnon Lipkin-Shahak and Nabil Shaath31 signed the first 
                                                 
29 At the time, Yitzhaq Rabin was Prime Minister of the State of Israel and Yasser Arafat was Chairman of the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). 
30 Points 1 and 4 were informal understandings, while point 6 was implicit within the TIPH Agreement (1994). 
31 At the time, Amnon Lipkin-Shahak was IDF Deputy Chief of Staff, while Nabil Shaath was a member of 
Fatah’s Central Committee, and chief negotiator of the PLO. 
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TIPH Agreement, stating the basic objectives and freedoms of the mission. According 
to the Agreement, the observers were, 
- to provide by their presence a feeling of security to the Palestinians of Hebron; 
- to help promote stability and an appropriate environment conducive to the enhancement of the well-being of 
the Palestinians of Hebron and their economic development; 
- to monitor the efforts to restore the safety of Palestinians and events affecting it and the return to normal life 
in the city of Hebron; and 
- to provide reports as set out in paragraph A.5 below (TIPH I Agreement 1994, Art. 3) 
 
Paragraph A.5 identified three committees to which TIPH were to report. The most 
instrumental of these was the Joint Hebron Committee (JHC), comprising local 
authorities of the two sides and a senior TIPH representative.  
   
The TIPH Agreement was criticised by “rightist” Israelis for compromising on Israel’s 
sovereignty and by Palestinians for lacking clout. In the following weeks, another 
round of negotiations was undertaken with the aim of making the mandate operable. 
Key players in this phase were the three Heads of Contingents, Kjell Johansen of 
Norway, Pietro Pistolese of Italy and Thøger Berg Nielsen of Denmark. They faced 
Brig. Gen. Baruch Spiegel, Head of the IDF Liaisons’ unit in Tel Aviv, and Col. Meir 
Klifi, the Brigade Commander in Hebron. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
was arrived at, regulating the mission’s mode of operations, its internal composition 
and disposition of personnel. The MOU also secured diplomatic immunity for TIPH 
members.  
 
The tenure of TIPH I, 8 May – 8 August 1994 may be described as one of gradual 
improvements for Hebron’s Palestinian citizens, nevertheless falling short of their 
expectations, and interrupted by two crises in which previous gains were lost: 
8 May – 16 May: Positive Changes:  
IDF responded to TIPH wishes, by, inter alia, reducing checkpoints, refraining from 
the use of tear-gas and by allowing the vegetable market to be partly reopened. 
16 May – 13 June: Crisis:  
Provoked by yeshiva students demonstrating outside a mosque just after Friday 
Prayers, Palestinians began throwing stones, and the yeshiva students opened fire. IDF 
intervention led to additional Palestinian injuries. The following night, two Israelis 
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were killed in the settlement of Beit Haggai, south of the city, prompting IDF to 
announce a military area and curfew in entire Hebron. The curfew was eased after 
Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Niels Helveg Petersen, blurted his misgivings to 
the press, but clashes continued, and new restrictions were imposed. Mayor Natshe 
publicly criticised TIPH of ineffectiveness, and IDF infringed on TIPH’s freedom of 
movement, eventually breaking day-to-day liaisons with the mission. 
13 June – 7 July: Improvements:  
IDF re-established daily liaisons with TIPH and began reducing physical obstacles to 
traffic. Decreases were observed in stone-throwing, arrests, settler provocations, the 
use of live fire and injuries. IDF stated its intention to reopen the Abraham Mosque as 
soon as security measures were considered sufficient.   
7 July – 23 July: New Crisis:  
Gunmen attacked a settler family on a road near Hebron, and a 17 year-old girl, Sarit 
Prigal, was fatally wounded. The IDF responded by declaring the city a military zone 
and curfew was levied on Palestinian residents. Settlers stormed through the streets, 
smashing cars, spreading salt in vineyards, stoning- and occasionally firing on houses 
(Keinon 1994; Rodan 1995). The curfew was eased after TIPH petitioning, but the day 
after, a reportedly peaceful Palestinian demonstration was dissolved by IDF using tear 
gas. Clashes continued, and brief curfews were enforced. A TIPH car was torched, 
presumably by a Palestinian.  
23 July – 8 August: De-escalation:  
IDF closed the city to Palestinians from surrounding villages. Gradually the clashes 
waned. IDF refrained from the use of tear gas and firearms in clashes, and made fewer 
arrests (WS 12:1).   
    
While the TIPH Agreement opened for a prolongation of the mandate if agreed, no 
real effort was made by the Palestinian side until after the expiration date, and the 
TIPH leadership did not launch their own initiative. In November 1994, the Abraham 
Shrine was reopened, albeit with separate days of worship for Muslims and Jews. 
During the following months of negotiations, Hebron remained a source of 
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controversy, the Palestinian side insisting on sovereignty, and the Israeli side denying 
it. Eventually, the Interim Agreement, signed 28 September 1995, gave each side 
responsibility for security in parts of the city, the Palestinian National Authority 
(PNA) controlling the Western 80%, with IDF remaining in the Eastern fringe and in a 
salient into the city centre. The zones were named H-1 and H-2 respectively. Apart 
from security responsibility, the city was to remain united.  
TIPH II 
The target date for IDF redeployment to positions outside H-1 was set to 28 March 
1996. Redeployment was, however, disrupted by a series of events that had a 
detrimental effect on the peace process, eventually leading to early elections and 
replacement of Israel’s Labour-dominated Government with a rightist coalition critical 
of the “Oslo process”. The incumbent Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, postponed 
redeployment till after the elections, but invited a second TIPH mission signalling 
commitment to the Interim Agreement. In addition to the tasks of the first TIPH, TIPH 
II was to prepare for a new mission to be established upon redeployment (TIPH 
Agreement 1996, Art. 1;4). However, when Peres lost the elections on 29 May 1996, 
he left the decision on redeployment to his successor, Benyamin Netanyahu. 
 
TIPH II began operating on 14 May 1996, initially with only 30 mission members, all 
of whom were Norwegian citizens. Its tenure was characterised by, 
- “Soft” policies on the part of Israeli security forces, reflecting Government wishes to de-escalate;32 
- A predominance of non-violent strategies in Palestinian activism; 
- An increase in settler activism, violent and non-violent. 
 
During the second half of 1996, Hebron rose to the top of the agenda in Israeli-
Palestinian talks, and under heavy international pressure, Netanyahu conceded to 
redeployment. In the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, signed 15 
                                                 
32 On the night of 25 September 1996, Israeli engineers blasted open an archaeological tunnel near the Temple 
Mount/al-Haram ash-Sharīf. The move provoked massive Palestinian protest, since it unilaterally changed the 
delicate status quo of the area, and was interpreted as an attempt to undermine the Al-Aqsa Mosque (Shlaim 
2001:576f). In three days of clashes throughout the Palestinian territories, 15 Israeli soldiers and 80 Palestinians 
lost their lives. In Hebron, however, none were killed, although 54 Palestinians were wounded on 26 September, 
a day of General Strike. In October, Druze Border Policemen, who spoke Arabic fluently, were deployed in the 
city, partly replacing IDF, and ordered to avoid antagonising or provoking postures (Zananiri 1996).     
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January 1997,33 the terms of the Interim Agreement were repeated and slightly 
expanded, including reopening of the vegetable market and Shuhada Street (Hebron 
Protocol, Art. 7.b). The parties also committed themselves to the unity of Hebron, the 
free flow of people, goods and vehicles and to the preservation of Hebron’s historic 
character (Hebron Protocol, Art. 9; 11.a).    
TIPH III 
On 21 January 1997, Eytan Bentsur and Saeb Erakat34 signed the third TIPH 
Agreement. It provided for a new TIPH, consisting of 180 members from Denmark, 
Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey. Again, the largest contributor, 
Norway, was to co-ordinate the mission. The mandate was, essentially, a replica of the 
first TIPH with its dual formula for enhancing the feeling of security among Hebron’s 
Palestinians, i.e.: 
- Observation and reports; 
- Economic development. 
 
However, the new mandate was adapted to the firmer co-operative framework that had 
been envisaged in the Interim Agreement. Thus, a TIPH representative was to be 
stationed at the District Co-ordination Office (DCO), reports were to be sent to the 
Monitoring and Steering Committee (MSC), and the Joint Hebron Committee (JHC) 
was to consist of security officers of both sides.  
 
The main topics on JHC’s agenda during TIPH III have been, 
 
Closures: Of the city, or of specific streets. Particularly Shuhada Street and the wholesale vegetable market have 
been frequently discussed. 
Conduct of individual soldiers: Two scenarios frequently referred to in connection with misconduct are: IDF 
observation posts on roofs of Palestinian homes and ID Checks; 
Construction/Rehabilitation: In addition to the material consequences of construction on security (tall houses 
make strategic positions), this issue is imbued with all the symbolism of presence. 
Curfews: According to Palestinian representatives, curfews constitute collective punishment. TIPH has 
sometimes supported this view, while at other times merely presented it as the Palestinian view. IDF has argued 
that curfews are necessary security measures. 
Violence: Committed by civilians of both sides, by Israeli security forces, and, according to IDF,  by the 
Palestinian Police Forces (PPF). 
Failures in law enforcement: TIPH has criticised IDF for connivance with settler violence, vandalism and 
threats. But TIPH has also criticised PPF when failing to intervene against Palestinian rioters (PR V:16). 
                                                 
33 Although several sources concur that the Protocol was signed on 15 January 1997, it is dated 17 January. 
34 At the time, Saeb Erakat was Minister of Local Government to the Palestinian National Authority, while Eytan 
Bentsur was Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA). 
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The tenure of TIPH III could roughly be summarised into five phases: 
January 1997 - March 1997: Calm:  
After the IDF redeployment, Hebron’s citizens enjoyed a brief period of lull.   
March 1997 – December 1998: Unrest:  
In mid-March 1997, Netanyahu initiated a new settlement project south of Jerusalem 
(Har Homa/Jabal Abu Ghnaym). Clashes broke out in several Palestinian cities, 
including Hebron. Another wave of protests erupted in reaction to soldiers killing a 
Palestinian boy in Hebron on 1 April 1997. Contentions remained high over a 
reconstruction project in Shuhada Street, forcing the settlers of Tel Rumeida to pass 
through parts of H-1. Other triggers of unrest were, a caricature depicting the Prophet 
Muhammad as a pig, posted on the doors of Palestinian-owned houses; settler marches 
through Palestinian neighbourhoods; attacks by vigilantes of both sides, including the 
killing of a Rabbi, and; bombings by British and American forces of Iraq.   
January 1999 – September 2000: De-escalation:  
This period was characterised by fewer Palestinian protests, fewer injuries, and Israeli 
openings of roads, including Shuhada Street. Also the MSC began functioning. On the 
other hand, there were a few tough clashes, settler activism remained palpable, and 
detentions of Palestinians on checkpoints remained fairly common (PR VI:19; VII:14).  
September 2000 – February 2003: The Second (Al-Aqsa) Intifada:  
Major Palestinian protests broke out after a visit by MK Ariel Sharon35 to the Temple 
Mount/Haram al-Sharif on 28 September 2000. The clashes, which must also be seen 
on the background of failed Final Status-negotiations at Camp David during July 
2000, quickly spread to Hebron. Initially the Intifada was a mass mobilisation of the 
Palestinian populace using low-level violence against IDF positions. Over time it 
turned into a guerrilla war with a small number of fighters using lethal violence – even 
against settler children. IDF responded with a closure of Hebron and with a lingering 
curfew in H-2, only interrupted by brief and irregular recesses, allowing the citizens to 
                                                 
35 Ariel Sharon is widely viewed as a war criminal among Palestinians. The most serious charges relate to his 
alleged involvement in the planning of massacres of Palestinian refugees in the camps of Sabra and Shatila, on 
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re-supply, but not to work. There have been numerous killings and injuries of 
Palestinian non-combatants, including children, who were for long periods disallowed 
from attending school. In December 2000, the telephones of most H-2 residents went 
silent and in February 2001, water supply was temporarily disrupted - reportedly only 
in Palestinian quarters (HRW 2001:55; Pacheco 2001:196). Settlers avenged attacks 
by bulldozing and burning random Palestinian houses, often protected by IDF and 
Police officers (B’tselem 2001b:6ff). IDF launched raids into H-1, which was also for 
shorter periods put under curfew. Israeli-Palestinian co-operative organs ceased to 
function, and in August 2001, Israeli officers accused TIPH of spying for Fatah. In 
February 2002, violence escalated. Palestinian militia launched several attacks against 
IDF positions, inter alia from around the TIPH Headquarters (author’s observation). 
Israeli rifle-fire hit the TIPH HQ, which was also shaken by the impact of a grenade on 
a near-by building. A modern hospital in Northern Hebron was shelled. The severest 
blow to TIPH was dealt on 26 March, when Catherine Berruex and Türgüt Cengiz 
Töytünc were killed by an assailant wearing PPF uniform.36 In April 2002, IDF briefly 
reoccupied H-1, and returned in June, blowing up the PPF HQ. The Israeli forces 
withdrew to an expanded H-2 in October, whereupon guerrillas launched a series of 
attacks in Hebron and against settlements in its vicinity. On 15 November, al-Jihad 
killed 12 Israeli soldiers and security guards, including the Hebron Brigade 
Commander, Dror Weinberg. IDF sealed and demolished houses associated with the 
attacks, uprooted olive groves, and evicted remaining Palestinians from the DCO 
(Aftenposten, 16 November 2002; Huggler 2002; Keller 2002).37       
                                                                                                                                                        
16-17 September 1982. (Sharon was Minister of Defence during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and had to 
resign his portfolio as a result of the Kahan Commission inquiry). 
36 Töytünc was serving as TIPH Deputy Head of Operations and Berruex was serving as observer. Also observer Hüsseyin 
Özarslan was injured in the attack, which took place just north of Hebron while the mission members were off duty. (For 
more information, see Aftenposten, 27 March 2002; TIPH Press Release, 2 April 2002). On 21 September 2003, Safwān 
Awīwi was sentenced to two life-time imprisonments (and more) for participation in the killing by the Military Court in Ofer. 
Two other suspects, Yūsuf Basharā’ and Dhiāb Shawīki had previously been killed. The three were allegedly al-Jihad 
affiliates. TIPH has followed the court hearings and has no opinion on the conviction (Indreberg 2004 [interview]).   
37 Demolishing of houses is permitted as a defensive act, but not as a retaliatory act (HR 1907, Arts. 25; 50; FGC 
1949, Art 33;53). It seems clear that houses were demolished, not during the fighting, but afterwards 
(Aftenposten 16 November 2002; Keller 2002). Moreover, the association of the houses to the attacks, remains 
spurious.  According to Keller (2002), homes were blown up “apparently without any inquiry as to whether or 
not their inhabitants had in any way been implicated…” When asked about whether the family of one the houses 
demolished had anything to do with the attack, Noam Tibon, the Hebron Commander in charge, replied: “Yes 
and no… This is an ugly war. Sometimes both sides take steps… which are really tough” (Huggler 2002). 
Urquhardt (2002) gives a slightly different version: “Nobody is innocent here. If you saw the bodies lined up last 
night, you would know that this is an ugly war.” 
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March 2003 – April 2004: Uncertainty: 
As the Al-Aqsa intifada was coming under criticism from influential Palestinians, 
Arafat was pressured by the USA to delegate powers to a Prime Minister. In June 
2003, the new Premier, Mahmoud Abbas, began working to unite factions in a cease-
fire vis-à-vis Israel. However, three months later, Abbas resigned, partly due to 
Arafat’s unwillingness to transfer powers over Palestinian security agencies, partly due 
to the Sharon government’s continued policy of assassination of alleged Palestinian 
terrorists. Ahmad Qurei became the new Palestinian Premier, and the period of official 
high-level contact came to a halt. 
 
Meanwhile, tensions in Hebron gradually fell. On 25 March 2003 IDF eased the 
curfew during daytime, and since then, curfew has been the exception rather than the 
rule (CPT [Internet site]). However, attacks on Israeli soldiers and settlers occurred, 
followed by sweeping IDF arrests inside H-1, and often, targeted operations in which 
several Palestinian militants were killed. On 21 June 2002, Abdullah Kawasme, the 
presumed West Bank leader of al-Qassam Brigades38 and a central recruiter of suicide 
bombers was killed by Israeli forces (Newsweek 2003;Yahoo! News 22 June 2003).    
 
In the autumn of 2003, TIPH expanded its humanitarian programs and began escorting 
teachers and pupils to school during curfew. While the IDF allowed this, HOM 
Kristensen reported a 60 percent rise in settler attacks on TIPH personnel during July-
December 2003 (Regular 2004). In a controversial interview following his resignation, 
Kristensen was cites as, 
“The activities of the settlers and the army in the H-2 area of Hebron is creating an irreversible situation. In a 
sense, cleansing is being carried out. In other words, if the situation continues for another few years, the result 
will be that no Palestinians will remain there. It is a miracle they have managed to remain there until now” 
(Regular 2004). 
 
Since 5 February 2004, TIPH has been headed by Maj. Gen. Tryggve Tellefsen.  
 
During its operations, TIPH has gone through major organisational restructuring, 
reducing its divisions from 5 to 3, and its size from ca. 140 to 68 mission members. 
                                                 
38 The al-Qassam Brigades constitute the armed wing of Hamas. 
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Chapter III: The Rationale for Peacekeeping 
 
This chapter reviews the concept of peacekeeping and its theoretical basis. The aim is 
to present theory relevant to the discussion on TIPH’s effect, undertaken in chapter 6. 
Peacekeeping is defined, and the vocabulary that goes with it is introduced. Secondly, 
peacekeeping is reviewed in light of two meta theories of social science. Thirdly, the 
relevance of the theoretical paradigm to the functions of TIPH is laid out.  
Definitions and Variations 
Various definitions of peacekeeping exist, and the term has been applied to quite 
disparate missions.39 Initially, peacekeeping would be associated with Chapter VI of 
the UN Charter, titled Peaceful Resolution to Conflict. Central is the clause,  
The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute… recommend appropriate procedures or methods of 
adjustment (UN Charter 1945, Art. 36 (my emphasis)). 
  
However, non-UN actors have also undertaken missions that would generally be 
defined as peacekeeping. Moreover, basing a definition on criteria such as intent, size, 
and armament is problematic, as the former tends to be too inclusive, and the latter 
two, too exclusive. I here apply the following definition:  
 
Peacekeepers are personnel deployed in a conflict situation, mandated to reduce its inherent violence, and 
meeting these criteria: 
- They are operating with the formal consent of the parties to the conflict;  
- They are operating without enforcement powers; 
- They are employed by (ideally) disinterested state or super-state actors. 
 
 
All these criteria are interpretable, and since the end of the Cold War, there has been 
substantive disagreement over the precise content of terms such as consent and non-
enforcement (Stedman 1996). The diverse application of key concepts is compounded 
by various, partly overlapping, categorising schemes:  
 
Dimensions: Missions mandated only to observe a demilitarised zone or a cease-fire, 
are termed Unidimensional. Missions that are in one way or another meant to 
contribute to the rehabilitation of post-conflict societies are termed Multidimensional.40  
                                                 
39 See Fetherston (1994:124ff ) for a wide range of definitions. 
40 Common tasks of multidimensional missions are cantonment, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of soldiers (a 
so-called ‘DDR-process’), election assistance and -monitoring, education, humanitarian aid, police functions, Human Rights’ 
promotion, protection and repatriation of refugees, de-mining assistance, etc. (Stedman 1996:37;39). 
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Generations: Since recent mandates are generally more elaborate than older ones, 
First Generation Missions largely equal Unidimensional ones, and Second Generation 
Missions are Multidimensional.41  
 
Degree of Enforcement: Peacekeeping is often juxtaposed to Enforcement. The former 
has its legal basis in Chapter VI of the UN Charter (1945), under which use of force 
has been restricted to self-defence. Enforcement is authorised under Chapter VII, 
which permits the use of force to create peace. Some analysts have argued that a grey 
area exists between these stereotypes, and argue that grey area operations should be 
recognised as a separate and useful kind of third party intervention, conceived of as 
peace enforcement, or muscular peacekeeping (Daniel 1996, see also Heiberg 1991).42
 
Form of Third Party Involvement: Peacekeeping is often contrasted with peacemaking 
and peacebuilding. Of these, peacemaking has been demarcated as, 
 “the negotiation for agreements on disputes, whereas peacekeeping is the implementation of those agreements” 
(Goulding, cited in Fetherston 1994:130).  
 
Peacebuilding has been defined as, 
 “rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; building bonds of peaceful 
mutual benefit among nations formally at war” (Boutros-Ghali 1992:8, cited in Fetherston 1994:132). 
 
Thus, peacebuilding refers to all facets of multidimensional peacekeeping that go 
beyond the traditional tasks of separating forces and observing cease-fires. 
 
Size/function: Some commentators distinguish between Force-level Missions and 
Observer Missions, the former referring to inter-positioning of 3,000 to 20,000 
peacekeepers between fighting forces, and the latter to smaller missions, often ca. 100 
observers, and not above 1,000 (Fetherston 1994:12;240; Heiberg 1991:18). 
 
Contributing States/national manuals: Stedman (1996) distinguishes between Nordic-, 
British-, American- and French peacekeeping.43   
                                                 
41 Doyle et al. (1997:3) refer to a “third generation,” which has supposedly been used of enforcement missions.   
42 Others use Peace Enforcement and Enforcement interchangeably (e.g.: Dobbie 1994; Stedman 1996). 
43 Stedman’s models are based on military manuals. The various actors differ in their view on equipment, understanding of 
consent, and the prescription of force. Nordic peacekeeping is most conservative, while the French doctrine is the most 
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It should be noted that unidimensional and multidimensional peacekeeping missions 
correspond to different concepts of peace, i.e.: negative peace and positive peace, 
respectively. Negative peace is conceived of as the absence of war (Fetherston 
1994:93). Positive peace was defined by Galtung (1975:29) to mean, a pattern of 
cooperation and integration between major human groups. In this view, peace is 
something more than non-war, namely the generation and strengthening of positive 
images within a society, enhancing friendship, interdependence, tolerance, respect etc. 
According to Fetherston (1994:94),  
“… positive peace represents not an end-point, but a set of structures which facilitate constructive resolution of 
conflict and positive human development. In this sense, positive peace is a process or a ‘means’ rather than an 
end” (Fetherston 1994:94).  
Theoretical Foundations of Peacekeeping 
Since the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping has risen to pre-eminence among means 
of conflict amelioration.44 The popularity of this instrument would seem justified by 
Walter’s assertion that,  
Almost every peace treaty that did successfully end civil wars over the last fifty years succeeded with the help of 
outside peacekeepers (Walter 1999:3). 
 
Several commentators have noted the discrepancy between the popularity of 
peacekeeping as a tool, and its poverty in theoretical elaboration.45 While that critique 
stands, there has always been implicit theory in the doctrine of peacekeeping. Already 
in 1956, Dag Hammarskjöld and Lester Pearson46 formulated five principles of 
peacekeeping, indicative of a coherent and comprehensive analysis of the causes of 
war and the potential for peaceful intervention. The principles were,47
1) Consent: The parties to the dispute must agree to the establishment of the peacekeeping mission. 
2) Non-use of force: The peacekeepers shall not use force, except in strict self-defence. 
3) Neutrality: Peacekeepers shall be drawn from non-aligned states, the more states the better, and the smaller 
states the better. 
4) Impartiality and Non-Intervention: Peacekeepers shall not engage on any side in the conflict, and shall 
refrain from acts that may be seen by any party as taking sides. 
5) Secretary-General responsibility: The UN Secretary-General shall have day-to-day control of Peacekeeping 
operations. 
                                                                                                                                                        
radical one, as it explicitly redefines the traditional dichotomy of Peacekeeping/Peace enforcement into a trichotomy, i.e.: 
Peacekeeping, Peace restoration and Peace enforcement. The latter two differ only in one respect: Peace enforcement is 
reserved for situations where one party is designated the aggressor, and must be defeated militarily (Stedman 1996, esp. 
46ff). 
44 The UN fielded five more peacekeeping missions between 1989 and 1994 than it had done in its previous forty-three year 
history (Fetherston 1994:xvi). Also CSCE, ECOWAS, NATO, Britain, France and the USA have contributed peacekeeping 
missions since the early 1990’es.  
45 See for example, Diehl et. al. (1998); Fetherston (1994:22;42f). 
46 Hammarskjöld was UN Secretary-General from 1953-1961. Pearson was a Canadian diplomat. 
47 Source: Fetherston (1994:13). 
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 The principal mechanism of classic peacekeeping is separation of forces. Thus, the 
basic theory of peacekeeping could be construed as:  
Figure 1: Principal Mechanism of First Generation Peacekeeping 
                                    _ 
 
Number of conflict-related deaths Distance between fighting forces 
The role of peacekeepers is to verify that separation of forces does take place, and that 
no party gains tactically from the other’s compliance. An absolute prerequisite for de-
escalation, is the parties’ confidence in the peacekeepers’ abilities and attitudes in this 
regard. Peacekeepers can scarcely display positive attitudes towards one party without 
provoking suspicion from the other, hence the principle of impartiality.  
 
Equally logically, one may derive from the principle of neutrality an understanding 
that perceived threats to super-power interests are likely to exacerbate conflicts.  
 
The principle of non-use of force would seem to imply an understanding that violence 
begets violence. It is perhaps paradoxical then, that, peacekeepers have most often 
been armed. The logic would be that weapons have their utility short of actual usage, 
in the sense that a display of force may render the actual use of force unnecessary 
(Stedman 1996:42).  
 
The principle of Consent demonstrates that genuine bi-partisan consent to a 
compromise involving peacekeepers is presumed possible. The implication is, that all 
warring parties may favour settlement to continued fighting and yet be unable to reach 
it – simply out of fear of being double-crossed. In other words, all warring parties 
could be motivated merely by security concerns - not predatory ones, which means that 
predation is not a necessary condition for war (Snyder and Jarvis 1999:19f).48  
   
                                                 
48 This line of thinking resonates well with what was later termed the security dilemma, i.e.: the choice of actors between 
arming themselves, thereby propelling others to arm, and; staying defenceless.  
While the notion that structural, not individual, factors, bedevil inter-actor relations is uncontroversial, it is more problematic 
to assume that peacekeeping would provide an answer to the security dilemma.  
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Finally, Secretary-General supervision could mean at least two things: Legitimacy to 
the peace process through world-wide sanction. And secondly, a boost to the claim of 
impartiality. Ergo, the status of the mission is expected to correlate positively with its 
chances of success.  
 
With regard to the soundness of the theory so far reconstructed, these questions are 
among the foremost:  
- Does peacekeeping without enforcement offer a credible solution to the security dilemma?  
- Is it really so, that violence begets violence, or is it more correct to say that violence may at times be 
necessary to avert more violence? In other words, is the relationship between use of force and number of 
killings positively linear, or parabolic? 
- Is it really so, that peacekeepers contribute something of their own to a settlement, given that the parties 
have already agreed to the settlement, and the peacekeepers have no mandate to enforce it?49  
 
As for questions relating to the elaborateness of the theory, these are critical: 
- How does one define success of a peacekeeping mission? Is it enough to “freeze” the conflict, i.e.: preserve 
status quo, or should peacekeepers aim to solve the underlying causes of conflict, which would often mean 
changing the status quo? What if such attempts are likely to destabilise the precarious temporary balance?  
- Precisely what does impartiality mean? What is the proper reaction to one-sided breaches of a settlement? 
Should reactions be clarified in advance in order to induce the parties to abide by the terms? 
 
All these questions link up to one fundamental theme: the trade-off between justice 
and peace. Should brutal warlords be induced by power-sharing arrangements, or 
should they be isolated or fought by the international community? Should compromise 
be sought at the expense of international law? While ambiguity in these matters would 
seem conducive to the establishment of peacekeeping missions, it leaves the 
peacekeepers in the field without guidance when addressing specific, local, issues. 
Within TIPH there has been tensions between idealists and realists as to the approach 
to Israeli settlements, considered illegal by the international community, but remaining 
under the security responsibility of Israel according to the Oslo Agreements.  
Peacekeeping Theory in a Wider Perspective 
Theories of violence generally incline towards one out of two philosophical schools 
(Morgenthau, 1993:3). The first, which I shall refer to as Humanism,50 postulates that 
                                                 
49 As we have seen, there is a correlation between the deployment of peacekeepers and the success of peace settlements 
(Walter 1999:3). The question is whether the link is causal or spurious? Critics of peacekeeping could argue that it is not the 
peacekeepers themselves that create peace, but that situations, in which the parties are already striving for peace are more 
likely to allow for peacekeepers. This argument is not foiled by the notion that settlements involving peacekeepers sometimes 
fail, since peacekeepers could also be accepted in situations where the parties do not have benign intents, albeit more rarely. 
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man is essentially a peaceful creature. In this perspective, violence is seen as 
pathological, and brutal acts are explained by inner or outer disturbances of the 
subject, typically adding up frustrating conditions, until the “glass overflows” 
(Dessler, 1994; Fetherston 1994:99f; Smelser, 1962:253). In other words, the 
individual is caused to be violent, rather than choosing it.  
 
The other perspective was coined by Morgenthau (1993) as political realism. Realism 
is today widely associated with International Relations, but it was originally construed 
at the level of the individual (Hobbes 1904:81ff). Realism treats violence not as 
pathological - but logical. Man is conceived of as an egoistic and rational actor, 
characterised by ability to rank his interests, to choose, and to pursue his own 
happiness by all means. He is operating in an anarchic world of limited resources, 
where actors can trust no-one and must either seek power or perish. Thus, it is not 
violence that riddles realism, but peace, and explanations of it will typically focus on 
the balance of power (Morgenthau 1993:183ff). Intentional, not causal explanations 
are characteristic of this perspective. Man will do what he pleases unless deterred. 
 
Thus, man as a rational actor would be pro-active, future-oriented, calculating, and 
communicating through his actions. Man as a subject would be, re-active, past-
oriented, passionate, and not consciously sending messages through his acts. 
 
The fundamental question of debate is how to confront violence? While counter-force 
may be a necessary short-term solution within both these perspectives, the long-term 
effects of such counter-force are viewed in radically different ways: According to the 
realist-rationalist perspective, countering is essential in order to “send a message” that 
one “will not give in to threats/force/terror”. If one fails to react forcefully, or worse, 
yields to threats, the other will be encouraged to pursue violence again. On the other 
hand, the humanist-emotionalist perspective holds that the only long-term solution to 
                                                                                                                                                        
50 The Humanist school is sometimes referred to as The Liberal school or Liberalism (Morgenthau 1993). However, Liberal 
is a term of liberal application. For this reason, and because Liberalism is sometimes treated as an alternative to Peace 
research, while I am clearly including Peace research in the tradition to which I am referring, I prefer the term Humanism. 
(Peace research and the Liberal school share a conception of man as essentially noble, but with a capacity for destruction). 
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violence goes through defusing the rage of the opponent through concessions. Meeting 
force with counter-force will only intensify the other’s feelings of injustice/loss.      
 
Both the realist and the humanist perspective have been challenged on a wide range of 
normative and factual grounds. Realism has been criticised for:  
- Difficulties in explaining apparently irrational collective behaviour; 
- Difficulties in explaining apparently irrational individual behaviour; 
- Wrongly assuming that actors are utility-maximising rather than satisficing; 
- Difficulties in explaining the constitution of collectives in strictly rationalist terms; 
- A tendency of creating the reality it purports to describe (i.e.: if people see themselves as operating within 
an anarchical self-help system, they will act as if they were, thereby creating one). 
 
With regard to difficulties in explaining irrational collective behaviour, that challenge 
has been convincingly overcome by various writers. Before looking at some examples, 
it should be noted that, what the reader may associate with “collective irrationality” is 
perhaps the opposite of what theorists do. For example, looting mobs are popularly 
analysed in terms of mass psychosis. Meanwhile, theorists of the rationalist school 
would emphasise that looting in a gang is rational to the individual and the group.  
 
Mancur Olsson (1971) has shown that collective irrationality is in fact a direct result of individual rationality (!) 
The larger the group, the less likely its individuals are to contribute to the common good - if they are rational. 
After Olsson, what needs to be explained of large groups is not collective irrationality, but collective rationality. 
Game theorists have construed a scenario called the prisoners’ dilemma (see below), in which a collectively 
sub-optimal outcome is a direct result of individual rationality in just two actors. Sub-optimal outcomes may also 
come as a result of lacking information about other actors’ preferences, although the preference structures 
themselves may be conducive to the common good (see below).      
 
As for apparent individual irrationality, theorists have come a long way towards 
defusing that charge as well: 
Roger Putnam (1988) and George Tsebelis (1990) have shown that apparently irrational choices could be made 
in one game, because they are intended to affect another game in which the actor is simultaneously engaged.  
Saadia Touval (2000) has argued that multiple power asymmetries involving actors that are not direct parties to 
a dispute may interfere with the negotiating power of the direct parties. Thus, a seemingly weak negotiating 
party may obtain leverage through a third party, over which it yields influence, and fare better than one might 
expect, if one took only the principal parties to the dispute into account. 
  
Still, there are phenomena that resist categorisation as rational in the broad sense of 
the word (Elster 1983). Examples could be desecration, purposeless violence, suicide 
missions, anonymous gifts and care for one’s legacy after death.  
 
The phenomenon of satisficing actors has been integrated into international relations 
theory in terms of “bounded rationality,” but has according to Keohane (1984:112) not 
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been convincingly addressed by realists. Much has been written on the constitution of 
collectives, but mainly by adherents to critical theory with an edge against realism.  
 
The humanist perspective is an enormous conglomerate of approaches. Some principal 
concepts linked to the genesis of violence are, fear, frustration, imitation, norms and 
honour/shame. According to the former, violence is caused by fear in an instinctive, 
not calculated way, and comes about when physical factors rule out another instinct: 
escape (Mackal 1979:9f). Contributions focusing on frustration, see violence as a 
result of inability to satisfy basic needs or to better ones situation as much as expected 
– alternatively, as much as others (Burton 1990; Hernes and Knutsen 1992). The 
imitation thesis holds that subjects witnessing or suffering violence will come to adopt 
it themselves (Adorno et al. 1950; Mitchell 1989:25ff). Theorists focusing on norms 
argue that subjects will internalise the hegemonic discourse of their societies, and act 
largely in correspondence with them (Foucault 2001; Elster 1986:22ff). Finally, 
honour/shame theorists come close to Realism in the sense that they conceive of a 
competition for status (Bourdieu 1990; Horowitz 1985).51 But whereas realists find the 
root of conflict in material sources of pleasure, honour/shame theorists focus on the 
social sources of pleasure, such as recognition, respect and charismatic power.  
 
The question of whether material or social conditions lie at the heart of conflict is 
consequential - because material capital is finite, whereas social capital is probably not 
(Fetherston 1994:101ff). Where the realist perspective regards conflicts as essentially 
zero-sum and objective, humanists tend to view them as variable-sum and subjective. 
Thus, end to conflict is differently understood – the realist approach typically 
proscribes a compromise settlement, often implying separation, while humanists 
                                                 
51 The reader might find competition irreconcilable with a causal framework, since competition would be directed towards 
some end state, implying intentionality. Bourdieu (1990:11) uses the parable of a tennis-player to illustrate the concept of 
habitus, essential to non-intentional utility maximisation. The tennis-player’s movements and strikes would seem rational, 
but they are in fact quite automatic, based on a prior programming of the body, and not on a calculus of utility in each case. 
Readers familiar with Bourdieu’s theoretical universe may place him as the synthesiser of historicism and voluntarism, rather 
than a proponent of the former. Others might balk at the use of Bourdieu to analyse violent, societal conflict, since he would 
mainly be concerned with symbolic violence at the individual level. One may also object to the placing of Horowitz in the 
Humanist perspective. Personally, I believe the two combine splendidly, and offer a distinct analytic framework of great 
interest.       
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typically advocate resolution through integration and changed perceptions (there is no 
conflict unless individuals see themselves as enemies) (Fetherston 1994:104ff).      
 
These are some of the challenges to the humanist/causal perspective: 
Predictability: While the level of violence within societies has been shown to correlate stochastically with 
socio-economic factors, tolerance with the level of education, etc., it has not been possible to establish 
determinative models of violence. It is simply hard to get by individual choice.   
Apparently widespread rational behaviour: There are plentiful examples of actors that appear to have 
behaved rationally moderate under extreme stress and deprivation.  
Moral dissolution: Ultimately, the humanist perspective implies that the individual is not responsible for his/her 
own acts. This attitude could be seen as a threat to human society (Walter 1999:2). 
  
While the normative critique largely stands, Pierre Bourdieu (1990) has come a long 
way towards explaining ostensibly rational behaviour. After conceptualising a habitus, 
defined as instinct + experience written into the body, Bourdieu argues that actors may 
appear to respond rationally to new impulses/challenges, while they are in fact 
automatically implementing a program of response ingrained through prior experience.   
 
Realising that conflicts are prone to have objective as well as subjective elements, 
some analysts have sought to combine the perspectives. Dessler (1994:104f) has 
categorised the causes of conflict by four: 
Triggers: events or outcomes that cause one action to become the most favoured alternative in someone’s 
feasible set. 
Targets: a social actor’s objective, aim or goal. 
Channels: Lines of political, social, economic or national cleavage. 
Catalysts: Any factor that controls the rate or intensity and the duration of conflict, once initiated. 
 
Not being explicit, Dessler would seem to place peacekeepers in the latter category. 
 
Drawing on Galtung (1969), C.R. Mitchell (1989:18) has presented a three-
dimensional model of conflict: 
     Situation 
 
 
 
 
 
              Behaviour   Attitudes 
 
Somewhat simplified, the conflict situation corresponds to what realists see as 
objective/structural causes of conflict. But according to Mitchell, conflict is more than 
structure, and the social component is separated into attitudes and behaviour. The 
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model is instructive in showing that conflicts may develop from one point to another 
and that there is a potential for misinterpretation of the underlying causes in each case. 
Attempts at solving conflicts will fail, unless they are calibrated to the current nature 
of the conflict. According to Mitchell, material conflicts may be solved through 
compromise, but that is infeasible in so-called value conflicts (Mitchell 1989:35ff). 
 
Based on a quantitative analysis of country-years in the period 1816-1992, Hegre et al. 
(2000), show the relationship between repressiveness of regime and probability of civil 
war to be a curvilinear one. Freedom and extreme repression both produce stability, 
whereas moderate grievances coupled with moderate opportunity is volatile. 
 
Figure VI: Relationship between repression and probability of civil war, according to Hegre et al. (2000): 
           (y) probability of civil war  
 
 
 
 extreme grievance/extreme control               (x) degree of repression               no grievance/no control 
Surprisingly, actors appear utility-maximising under pressure – and satisficing at 
leisure. The first point contradicts humanism; the second contradicts realism. 
The Role of Peacekeepers within the Realist Perspective 
Initially, the realist perspective would seem to offer little room for peacekeeping. That 
is because realism assumes power to be the prime mechanism of interaction, and 
peacekeepers, by definition, do not project power. However, game theory, which, like 
realism presumes rational unitary actors, leaves a few niches for peacekeepers:  
 
The prisoners’ dilemma is commonly used as an introduction to game theory. The 
name of the game alludes a scenario where two suspects are held in separate cells. 
They have previously agreed on a cover story, and the police have only got enough 
evidence to give them a light sentence. However, the police offer the following choice:  
- Incriminate your comrade, and serve an even lighter sentence, or; 
- Do not inform us, and take all the blame if your comrade chooses to tell.  
 
In this situation, there are four possible outcomes: 
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Table 1: Individual and Collective Payoffs in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
Value of outcome to actor Outcomes: 
Prisoner A Prisoner B 
Sum of values 
Both stick to the story 3 3 6 
Prisoner A tells on prisoner B 4 1 5 
Prisoner B tells on prisoner A 1 4 5 
Both tell on each other 2 2 4 
 
From the collective point of view, it would be rational if both stuck to the story. 
However, each prisoner has a double incentive to “cheat”, because whatever the one 
does, the other would gain from telling. (If both tell on each other, no-one is the 
sucker). As a result, both prisoners give away evidence without which they could not 
have been sentenced so hard. The standard form of the game, given below, visualises 
the considerations of each actor. Arrows indicate the comparisons of values of 
hypothetical outcomes that the actors make, and point to the individually preferred 
outcome. As shown, mutual defection is the outcome to which arrows of both actors 
point. In Game Theory, such an outcome is denoted a Nash-equilibrium, and if there is 
only one, this is the predicted outcome of the game. 
 
Table 2: Standard Matrix of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
Prisoner A Game 1: The 
Prisoners’ 
dilemma 
Co-operate 
(C) 
Defect  (D)
Co-operate   
            (C) 
             3 
  3 
               4 
  1 
Pr
iso
ne
r 
B 
Defect    
            (D) 
             1 
  4 
               2 
  2 
 
The prisoners’ dilemma, implies the following preference structure in actors:  
 
unilateral defection (D-C) >mutual co-operation (C-C) > non-co-operation (D-D) > unilateral co-operation (C-D) 
 
Since Game Theory in general does not postulate any prior agreement between the 
parties, I shall in the following generalise the categories of Co-operation and 
Defection somewhat: From here on,  
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C will stand for: conciliatory strategy (between the two actors of the game) and; 
D will stand for defiant strategy. 
 
The preference structure of the Prisoners’ dilemma may be transferred to international 
relations. If applied to Hebron, it would mean that both actors (the Israelis and the 
Palestinians respectively) would be better off if they co-operated than if they fought, 
and yet, they both have a double incentive to “cheat”, i.e.: seek gains unilaterally. 
Notably, in a Prisoners’ dilemma, knowledge about the other actor’s preference 
structure will not have a pacifying impact on one’s own choice of strategy.  If actor A 
knew, that actor B would co-operate, his incentive to cheat would only be greater. 
 
There are other plausible preference structures, though. For example, actors may prefer 
mutual co-operation to unilateral defection/defiance, making:  
Mutual conciliation  > Unilateral defiance > Mutual defiance > Unilateral conciliation. 
 
The typical situation would be one in which the benefits of co-operation were clearly 
greater than the cost of co-operation, yet contingent on concerted action. In such a 
case, the standard form of the game would be:  
 
Table 3: Standard Matrix of the Assurance Game  
A Game 2: The 
assurance game Conciliation 
(C) 
Defiance (D) 
Conciliation     
            (C) 
             4 
  4 
               3 
  1 
 
B 
Defiance    
            (D) 
             1 
  3 
               2 
  2 
 
This game, known as the assurance game, has two Nash-equilibria. In this scenario, 
what strategy to choose would seem crucially contingent on the strategy chosen by the 
other party: mutual information about each other’s preference structures is essential to 
the outcome of the game. If actor A believes that actor B will co-operate, it will be 
rational for himself to co-operate. But if A is convinced that B will not co-operate, 
neither will A.  
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 A third conceivable preference structure could be: 
Unilateral defiance > Mutual conciliation > Unilateral conciliation > Mutual defiance 
 
This preference structure leads to the game known as chicken. The name alludes a test 
of will in which two cars drive towards each other in the middle of the road, and the 
winner is the one who dares to stay on course the longest. 
 
Table 4: Standard Matrix of the Chicken Game 
Actor A Game 3: The chicken 
game Conciliation 
(C) 
Defiance 
(D) 
Conciliation 
(C) 
                3 
  3 
                 4 
  2 
Actor B 
Defiance 
(D) 
                2 
  4 
                 1 
  1 
 
Chicken also has two Nash-equilibria, but not the same ones as the assurance 
game. What strategy to choose is again contingent on the strategy of the opposite 
player, but whereas conciliation was before the rational response to conciliation, it is 
now the rational response to defiance. Information about the other actor’s preference 
structure is therefore crucial to the outcome of the game, but the outcome of the game 
will predictably be victory to one party, not co-operation or mutual destruction. 
 
For now, the following corollaries could be made:  
- Peacekeepers could serve as information providers in assurance games, promoting compromise. Their task 
would be to provide the parties with information about each other’s operations, in order to ensure them of 
their mutual commitment to the agreement and their non-predatory intent. This would remove the rationale 
for security-motivated pre-emptive strikes.  
- Peacekeepers are not likely to be deployed in a prisoners’ dilemma situation, and if they were, they would 
not be likely to stabilise the conflict, since neither of the parties would see it in their interest to keep the 
status quo - regardless of the other party’s intentions.  
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- Peacekeepers are moderately likely to be deployed in chicken game situations, but their utility is highly 
questionable.52 If peacekeepers were to provide the parties with information of their mutual preference 
structures, that would counter-intentionally encourage brinkmanship. 
   
As noted above, theorists have pointed out that actors may choose sub-optimally in 
one game, in order to score in other games in which they are simultaneously engaged 
(Tsebelis 1990; Touval 2000). There are two basic parameters of game inter-relation: 
space and time.  
 
Is it possible that the “shadow of the future” could make actors forego the immediate 
gain in for example prisoners’ dilemmas, in order to preserve a co-operative spirit in 
the opponent for later interactions? 
 
Game theory allows for discounting future, potential, gains against immediate ones. It 
is common to operate with a discount factor, δ, which is usually treated as equally 
regarded by the parties, i.e.: both actors weigh immediate vs. future gains similarly. 
The discount factor is multiplied with the potential payoffs of later rounds, allowing 
for comparison between what could be gained now, and what could be gained later, if 
moderation is chosen now. Conventionally, 
T stands for temptation, i.e.: the payoff of unilateral defection (D-C) 
R stands for reward, i.e.: the payoff of bilateral co-operation (C-C) 
P stands for punishment, i.e.: the payoff of bilateral defection (D-D) 
S stands for sucker’s treat, i.e.: the payoff of unilateral co-operation (C-D) 
 
Thus, for two rounds, in which A defects in both, and in which B co-operates in the 
first, and retaliates for A’s defection by playing D in the second, the payoffs would 
(from the vantage point of immediately before round 1) be: 
Table 5: Payoffs to Actors A and B over 2 Rounds in Which A Cheats in the First Round and B Retaliates 
Actor Round 1 Round 2 
A T δ P 
B S δ P 
The discounted payoffs of infinite rounds can be calculated (Morrow 1994:265;316f). 
It can, for instance, be shown that the payoff of infinite games of full co-operation 
would be R+ δR + δ2R +δ3R +…. = R/(1- δ), if 0 < δ < 1.53
                                                 
52 Chicken games are characterised by crises that are quickly solved through the yield of one party. However, the preference 
structure indicates that submission does not equal death, which means that renewed rounds of contention are likely. Chicken 
games thus produce enduring, low-level conflicts. The time factor increases the likelihood of third party intervention. 
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 Actors may use threats of various types of retaliation in order to discipline their 
opponents. Morrow (1994:264f) refers to the threat of all-time defection as the grim 
trigger, and the threat of punishing each round of defection with defection in the next 
round as tit for tat. Naturally, the grim trigger has the largest potential for deterrence, 
but, once initiated, there is no going back to a co-operative framework, unless at the 
expense of a severe credibility loss. Morrow (1994:265) shows that defection will be 
deterred by the grim trigger if, 
     δ > (T – R) / (T – P) 
and by tit for tat if, 
     δ > (T – R) / (R – S) 
It follows from this, that, the chances of co-operation increase if, 
- δ increases, i.e.: if the value actors place on future payoffs increases; 
- T is reduced, i.e.: if less can be achieved through unilateral defection/defiance; 
- R increases, i.e.: if more can be gained through co-operation/conciliation; 
- P decreases, i.e.: if the state of mutual defiance becomes harsher; 
- S decreases, i.e.: if the cost of restoring co-operation becomes less bearable. 
  
How does all this relate to peacekeeping? Mearsheimer (1995:11) argues that the 
extreme risks involved in international politics will force actors to adopt a myopic 
outlook, and place greater priority on the present rather than the future. (If gullible 
today, tomorrow may not come). It would seem consistent with his realist argument, to 
say that, unless peacekeepers could provide credible guarantees through real force, 
their ability to increase the discount factor of actors is doubtful.  
 
With respect to T, i.e.: what could be achieved through defection, the response ability 
of peacekeepers would again seem crucial. But as long as peacekeepers are not to take 
active part in the fighting, and are not to strengthen the defence of the cheated party, 
their role would seem restricted to early warning. Indeed, peacekeepers might hesitate 
to provide such warning, for three reasons: 
- They might fear to compromise their status as impartial; 
- They might fear retaliation from the cheating, and possibly victorious, party; 
- They might fear calling false alarm, perhaps triggering the conflict instead of averting it.  
        
                                                                                                                                                        
53 For the formal mathematical proof, see Sydsæther (1987:524ff). 
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In a worst-case scenario, peacekeepers could even increase the T, by lulling one party 
to lower its guard.54
 
Probably the most promising function of peacekeepers in the game theoretic model lies 
in the potential of raising the R, the so-called peace dividend.  The crux is to increase 
the benefit that the parties would reap from co-operation relative to what they would 
gain from defiance - essentially through side-payments. There are, however, serious 
objections here as well:  
- The parties would not be so much interested in absolute gains as in relative gains (Mearsheimer 1995:19ff); 
- Increasing the benefit, for example through economic payoffs, might mean enhancing the parties’ ability of 
getting weapons, raising cadres, etc..  
 
The notion that peacekeepers should somehow contribute to a lowering of P, is 
anathema to humanism, but is consistent with the realist logic of deterrence. It implies 
that the peacekeepers would somehow increase the pain of a conflict stalemate, and 
thereby make it a less attractive option. This correlates well with Zartman’s (1989) 
observation that some conflicts are ripe for resolution, in the sense that they have 
reached a painful, mutual stalemate. However a peacekeeping mission that actually 
made conflict worse, would face a serious legitimacy problem. Hence, the threat of 
lowering P would only be valuable before hostilities resumed, and this would 
undermine the credibility of the threat.   
 
The potential for lowering S is scarcely significant, unless it could be applied 
selectively, and even then it is suspect. The reason is that S would be the payoff of the 
cheated actor first, and only later might it befall the defector. Since it is obvious that 
the defector would not rationally choose C (with the promise of an extremely low S) 
above D (which would guarantee P), a reversal to co-operation could only come about 
through a credible commitment by the cheated party to play C, or through substantial 
side-payments. Either way, the cheater would have benefited. The value of lowering S 
is again strictly ex ante, undermining the whole concept.         
 
                                                 
54 That this is not a just a hypothetical dilemma, should be clear from the failure of UNPROFOR II to provide security in the 
so-called “safe areas” in Bosnia-Herzegovina, resulting in the July 1995 Srebrenica Massacre, in which “thousands of 
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It seems reasonable to conclude that, although the scenario of repeated games allows 
for modifying the deterministic and perverse conclusion of a one-stage prisoners’ 
dilemma (namely that defiance always pays), the realistic potential for peaceful 
intervention is moderate. Although theoretically, some third party role could be 
envisaged in a tit for tat framework, the practical application has yet to be devised. In 
essence, this leaves us with spatially nested games. Can third parties peacefully make 
a difference through linking the focal game to other games in which the actors are 
simultaneously engaged?  
 
From the most conservative, realist, point of view, the answer would be no - in so far 
as those third parties shunned the threat of military intervention. However, 
Mearsheimer (1995:20) makes a point of the fact that economic power is convertible 
to military power. If that is so, it is conceivable that an actor, although militarily 
superior, might concede to peacekeepers under third-party pressure short of military 
threats. It is also possible that actors would restrain field operations somewhat, so as 
not to endanger foreign peacekeepers. Thus, the watered-down realist perspective 
entails a certain hostage-function for peacekeepers.   
The Role of Peacekeepers within the Humanist Perspective  
As noted above, the humanist perspective focuses on the process through which 
subjects come to see each other as enemies (Wendt 1992). Humanists typically insist 
that peacekeepers must move beyond conflict control, and aspire at peace-building i.e.: 
the construction of positive peace, through changed perceptions (Fetherston 
1994:148). The goal is micro- and macro-level integration of the former enemies. 
According to Fetherston (1994:138),  
“… peacekeepers are uniquely placed to begin processes of reconciliation and reconstruction as well as facilitate 
communication at all levels in the conflict-torn communities in which they operate”. 
 
Primarily, peacekeepers might offer a channel of communication. Later, they could 
provide venues of discussion, monitor arrangements, mediate, perhaps arbitrate, and 
promote structures of decision-making that involve both sides while redefining the 
cleavages in a way that would make cross-communal alliances more likely. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Muslims” were killed (Burg and Shoup 2000:324).   
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Corresponding to the theoretical approaches mentioned earlier, at least these functions 
could be filled: 
 
Fear could be reduced in a number of ways. Functions such as monitoring, 
cantonment and disarmament of fighters are possible tasks to peacekeepers, although 
infeasible to the parties themselves. At community level, peacekeepers could facilitate 
meetings, mitigating enemy stereotypes and promoting understanding and trust.  
 
Frustration could be reduced through humanitarian work, through the economic input 
of the peacekeepers’ presence, through the easing of livelihood associated with peace, 
etc. It should be noted, however, that frustration stemming from perceived injustice 
could be impossible to relieve, given the hybridity of order implied in compromise. 
 
Imitation offers a real challenge to peacekeepers/builders. Obviously, erasing 
memories of violence from entire populations is a difficult and time-consuming task. 
Instead one might try to add memories of a benign nature, encourage good deeds 
across the former divide, and amplify positive examples through all kinds of 
communication.   
 
Norms offer an even greater challenge. Norms are rooted in culture, and often 
sanctified through religion. Fighting norms would mean fighting convictions and 
habits, even identity. On the other hand, although norm-sets may attain predominance 
within societies, ethical monopolies are rare. Religious traditions often contain 
seemingly contradictory statements. When a conflict has reached the stage where 
peacekeeping is conceded to, there will be a palpable current of moderation on both 
sides. With knowledge, peacekeepers could strengthen the voices of moderation. The 
crux would be to work with the norms, not against them. Again, a hostage-function is 
conceivable to peacekeepers, since belligerents may have a normative reflex against 
pulling the trigger, if they risk hitting an “innocent” third party.   
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A theoretical school of integration, which draws on both the imitation- and the norms 
rationale, is neo-functionalism. The approach, which owes much to David Mitrany and 
Jean Monnet, has primarily been applied to the EEC/EC/EU.55 According to Neo-
functionalism, integration should start from below, i.e.: with harmonisation of low-
politics issues so as to avoid nationalist opposition (Østerud 1996:388).56 Co-operation 
will necessitate standardisation, which will spill over into related areas. Over time, co-
operation will proliferate to encompass ever-new sectors, at last locking peoples in 
interdependency and a common frame of reference. The logic could be captured thus: 
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 It should be noted that these functions neatly fit the humanist perspective and conflict 
with the realist one. According to humanism, strengthening the Palestinian economy 
would promote peace through the alleviation of frustration. On the contrary, according 
to realism, it would destabilise the balance of power through increasing the 
mobilisation potential of Palestinians. Similarly, in so far as the observers would have 
any restraining effect upon the Israeli soldiers patrolling the city, humanism would 
foresee less frustration among the city’s Palestinians, while realism would foresee 
more opportunism, ending at diametrically opposite predictions of the level of 
violence. An empirical evaluation of the violence level in Hebron with and without 
TIPH might therefore yield valuable insights to the realist-humanist debate as well as 
interrelated debates such as,  
- Historicism vs. voluntarism;58 
- Political realism vs. liberal institutionalism;59 
Summary 
This chapter has explored the potential underpinnings of peacekeeping according to 
various theoretical schools. The presentation has been systematised under two major 
conflicting paradigms: humanism and political realism. In effect, the crude question of 
how TIPH might function has been supplemented with a set of hypotheses for 
evaluation. A realist analysis would focus on, 
- TIPH’s potential for enhancing transparency; 
- TIPH’s potential for linking the Hebron game to other games in which Israel is engaged; 
- TIPH’s potential for raising the prospective benefit of mutual conciliation (R). 
  
A humanist analysis would focus on TIPH’s ability of reducing fear and frustration, 
promoting integration, erasing traumas, and exploiting- or changing norms. 
 
                                                 
58 The debate concerns the existence of free will, voluntarists holding the position that men are fundamentally free to choose 
their acts, while historicists argue that material or social structures constrain the choices of subjects into virtual 
predetermination.  
59 The focal topic is whether or not institutions in themselves, are able to affect the choices of actors, or whether institutions 
work only as long as they serve the strong by legitimating their hegemony, and break down when there is a discrepancy 
between the norms of the organisation and the interests of the strong actor. Realists, of course, hold the sceptical position. 
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Chapter IV: Method 
 
The methods employed in this thesis include, 
 
- Direct observation; 
- Interviews; 
- Study of written material; 
- Statistical analysis of aggregate data. 
Direct Observation 
I spent six and a half days in Hebron during March-April 2002. During this time, TIPH 
facilitated me with an office in their Headquarters, allowed me to share their meals and 
social activities, conduct interviews and to participate on one regular patrol. I visited 
H-2 unaccompanied four times, including the Avraham Avinu settlement.  
Interviews  
The interviews may be categorised according to methodology thus: 
Table 6: Interviews Categorised According to Methodology:60
Standardised Structured Semi-structured Improvised Total 
0 14 12 11 37 
 
The above categories are organised according to increasing capacity for information 
input, yet a decreasing guarantee of relevance. I believe the distribution of interviews 
reflects the phase of study I was in at the time, having defined variables of interest, but 
not being able to exclude the existence of additional, important, variables.61 The lack 
of standardised interviews was due, mainly, to factors beyond my control.62  
 
Table 7: Interviews Categorised According to Location and Status of Informer:  
 Palestinian 
Civilian 
Palestinian 
Authority 
Pal. 
Militia 
Israeli 
Civilian 
Israeli 
Authority63
IDF TIPH or 
ex-TIPH 
Others 
In Hebron 5 2 0 1 0 0 12 0 
Else-where 1 1 0 1 1 2 6 5 
                                                 
60 In a standardised interview, both questions and answering categories are pre-defined. Thus, the informer has to choose 
rather than formulate answers. Structured interviews have formulated questions, but there are no limitations on the answers 
acceptable. Semi-structured interviews have identified topics of interest, but not specific questions. In improvised interviews, 
there is no pre-conceived structure of the interview, and the questions come up as a result of the course of the conversation. 
61 The choice of interview type would ideally correspond to the phase of research one is in. In an early, exploratory, phase, 
improvised interviews would seem to yield maximum output, as the researcher is still unable to draw a conceptual map of the 
topic that includes all crucial variables and leaves out the others. In an explanatory phase, it is necessary to filter out 
irrelevant data in order to avoid information overflow, and standardised interviews are preferable. Standardised interviews 
hinge on the ability of the researcher to create exhaustive categories of response. 
62 A survey intended for TIPH personnel had been clarified with Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Datatjeneste – the Norwegian 
agency responsible for monitoring scientific data acquisition and -treatment. TIPH did not allow me to investigate the 
attitudes of its observers to the conflict, and I mistook that for a general ban on survey (Terms of Reference). Morten 
Arnesen, an expert on the region, advised me not to attempt a survey among Palestinians for security reasons. 
63 I have classified Amnon Lipkin-Shahak as “Israeli Authority”. Lipkin-Shahak was a civilian at the time of interview, and a 
military officer during the period covered by the interview. However, his relation to TIPH consisted primarily in negotiations 
at the political level, as he headed the second Ministry of Foreign Affairs delegation to Tunis (Savir 1999:129).  
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The conduct and attitudes of Israeli security personnel in Hebron are central to this 
thesis, and interviews with soldiers would seem critical. I have tried to compensate for 
the lack of such interviews, mainly through written sources. 64
Study of Written Material 
The written sources of data include: 
 
Table 8: Primary and Secondary Sources of Qualitative Data 
Primary Sources65 Secondary Sources 
- Israeli-Palestinian agreements 
- TIPH mandatory papers 
- TIPH letters 
- TIPH job descriptions 
- TIPH financial papers 
- TIPH internal papers 
- TIPH press releases 
- Internet sites66 
- Books by Eyal Ben-Ari, Israeli Anthropologist 
and officer in Hebron and Uri Savir, negotiator. 
- Newspaper reports 
 
 
- TIPH Weekly- and Periodical Reports 
- Scholarly reports on TIPH by Brynjar Lia and 
Anna Valve 
- Newspaper interviews 
- Reports by various Human Rights 
organisations 
- Internet sites 
Of these, only the job descriptions and one scholarly report were provided by TIPH. 
The TIPH reports, -letters, -financial papers and one excerpt of a Risk Assessment 
from January 1997, were provided by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
remaining material was available from public or private sources.67  
- Limitations to the Qualitative Material 
A number of factors complicated my acquisition of data: 
- Formal restrictions on written material and on the use of observation and interview data;68 
- Curfew in H-2 and closures of other Palestinian areas; 
- Negative or lacking answers to requests for interviews; 
- Queuing of researchers at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 
- Escalation of violence, prompting TIPH to ask me to leave Hebron temporarily. I complied, thus shortening 
a stay that was planned to last for ca. 3 weeks.  
                                                 
64 I had contacted the IDF Spokesperson before my arrival in Israel, requesting interviews with military personnel in Hebron. 
For a long time there appeared to be a chance for such a grant, and only on the last day of my trip, did I receive a negative 
answer. The main compensatory sources are Ben-Ari (1998) and the Internet site of Christian Peacemakers’ Teams (CPT).  
65 Many of the sources are in fact both primary and secondary sources, depending on the issue of reference. For example, the 
TIPH Periodical Reports give a condensed version of events in Hebron. Since they are not incident reports, but rather based 
on incident reports, I have classified them as secondary sources. However, in so far as they refer to dealings of the JHC etc., 
they should be regarded as primary sources. 
66 Among the foremost are TIPH’s Internet site, various settler sites, and the site of Christian Peacemakers Teams. For 
details, confer, List of References. 
67 For a full overview, confer the annexed List of References. 
68 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs granted insight into a select number of requested papers, only under certain conditions: 
- No personal information may be transmitted; 
- No copying of documents was allowed; 
- The Ministry retained the right to review the thesis before its submission. 
I was given strict Terms of Reference as to the use of any information obtained through participatory observation at the TIPH 
premises. (For a full overview, see Appendix II: Terms of Reference). Due to a restrictive reading of the mandate, stating that 
“TIPH reports are not for public use”, I was barred from the daily briefings. 
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As for the interviews that did take place, these reservations should be noted:  
Language: Most interviews were conducted in English, which is not my mother 
tongue of me, nor the one of my informants. 3 interviews were conducted in 
Palestinian Arabic, a dialect of which my comprehension is very limited. I got some 
ad-hoc translation assistance, but not by a professional interpreter.69     
 
Interviewer effect: The effects of environment upon informants is a focal topic of 
literature concerned with interview methodology. Particularly the attitudes projected 
by the interviewer have been shown to have considerable distorting potential (Mordal 
1989:39;46;94). As a rule, I sought to establish in the informants a feeling of control 
and confidence. Only after some “warming-up” questions did we proceed to more 
controversial issues.70 Several times, informants surprised me with their candidness. 
  
Recording: I used pen and paper for recording. The positive side to this technique is 
that informants are supposedly more relaxed and direct, compared to electronically 
recorded interviews (Rubin & Rubin 1995:126). The danger is that data may get lost or 
distorted. Most cited informants have been given transcripts of their interviews.  
Statistical Analysis of Aggregate Data  
The statistical analysis is based on a numerical comparison of conflict-related deaths 
among Palestinians of four cities during the months of December 1987 through 
February 2002. Units of analysis are city-months of Hebron, Nablus, Ramallah/al-
Birah and Khan Younis, totalling 684. The analysis is a multiple Overt Least Squares’ 
regression. It was performed using SPSS 9.0 and 11.0,71 with the aim of detecting any 
variation in the number of killings related to the presence of TIPH by statistically 
controlling for other conceivable variables. Control variables fall into 7 categories: 
- Structural timely variations; 
- Structural spatial variations; 
- Political situation in Israel; 
- Political situation in the Palestinian Territories; 
- Number of days of cultural significance; 
- Number of conflict-related deaths (Israelis in month(m) and Palestinians in month(m-1)); 
- Variables related to TIPH 
                                                 
69 Many thanks to Nizār Khalīl Banāt for volunteering to help me with facilities and interpretation in 2 interviews. 
70 The Method is recommended by Rubin and Rubin (1995:128ff) 
71 SPSS is a statistics computer program developed by SPSS Inc. in co-operation with Microsoft Corporation. 
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The Dependent Variable: Palestinian Conflict-Related Deaths 
The value of this variable for every city-month is the number of Palestinians killed by 
Israelis within the month in question. 
 
Validity 
The TIPH Agreements (1994;1996;1997) all state the overarching aim of TIPH as to 
“provide… a feeling of security to the Palestinians of Hebron.” My switch from the 
subjective feelings of Palestinians to objective, actual, security might therefore call for 
some justification. I would argue, 
- It is a more crucial question; 
- Information from the negotiations over TIPH’s mandates show that the Palestinian negotiators were 
primarily concerned with actual security, and only secondarily with feelings of the same; 
- The reason why “feelings” got into the mandate in the first place is probably that “provision of security” 
would seem to imply enforcement powers. Israel would not concede to any mandate that derogated 
responsibility for security from IDF in the sense that the alternative provider of security could physically 
challenge it. 
 
The question remains, of course, if the number of conflict-related deaths is a valid 
operationalisation of security. While security is certainly a broader concept than not 
being killed, I would argue that, 
- Any security concept excluding security from being killed is absurd , 
- From the measurement of killings one might deduce corollaries of injuries, economy, harassment etc., to a 
greater extent than one could do the other way around.72    
- Quantitative data of killings were accessible, and could be re-coded by me into killings by month and city, 
whereas data on injuries, curfews, attitudes of soldiers etc., were not available to my knowledge. This means 
I should have had to rely upon extensive assistance by others.  
- Reliability  
The data were compiled by B’Tselem - the Israeli Centre for Human Rights in the 
Occupied Territories. B’Tselem regularly publishes reports on Human Rights issues, 
and its soundness of credentials is a prerequisite for continued activities. The privately 
funded organisation combines a network of local Palestinian informants with the 
privileges of movement enjoyed by Israeli citizens. Killings counted by B’Tselem are 
considerably fewer than those counted by the Palestine Liberation Army (2002).  
The data used were stored on three different servers. Two of these were only operable 
in Hebrew. Ronen Shnayderman of B’tselem aided me invaluably, but I had to do 
                                                 
72 Killing is the ultimate form of violence. Accepting that premise, and postulating rationality, one could argue that, one who 
is willing to kill would also be willing to hit. On the other hand, saying that one who is willing to hit is also willing to kill, is 
a logically invalid deduction. If TIPH could be shown to reduce the most extreme form of violence, which is the least likely 
to be employed excessively, it would seem probable that it could also reduce more “unnecessary” forms of violence.       
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much of the work on one of these systems myself. Not being a Hebrew speaker, there 
is a definite possibility of personal error. However, I double-checked most of the data, 
and a systematic slant seems unlikely.73
 
I have not attempted to trace the exact location of each killing. What killings are 
included in the analysis, is guided by B’Tselem’s designation.74 In four cases, I have 
ascertained that the killings took place within TIPH’s area of operations (AOR). The 
principle of selection has been to err on the side of caution, and killings of doubtful 
location have as a rule been left out. In cases where the victim died only after a period 
of hospitalisation, I have coded the death according to the date of injury.75
Variables of Time 
The time variables were entered in order to separate the effect of TIPH from the effect 
of other structural and unspecified trends in time that might have had a bearing on the 
number of Palestinian deaths. The two variables were, 
Month: numbering the months of December 1987 through February 2002 by increasing 1 per unit (i.e.: 1-171). 
The variable is construed to detect any linear relationship between itself and the number of Palestinian conflict-
related deaths (i.e.: an overall positive or negative development).  
Month2 : numbering the first 85 months by decreasing numbers, and the last 85 by increasing ones ((-85)2 – 852). 
This is a common way of establishing any parabolic (curvilinear) relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables (the aim is to find a mathematical expression of how perfectly the development resembles a 
“U” or an inverted “U” ). 
Variables of Space 
The variables of City include dummy variables of Nablus, Ramallah and Khan Younis. 
Value “1” is given to every city-month falling within the city in question and 
otherwise “0”. Hebron is the reference category.  
 
The rationale for entering variables of space is to avoid mistaking any overall 
difference in the level of violence between Hebron and other cities as an effect of 
TIPH. The analysis could have been done simply, by comparing months of Hebron to 
months of rest-Palestine. The differentiation preferred has some valuable implications: 
                                                 
73 This is based on the fact that killings were detected in all the cities in question, so I have not missed out on one because of 
misspelling. Moreover, a separate command had to be entered in order to get regional, as opposed to local, data, and it seems 
unlikely that I have done that mistake. 
74 I have detected one small error made by B’Tselem with respect to location of killing, namely that of Mahmud al-Madani 
(19 February 2001), which is put in Balata Refugee camp, Hebron/The West Bank. Balata refugee camp is in Nablus. The 
example shows that there could be more mistakes that I have not been able to uncover.  
75 Such cases include, Taha Ribhi Abu Sneineh (7 Oct. 2001/12 Feb. 2002); Jihad Mahmud al-‘A’lul (30 Sept./1 Oct. 2000) 
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- It doubles the number of units, enhancing the chances for statistically significant results; 
- It allows for a more sophisticated analysis of the findings, since it is possible to see differences not only 
between Hebron and “non-Hebron”, but between Hebron and other cities with their peculiarities. 
 
Initially, these cities were chosen because they share certain features with Hebron, 
notably a relative closeness to Israeli settlements. However, as the units of comparison 
are not cities but city-months, such resemblance is in fact slightly unfortunate.76  
- Validity 
Just as in the case of time, it is not space per se that kills, but other factors manifest in 
space. By controlling for city, one is in reality controlling for the totality of structural 
factors that make one city a more dangerous place than another.77 In order to discern 
between the actual causes of hazard, one has to add control variables of a more 
specific quality, or simply speculate on the basis of registered inter-city differences.  
 
The cities of comparison chosen all comprise refugee camps, and these are included 
within the definition of cities. Surrounding suburbs/villages and settlements are as a 
rule left out. That choice could be challenged. The guiding principle has been one of 
contiguity of housing, but exceptions have been made for Nablus, where certain 
neighbourhoods counted as Nablus proper are non-contiguous with the rest of the city. 
Villages/suburbs posited as close or closer to the city centre have been included.78  
- Reliability 
I cannot account for the exact definition of B’Tselem with regard to the cities under 
scrutiny, nor say for sure that it has been constant during the years in question. My 
definition of the city limits is derived from maps provided by FAFO.79
                                                 
76 If the units of analysis had been cities, it would have been useful to choose cities that resemble Hebron in as many respects 
as possible except for the presence of observers. Such a design is known as most similar systems design, and the rationale for 
it is to single out the effect of the independent variable under scrutiny, by holding other variables constant (Collier 1993). 
Differences between the cities under such a design would have been problematic only in so far as a non-TIPH variable would 
suggest that Hebron were more peaceful than the other cities (Confer Critical Case theory, e.g.: Yin 2003:40f). That is 
because, then, it would have been impossible to discern the effect of TIPH from the effect of that other variable. Accordingly, 
it would have been a methodological problem that Nablus is known to be a centre for Palestinian militias, that the other cities 
have refugee camps, etc. But in this case, all that is irrelevant, since city is not a unit, but a variable, which means that one 
may estimate the average level of violence within each city, and take that into account when the effect of TIPH is estimated. 
In fact, provided the possibility of spatial control, the more dissimilar the cities had been, the more interesting the analysis. In 
this light, the choice of cities was a mistake, albeit a minor one. Anyhow, the cities are not all that similar. 
77 Such factors could be: Average income of citizens, Distribution of wealth (Gini coefficient), Average level of education, 
Population size, Population density, Average level of Religiosity, Religious and Communal composition of Populace, etc.. In 
so far as the Israeli military and civilian presence is stable, that could be counted among the structural variables.    
78 The included villages are: Beit Iba, Beit Wazan, Zawata, ‘Azmut, Deir al Hatab and Salim.  
79 FAFO is the Research Facility of the Norwegian Labour Movement. The maps were made in 1997, on the request of the 
Palestinian Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation (MOPIC).  
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Israeli Politics 
The type of Israeli government would seem a probable determinant of the number of 
Palestinian casualties. Thus, dummy variables of the Rabin-, Peres-, Netanyahu-, 
Barak- and Sharon governments are entered. The reference category is the Shamir 
Governments in the period December 1987- June 1992.80 The variables are coded “1” 
from the month of inauguration, through the last month before a new shift in 
government, and otherwise “0”.   
 
A separate dichotomous variable is intended to capture the influence of political 
uncertainty. It is coded “1” for periods when elections are announced, but not yet held, 
and “0” for periods when elections are not announced. The period March - June 1990 
is coded 1, because of the parliamentary crisis then (Shlaim 2001:471f).  
- Validity 
It seems overzealous to differentiate between government and governance. One could 
of course argue that announced elections is not a valid operationalisation of political 
uncertainty, but that is probably also to stretch the point.     
- Reliability 
Periods of office were found on the Internet site of Zarate Political Collections.  
 
Palestinian Politics 
The existence and policies of a Palestinian National Authority would also appear to 
have a bearing on the risk to life of ordinary Palestinians. Two variables have been 
controlled for: 
- The existence of a Palestinian Authority; 
- The existence of a state of Intifada 
 
The variables are dichotomous. The first is coded “1” for the months of July 1994 
through February 2002, and “0” for preceding months. The second is coded “1” for 
December 1987 through August 1993, “0” for September 1993 through September 
2000, and again “1” for October 2000 until February 2002.     
                                                 
80 As regards the interregnum in spring 1990, see below. Initially, I entered a separate variable for “Likud in Government?” 
in order to separate between the influence of party politics and personal politics. However, for reasons of collinearity, SPSS 
would not accept such a variable.   
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- Validity 
Any problems of validity related to the existence of a Palestinian National Authority, 
would seem to revolve around two questions: 
- Is it possible that the PNA existed de facto before it was officially in place? 
- Is it possible that the PNA did not exist de facto, despite its official existence? 
 
Due to the staged establishment of the PNA, and the later circumscriptions of its 
capabilities, these questions are not merely academical. Since the variable is construed 
as an indicator of Palestinian politics, rather than bilateral politics, I have taken July 
1994, the month of inauguration of PNA ministers rather than August, the month of 
transfer of powers, as the starting point.  
 
With respect to the Intifada variable, it may be argued that the autumn of 1996 should 
be counted as such, since stone-throwing incidents and fire-fights took place on a 
substantial scale during that period.81 However, it may be countered that such an 
inclusion would blur the distinction between the dependent and the independent 
variables, as they would virtually measure the same phenomenon. By focusing on the 
official state of Intifada instead of the de facto state of Intifada, one is able to treat the 
policies of the PNA as conceptually distinct from the consequences of those same 
policies, and that is in fact a precondition for evaluating them. This argument also 
pertains to the Al-Aqsa Intifada, which started on 29 September 2000, but which was 
only officially sanctioned by Arafat in late October (ADL 2000).   
- Reliability 
I found the inauguration dates of PNA ministers on the Internet site of Palestine-UN 
org and consider them unproblematic. Though the PLO leadership was taken by 
surprise at the outbreak of the first Intifada, liaisons intended to co-ordinate activities 
inside and outside the territories was established in a matter of weeks, and it seems 
natural to count December 1987 as the first month of Intifada, also in a policy sense 
(Peretz 1990:89). The Intifada was officially called off only on 25 September 1993, 
but the signing of the DOP on 13 September justifies coding this month as “peaceful.” 
The PNA endorsement of the Al-Aqsa Intifada was taken from the site of ADL (2000).    
                                                 
81 See footnote 29. 
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Days of Significance 
The values on the variables of Palestinian and Jewish days of significance are 
construed as, the number of days of significance to collective for every city-month in 
question. Both religious holidays and days of remembrance linked to the national 
struggle are counted.   
 
Among the Palestinian religious holidays, these are counted:82
Muslim New Year (1 Muharram) 
Mawlid un-Nabiyyi: Birth of the Prophet Muhammad (12 Rabīc ul-Awwal)  
Laylatu l-Mihraj: Night of Muhammad’s ascention to the Heavens (27 Rajab) 
Shahru r-Ramadan: The month of fast (Including the special holiday, Laylatu l-Qadr) 
caydu l-Fitr: The day of breaking the fast (1 Shawwal) 
Hajj: The celebration of Pilgrimage (8, 9 and 10 Dhu ul-Hijjah) 
Yawm al-Jumca: The weekly holiday, i.e.: Every Friday 
 
Among the national days of remembrance, these are counted: 
Land day: Commemorating the confiscation of Arab-owned lands by Israel (30 March); 
Yawm al-Nakba: Commemorating the Catastrophe of expulsion (14 May); 
Liberation Day: Commemorating the Pan-Arab struggle for the liberation of Palestine (15 May). 
Sabra and Shatila anniversary: The day commemorating the massacres of Palestinians in Sabra and Shatila  
refugee camps (16 September);83  
Palestine Day: The anniversary of UNGA resolution 181, partitioning Palestine (29 November); 
Fatah day: The day of the founding of the Movement for the Liberation of Palestine (1 January).  
 
Among the Jewish religious holidays, these are counted: 
Rosh HaShanah, Tzom Gedaliah, Yom Kippur, Sukkot, Hosh’anah Rabah, Simchat Torah, Rosh Chodesh 
Chesvan (2 days), Chanukkah (8 days), Rosh Chodesh Tevet, Asarah B’Tevet, Rosh Chodesh Shvat, Tu 
B’Shevat, Rosh Chodesh Adar (2 days), Fast of Esther, Purim, Shushan Purim, Rosh Chodesh Nisan, 
Pessach (7 days), Rosh Chodesh Iyar (2 days), Pesach Sheini, Lag BaOmer, Rosh Chodesh Sivan, Shavout, 
Rosh Chodesh Tammuz (2 days), Fast of Shiva Asar B’Tammuz, Rosh Chodesh Av, Fast of Tisha B’Av, Rosh 
Chodesh Elul (2 days), and finally the weekly holiday, Shabbat (Saturday).84
 
Among the days of National significance, these are counted: 
- Die Kristallnacht: The night of the first large-scale pogrom in Nazi Germany (9 November); 
- Yom Hazikarion: The night before the establishment of the State of Israel (4 Iyar); 
- Yom HaAtzmaut: The day of establishment of the State of Israel (5 Iyar); 
- Yom Yerushalayim: The day of recapturing Jerusalem (28 Iyar). 
- Validity 
The variables are supposed to reflect the cultural horizon of both sides, i.e.: the 
premises that are unconsciously accepted when defining the self and the other. It 
seems likely that individuals of the collectives in question are continually reintegrated 
                                                 
82 Ashura on 10 Muharram was skipped, because it is a Shiite holiday, while Palestinian Muslims are Sunni.  
83 The massacre took place during the night 16-17 September 1982, and are sometimes commemorated on the 17th rather than 
the 16th (Landsverk 1994:128) I have used 16 September consistently. This is only relevant to years in which the day 
fell, or could otherwise have fallen, on a Friday, i.e.: 1988, 1993, 1994 and 1999. (Cf. Reliability below). 
84 The following Jewish religious holidays are left out by the calendar, and subsequently by me: Shmini Atzeret (Not 
celebrated in Israel), Sefirat HaOmer, Yom HaShoah, Tu B’Av, The Three Weeks (7 Tammuz - 9 Av), The Month of Av 
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into their social position through repetition of rituals (Bourdieu 1990:127ff;1997:92ff). 
Thus, the quantity of time devoted to such rituals would seem a suitable indicator of 
cultural centricity. The approach may be criticised for equalling all days of 
significance. However, any differentiation between such days would also need 
justification, and is liable to the charge of subjectivity. 
- Reliability  
In cases where there was an overlap between the weekly holiday and an annual 
holiday, I have counted the day in question as one. 
 
The Jewish days of significance were displayed as red calendar days on the Internet 
site of Hebrewcalendar. A slight problem was discrepancies in Israeli and Diaspora 
definitions of holidays. In such cases, I have taken the Israeli norm as standard. 
Muslim religious holidays, which follow the lunar year, were found on the Amaana 
Internet site. I used an Internet calendar converter, in which I had to enter the exact 
hijri date in question, note the Gregorian date, and take holiday overlap into account 
(Gregoran-Hijri Dates Converter). The converter warned of the possibility of 1-day 
errors, but it should not be considered a big problem.85  
 
The Israeli-National holidays were obtained from the Internet site of Orthodox Union. 
The Palestinian National days of significance were obtained from Bishara (2001:142), 
Landsverk (1994:36;98;127) and Peretz (1990:40;67;145). There may be days of equal 
or greater significance that I have not noted.86
Conflict-Related Deaths 
The control variables of conflict-related deaths are of two kinds: 
- Israeli conflict-related deaths: Indicating the number of Israelis killed within each city-month; 
- Palestinian conflict-related deaths: Indicating the number of Palestinians killed in the previous city-month. 
                                                 
85 First of all, it would only be a problem in so far as the date in question fell on the first or last day of a Gregorian month. 
Secondly, it should be recalled that the Calendar Converter covers history back to year 1 AD, and that minor lunar-solar 
displacements may be a problem in that perspective, but not in the short span of time in which I operate.   
86 During the first Intifada, 15 November (1988), the day of the Palestinian Declaration of Independence, attained a special 
observance (Peretz 1990:????). However, later, the day seems to have lost its importance. Not being able to say when that 
happened, I have left out the date altogether. Other days, such as the Day of Wrath (30 June 1999) were days of organised 
Palestinian activism. I did not include days that are not annually recurrent, though, partly because of the difficulties of 
selection, partly because this is intended as a cultural, rather than political, variable.   
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- Validity 
Israelis widely conceive of violence committed by Jews against Palestinians as 
revenge (B’Tselem 2001:4). In so far as the variable of Israeli conflict-related deaths 
is meant to reflect the grief/rage of local settlers, it should be noted that, 
- Killings of Israelis outside the cities in question are often lamented within them, and while there seems to be 
a certain correlation between the proximity of the killing to the city in question and the anger of settlers 
displayed within the city, the relationship is not deterministic (HRW 2001:56); 
- Palestinians violence short of killings may evoke just as strong resentment. 
 
Again, the choice of variable is a pragmatic one. Its strength is conceptual clarity and 
parsimony in retrieval. 
 
The variable of Palestinians killed in previous city-month is entered in order to deal 
with the problem of auto-correlation, common in time-series studies (Skog 
1998:237ff).87 By controlling for the number of Palestinians killed in the previous city-
month, I reduce the pitfall of overlooking long-term trends in the level of violence, 
which would result in undue conclusions about intra-month correlations.88  
- Reliability 
The data on Israelis killed are courtesy of B’Tselem. Names are given in each case, 
and brief facts about the deaths are available on their latest system, which goes back to 
September 2000. Any remaining doubts as to the reliability of these data would seem 
to relate to my handling of them or to the hazy situation in the occupied territories. I 
believe the latter is a non-problem.89      
The TIPH Variables 
In the main analysis, three variables related to TIPH have been entered: 
- TIPH presence;  
- Interaction variable between TIPH presence and Type of Israeli Government; 
- Interaction variable between TIPH presence and the number of Israeli conflict-related deaths.  
 
                                                 
87 Auto-correlation exists when it is possible to predict (estimate) the residual of one unit on the basis of the preceding unit. 
This is not a problem with sample data, since units are independently selected, but with time-series data, it is likely that long-
term trends exist in the dependent variable. If this is also the case in the independent variable, there will be a correlation, 
which may easily be misinterpreted as a causal one. To avoid making false inferences, one has to control for auto-correlation. 
88 There are several methods for dealing with auto-correlation. Skog (1998:301ff) suggests re-coding the dependent variable 
so that it reflects the rise/fall in the number of killings rather than the actual number of killings. I adopt the method of Hegre 
et al. (2000), with the advantage of yielding more easily interpretable coefficients.   
89 Israelis do not just disappear without anybody noticing. Like in other developed countries, there are examples of people 
who vanish, generally resulting in a nation-wide frenzy, until the person is found - dead or alive.   
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The first two variables are Dichotomies. TIPH Presence is coded “1” for city-months 
of Hebron in the periods of May 1994 through August 1994 and May 1996 through 
February 2002. For other city-months, the variable has been coded “0”. The interaction 
variable between TIPH presence and Type of Israeli government has been coded “1” 
for all city-months in which TIPH has been operative during an Israeli government 
comprising the “rightist” Likud party, and otherwise “0”.90 The interaction variable 
between TIPH presence and number of Israeli conflict-related deaths has been coded 
“0” for all city-months in which there has been no Israelis killed, and/or no TIPH 
presence. For city-months in which TIPH has been present and there have been Israelis 
killed, the variable denotes the number of Israelis killed.91
- Validity 
An obvious objection would be that TIPH has not been constant during the years of 
operation, but has varied in terms of number of mission members, number of actual 
observers, technical equipment, organisational structure, leadership, operational 
procedures, etc. The most important of these would seem number of mission members, 
so I added that as a separate control variable. In so far as the variables factored into the 
interaction variable are valid, the interaction variable must itself be regarded as valid. 
- Reliability    
Dates of TIPH arrivals and departures are available from many sources, and there is 
little reason to doubt these from a methodological point of view. More doubtful is the 
monthly number of mission members. I had to reconstruct this variable from scattered 
and partly inaccurate sources, and quite a bit of speculation has gone into the process. 
It would be tedious to go into detail, so the reader shall have to settle for this diagram: 
F ig u re  5 :  
N u m b e r  o f  T IP H  M is s io n  M e m b e rs , J a n u a ry  1 9 9 4  -  
J a n u a ry  2 0 0 4
0
5 0
1 0 0
1 5 0
2 0 0
1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
                                                 
90 The city-months of Hebron given value “1” on the TIPH - Israeli Government interaction variable are, June 1996 through 
June 1999 and March 2001 through February 2002. The variable is coded “0” for all other city-months.  
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Objections to the Statistical Approach  
One objection to the statistical approach might be that the reasons for killing differ 
from case to case, so how can one invoke structural variables with a pretence to causal 
explanation of such killings? The answer is that, although the rationale for killings 
would vary, it is still possible that structural factors could affect the cost-benefit 
calculuses of actors when deciding on violence or the degree of violence - and that 
over time, these structural differences could be measured. All idiosyncratic factors 
would remain unexplained by the model, and that would be reflected in a small R2.  
 
Another caveat could be, that, statistical analysis only reveals correlations between 
variables, not causalities, and that the causal direction may be the opposite of what is 
presumed. In this case, however, most variables are of a structural character. While it 
would seem probable that the type of government in Israel could have an effect upon 
the number of Palestinian conflict-related deaths, it would seem far-fetched to assume 
that the Israeli government from month to month would shift with the number of 
Palestinian casualties. I consider most of the variables unproblematic in this regard, 
but in the case of number of Israeli conflict-related deaths, and the interaction variable 
in which this is a component, there is a clear possibility of reversed causal order.         
 
There is also a possibility of other factors coinciding with TIPH, affecting the level of 
violence, but for which statistical control is impossible under this research design. One 
such factor, could be the Christian Peacemakers’ Teams (CPT), which has operated in 
Hebron since June 1995, and thus overlaps considerably with TIPH. There are two 
ways to go about this problem:  
- One could redefine the unit of analysis, to include all peacekeeping/making organisations in Hebron; 
- One could theorise why any measured effect should be attributed to TIPH rather than to CPT. 
 
CPT is a much smaller organisation (ca. 5-10 persons). It has no official mandate, and 
fewer technical and logistical resources than TIPH. On the other hand, CPT is 
constantly present in the Old City, and engages soldiers in discussions. When CPT 
                                                                                                                                                        
91 The city-months of Hebron with Israeli casualties that fall within the time-span of the quantitative analysis include: 
October 1992 (1); December 1992 (1); May 1993 (1); November 1993 (1); December 1993 (2); February 1994 (1); July 1994 
(1); March 1995 (2); August 1998 (1); October 1998 (1) December 1998 (1); March 2001 (1); July 2001 (3).   
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activists need back-up, they sometimes call TIPH. Although controlling for CPT 
presence is for methodological reasons considered close to meaningless, I have done it.    
 
One control variable that would have been extremely interesting to include in the 
analysis, but which for practical reasons had to be left out is the number of days of 
curfew by city-month. Although it is hard to predict whether curfew increases or 
reduces the risk to life of Palestinians, it appears most relevant and would allow for a 
more solid assessment of the Israeli policies. Yet, even if I could reconstruct the 
duration of curfews in Hebron, it would be hard to find valid and reliable expressions 
for their extent in space, and even more so for the cities of comparison. 
       
Finally, one might also question the technical preconditions for linear regression. I 
believe there is every reason to say that, 
- The variables are on scale level; 
- The presumed non-linear variable has been properly re-coded; 
- I have operationalised in a way that minimises conceptual blur between the independent and dependent 
variables; 
- I have dealt with the issue of auto-correlation in a conventional way.  
 
Source Criticism. 
It follows from the metaphysical realist understanding of science, that information may 
be more or less correct, and that the reliability of sources should be evaluated.  
In the text, all data relayed falls within one of five categories: 
- The source is criticised and its credibility questioned; 
- The source is criticised, but a point is made of the fact that the information was given;92 
- The sentence containing the information begins with “According to…”, alerting the reader to the fact that 
the source is embedded, but without explicitly criticising it; 
- The source is identified through a parenthesis at the end of the sentence; 
- The source is not indicated at all. 
 
The applied criteria for determining the level of source criticism are, 
- Closeness of the source in space and time to the fact reported; 
- Plausible interest of the source in a particular rendition of facts; 
- Number, Independence and Consistency of sources; 
- Contentiousness of the issue.93 
 
                                                 
92 The method corresponds to Dahl (1997:33ff) who argues that a piece of information can be treated as either narrative or 
artefact. Even positively false material can be informative, if the context of its appearance is understood. 
93 I am indebted to my tutors, Brynjar Lia and Tore Nyhamar, for insisting on the importance of source criticism, thereby 
substantially strengthening the thesis.  
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Chapter V: The Hebron Regime: Indicators of Efficiency  
This chapter offers the basic empirical data needed for assessing the efficiency of the 
Hebron regime. A theoretically guided analysis follows in Chapter 6. The presentation 
below will focus on three composite variables: TIPH’s Ability of Observation, Avenues 
of Influence and Tangible Changes in Israeli Conduct.  
Ability of Observation 
The factors potentially inhibiting TIPH’s ability of observation might be systematised 
into five broad categories:  
- Mandatory restrictions on observation and reporting;  
- Explicit, extra-mandatory restrictions; 
- Self-imposed restrictions;  
- De facto restrictions; 
- Conceptual apparatus of observers.  
 
Mandatory Restrictions on Observation and Reporting 
- a) Area of Responsibility (AOR) 
Map No.9, annexed to the Interim Agreement (1995) defines the City of Hebron, and 
hence, the TIPH AOR (TIPH Agreement 1997, Art. 1). TIPH has as a rule not reported 
on incidents outside this perimeter (PR VII:7). However, there have been borderline 
cases, and TIPH has argued that events taking place just outside AOR are relevant to 
the mandate if they are likely to affect the situation within the city (PRs II:9f; X:6-8). 
IDF has denied TIPH access to areas outside AOR and has refused to consider reports 
from such areas (PRs II:16; VI:8; X:8). Still, IDF has, on a few occasions, offered to 
discuss such issues in other settings than the JHC (PRs V:10; X:8). 
- b) Number of Observers 
The initial PLO demand for observers in Hebron seems to have been at ca. 1000 
persons. During the Tunis and Cairo negotiations, Israel bargained the number of 
mission members down to 160, and in the subsequent MOU rounds, the number of 
actual field observers, excluding support personnel, staff etc., was set to 60, giving the 
mission a rather administration-heavy slant (MOU 1994, A.1.). The TIPH II 
Agreement provided for some “50-60 persons”, but it was established at short notice, 
and was characterised by contracts of short duration and subsequent fluctuations in 
manning, eventually stabilising at ca. 40 persons. Under the TIPH II and TIPH III 
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Mandates, there was no explicit staff/observer ratio, but the latter Agreement (1997) 
included the clause,  
“The number of on-duty observers at any given time and changes in the composition of the TIPH shall be with 
the consent of both sides” (TIPH Agreement 1997, Art. 2). 
 
The TIPH III Agreement (1997) put the number of mission members to 180, but 
symptomatically, the MOU (1997) said “up to 180.” In practice, the number never 
exceeded 142 and has since gradually decreased. Another trend has been a certain 
softening of the categories “observer/non-observer”. All TIPH personnel partake in 
two introductory courses upon their arrival in Hebron, with the explicit aim of 
enabling them to report incidents whether or not they are actually assigned as 
observers (TIPH Legal Adviser 2002; Knutsen 2003a). After a period of clashes in 
1998, TIPH stated that,             
 
“Due to the curfew, the number of observers in the field had to be increased, and many members of divisions 
supporting the operation division were engaged in daily observation activities” (PR V:5). 
 
Table 9: Number of mission members (On 15 November of each year, except 1994 and 1996)   
 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Number of mission 
members 
150 40 140 110 111 87 89 60 68 
- c) No Military or Police Functions 
A basic tenet of all TIPH Agreements is their regulation that TIPH shall not have any 
military or police functions (TIPH Agreements 1994, A.2; 1996, Art. 3; 1997, Art. 3). 
During the negotiations over the first MOU (1994), the Israelis insisted that TIPH 
should neither intervene in incidents nor investigate alleged incidents (Lia 1998). In 
other words, the observers should strictly report what they saw. The MOU eventually 
stated that, “Members of TIPH will not interfere in disputes involving violent action,” 
but it did not define “interfere” (MOU 1994, Art.7). TIPH evidently saw non-
interference as non-enforcement, as observers did place themselves between IDF 
soldiers and stone-throwing Palestinians (Rodan 1995). IDF, conversely, believed the 
observers should stand aside (Rodan 1995). From 1996 on, the observers have avoided 
inter-positioning, believing that Israel would otherwise cancel the mission (Øverkil 
2004b [Interview]). Yet, only in 1997 was the issue settled in the framework of the 
TIPH Agreement itself, i.e.: not in the MOU (TIPH Agreement 1997, Art.3). 
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There have also been discrepancies in the interpretation of “police functions” (MOU 
1994, Art.7). TIPH has continued to interview complainants and witnesses, despite 
IDF reluctance to investigate so-called alleged reports.94 One report justified the 
policy of taking testimonies thus:  
“TIPH wants to stress that cases reported to TIPH are an important source of information since TIPH is not able 
to be present everywhere at all times. Furthermore, a feeling of security is dependent on the individual’s 
perception of the security situation and cannot be assessed by concentrating on incidents observed by TIPH 
only” (PR IV 1-2). 
- d) No Access to Information  
An apparent shortcoming of all the TIPH mandates was that neither obliged the parties 
to provide TIPH with information relevant to the fulfilment of its tasks. Such a clause 
is standard in UN peacekeeping and Civilian Policing mandates. During TIPH I, 
meetings took place between Palestinian and Israeli local authorities, without TIPH 
being invited, and only after some time was TIPH able to place a liaison officer at the 
Municipality (Johansen 2002a [Interview]; WS 10:1). Moreover, IDF soldiers in the 
field were ordered not to give any information away to the observers, a later consistent 
policy (Rodan 1995). According to Johansen (2002a [Interview]),  
“The Israelis only gave us information that they somehow benefited from us having.” 
 
Under the TIPH III Agreement (1997), TIPH was incorporated into the DCO. 
However, there was some local resistance to this arrangement, especially on the part of 
IDF, and it would soon become clear that the parties kept making decisions jointly – 
without informing TIPH (PR I:7;9). After lobbying, TIPH got a Liaison Officer 
stationed at the DCO, but access to information remained an issue (PRs I:9f;II:4;VI:8). 
At street level, observers were often denied information about the reasons for 
detentions and arrests (PRs V:9; VI:19f).95 In July 1998, the Israeli representative in 
the JHC even refused to give information on arrests raised in that forum, saying,  
“TIPH will generally not be informed about the reasons for the arrests but only about the behaviour of the IDF 
during arrests. Furthermore, TIPH will merely obtain requested information on selected cases” (PR IV:4). 
 
By then, TIPH only considered 19% of the cases it reported to be answered in a 
satisfactory manner (PR IV:4). That figure would later improve, and despite resumed 
hostilities and a full stop in JHC meetings, in March 2002 a TIPH Liaison Officer 
                                                 
94 Reports have in practice often been “partly observed”, implying that witness testimony has been collected to substantiate, 
correct and expand the observers’ understanding of the situation.  
95 Palestinians, themselves, often complained about not being told the reason for their detention (PR VII:14). 
 
 
57
estimated the proportion of reports unanswered to be only ca.10% (TIPH LO 2002 
[interview]). Yet, only 52% of the cases were answered within 3 months of request.  
- e) Mandatory Restrictions on Movement within the AOR 
According to the first Hebron Agreement (1994),  
“TIPH will enjoy freedom of movement for the performance of its tasks… Such freedom of movement shall not 
be restricted, except for reasons of imperative military necessity, and then only as an exceptional measure” 
(TIPH Agreement 1994, Art. 7). 
 
During the subsequent MOU negotiations Hebron Commander, Col. Klifi, challenged 
this provision (Johansen 2002a). First, he insisted that patrols should be stationary. 
That was unacceptable to Johansen, who succeeded in negotiating a compromise, 
whereby TIPH would have both stationary and mobile patrols. Then Military areas 
were declared off limits and detention centres were defined as military areas. At one 
point, Klifi indicated that he would declare the whole city centre a military area, 
effectively barring TIPH from the focal clash-points (Johansen 2002b [interview]). 
Johansen then threatened to cancel the mission. Klifi backed down, but patrols did not 
get access to private property, military camps and security installations (MOU 1994, 
B.3.). During the mission, IDF frequently declared limited military zones within the 
city.96 The restrictions on access to private property and military areas and installations 
were kept in the later TIPH mandates, but the demand that some patrols be stationary 
was dropped. The military zones, as well as physical obstacles have later made access 
to officially open areas difficult (author’s observation 2002). 
Explicit, Extra-Mandatory Restrictions on Observation 
By “explicit, extra-mandatory” I mean restrictions, for which the provisions in the 
relevant agreements were doubtful, but which IDF has nevertheless insisted on. Some 
of these may not have been intended to inhibit TIPH.  
- a) Restrictions on Movement 
When the preparatory team of TIPH I arrived in Hebron in April 1994, they were 
escorted by IDF wherever they went. While that was a reassurance to some, others felt 
restrained and imperilled. After the Yeshiva students’ incident on 16 May 1994, TIPH 
                                                 
96 See Weekly summaries (WS), Nos. 1:1; 3:1; 4:1; 5:1f; 8:1; 9:1; 10:2. 
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was politely but unequivocally asked to stay off the streets, on the grounds that IDF 
was unable to ensure the security of TIPH members (Johansen 2002b[Interview]).  
 
In 1996, Israel began constructing a Bypass road, that cut through the northern part of 
the city, and which, according to TIPH, in practice reduced its AOR (PR V:10). 
During TIPH III, the observers have consistently been denied access to the area around 
the Abraham Shrine, although it is clearly inside Hebron City, and therefore within 
TIPH’s mandated AOR (Interim Agreement 1995, Map No.9; TIPH Agreement 1997, 
Art. 1; PRs I:8; II:15). TIPH has also been held up at Checkpoints.97 Finally, TIPH was 
denied access to Shuhada Street and the settlement of Tel Rumeida, after one settler 
was stabbed to death in his home in 1998. TIPH accepted the move “under the 
circumstances”, despite the special peril to Palestinians in such times (PR V:9).  
 
In September 2001, IDF denied regular TIPH patrol cars access to H-2, on the grounds 
that they were too easy to emulate by Palestinian terrorists (Eltervåg 2002).98  
- b) Restrictions on language 
On 30 December 1997, Eytan Bentsur, Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (IMFA), gave Israel’s consent to a renewal of the TIPH mandate. 
However, he added that,  
“Israel expects there to be a dialogue on the nature and role of the TIPH in order to prevent misunderstandings 
and ensure its effectiveness” (Dudkevitch 1997). 
 
In diplomatic vernacular, this linking of mandate renewal to understated critique, 
would constitute a warning that TIPH should take care not to provoke Israel further. 
Israel has later strongly reacted to references to the Universal Declaration of Human 
                                                 
97 According to PR V: “…IDF reinforcement units denied TIPH access to places in the AOR or told TIPH patrols to leave an 
area where detentions took place. In some cases the IDF troops tried to obstruct the observation work of TIPH preventing its 
patrols from taking pictures or following a police patrol” (PR V:9). This was not a passing phenomenon, as shown by the 
following passage from PR VII: “On several occasions, Israeli security forces restricted the freedom of movement of TIPH. 
In the areas between the Cave of Machpelah/Ibrahimi Mosque, Bab Al Khan and Avraham Avinu settlement, TIPH patrols 
were repeatedly stopped by Israeli Security forces and prevented from moving freely, even on foot. These decisions were 
taken by local company/platoon commanders and not on the regional level. TIPH was several times forced to contact the IDF 
liaison to solve the matter. IDF later reassured TIPH that it would instruct all its soldiers to let TIPH pass freely, and that 
such incidents should not occur again” (PR VII:11). 
98 While the TIPH co-ordinator was sceptical of the Israeli reasons for barring TIPH cars, the Jerusalem Post on 14 
November 2001, reported that three Fatah members had been arrested for planning and preparing a car-bomb attack, under 
the guise of TIPH insignia.  
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Rights (UDHR 1948). The central argument was that “one cannot be both a witness 
and a judge” (Eltervåg 2002 [Interview]).    
 
Self-Imposed Restrictions on Observation: Standard Operational Procedures 
 
I have not been given access to TIPH Standard Operational Procedures (SOP). Still, 
other sources shed some light on TIPH policies and priorities.  
- Avoid Areas of Live Fire 
As we have seen, during TIPH I, observers would place themselves between IDF 
soldiers and stone-throwing Palestinians. This practice was abandoned perhaps as 
early as 1994, or at least during TIPH II (Øverkil 2004 [interview]). According to an 
internal Risk Assessment of early January 1997, 
“If live ammunition is being used for shooting, the observer should drive away from the area, put on a heavy-
duty protective vest and helmet and then drive back to HQ by the safest route” (RAI 1997b, Art 7.2.2).  
 
Direct observation in 2002 indicated that TIPH observers would still drive away from 
scenes of live fire, but not necessarily all the way back to Headquarters. Instead, a 
radio-based communications-system allows the Duty Officer to direct patrols to 
strategic positions, such as observation points in lofty terrain. Meanwhile, a bullet-
proof car would approach the area in question, as far as roadblocks etc. permit. 
- Avoid Areas of Stone-throwing 
The 1997 Risk Assessment also said, 
“Avoid driving in areas where there is known to be daily stone-throwing at TIPH vehicles and personnel” (RAI 
1997b, Art 7.5.2).  
 
TIPH has been targeted by both Israeli and Palestinian stone-throwers (Øverkil 2004 
[Interview]). After two settler boys dropped a 3kg. stone on a TIPH car in August 
2001, smashing the windshield and nearly injuring two female observers, HOM 
declared that TIPH could no longer patrol H-2 (Aftenposten, 27 August 2001). The 
patrolling was later resumed, but at a far less frequent rate (Wilder 2002 [Interview]).  
- Avoid driving at night  
TIPH has always prioritised daytime observation. Prior to the killing of two observers 
in March 2002, TIPH had one car regularly patrolling at night. Night patrols were 
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suspended for the rest of 2002, but resumed again in June 2003 (Knutsen 2003a 
[interview]; TIPH Newsletter 13 June 2003).   
 
De Facto Restrictions on Observation. 
- Movement 
Roads in Hebron are narrow and dwindling, often allowing only one car to pass at a 
time. Concrete roadblocks and barbed-wire present further impediments. 
- Language Proficiency  
TIPH I included only 4 Arabic Speakers and 1 Hebrew speaker. Emphasis was put on 
expanding the number of language experts during TIPH II, and from then on, it has 
been the declared policy of TIPH to have at least one Arabic speaker per patrol (Ruggi 
1996; Øverkil (2002 [Interview]).    
- Equipment  
a) Cars: TIPH seems to have been sufficiently equipped with cars throughout its 
operations. However, since 1994 onwards, cars have been vandalised and pelted with 
stones, forcing TIPH to reduce its presence in some areas. During TIPH III, a bullet-
proof car was acquired in order to patrol trouble spots, and a second one was ordered 
in 2002 (Øverkil 2004[interview]). The regular patrol cars have shaded windshields, 
and according to one informant, could easily be mistaken for cars used by Israeli 
undercover units (Banāt 2002 [Interview]).99
 
b) Security equipment: Helmets, flak-jackets and gas-masks have been standard 
equipment since 1994, although well into TIPH III, such equipment was considered a 
national responsibility - and varied in quality (Øverkil 2004b [Interview]). The use of 
such equipment during various levels of alert is guided by Standard Operational 
Procedures. TIPH personnel have never been armed, despite provisions in all TIPH 
Agreements for pistols (TIPH Agreements 1994 A.6.; 1996, Art. 7; 1997, Art. 8).  
 
c) Surveillance equipment: Since 1994, each TIPH observer has been provided with 
binoculars and a camera. Notebooks have been used for the record. In addition, TIPH 
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has made increasing use of video, and today, video cameras are standard equipment on 
patrol (Øverkil 2004b [Interview]).  
 
d) Communications equipment: All TIPH patrol cars have radio transceivers. In 
addition, all TIPH members have a personal mobile phone, which is in frequent use 
during patrolling (author’s observation 2002).    
 
e) Uniforms: TIPH observers have always been uniformed in a way that would 
distinguish them from both civilians and the various security forces. In 1994, the 
uniforms were white, inspiring the nickname “the pizza men.” Since 1996 they have 
been grey and blue. The relevance to ability of observation is two-fold. On the one 
hand, it makes patrols visible at a distance, which might give violators time to stop 
their misconduct. On the other, those who want to draw the observers’ attention to an 
incident could more easily find them.    
- IDF Attitudes  
Having de facto military hegemony in Hebron, IDF’s consent is a sine qua non for 
TIPH observation activities. In fact, IDF’s approach to TIPH has been quite complex, 
and seems to have depended on individual factors, political climate, specific incidents, 
etc. I believe four general observations to be correct:  
1) Although there have been several aberrations, the general climate between IDF soldiers and TIPH patrols is 
respectful. 
2) TIPH has never been viewed as an alternative source of stability, i.e.: the objective of IDF in negotiations 
has been to limit TIPH’s capabilities, not to maximise them; 
3) The temporal trend has been one of increasing scepticism towards TIPH’s intentions, reflected in a lower 
priority on co-operation/co-ordination (See more below); 
4) The displayed attitude has correlated positively with rank. TIPH has been more favourably viewed among 
those relatively distant from the day-to-day operational demands of the streets of Hebron.100 
  
According to TIPH reports, in 1998-99, there were four episodes of IDF gun-pointing 
at TIPH observers, some of which were trivialised by an official IDF representative.101 
                                                                                                                                                        
99 The statement was given six days before the attack on a TIPH car on 26 March 2002, and was thus not intended as an 
apology for that attack.  
100 This being said, it is of course quite possible that negative attitudes of lower service-men has come as result of orders or 
attitudes emanating at higher level. Øverkil commented thus on the Brigade Commander’s failure to meet in the JHC during 
the year 2002: “It was impossible to sustain co-operation. That was when I had to ask myself: Is this the Brigade 
Commander’s own decision? Is he authorised to make decisions like this, or is it rather the policy of the State of Israel?” 
(Øverkil 2004a [interview]). 
101 According to the representative, the soldiers used their telescope rifle sights as binoculars (PR VI:14). In one case, the IDF 
representative who gave this explanation was the Liaison Officer (PR VII:11). The other time, it is unclear precisely who 
gave it, as the term used in the TIPH report was simply “IDF” (PR VI:14). TIPH retorted that the distance between the 
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Meanwhile, a certain hostility/contempt seems to have been manifest in acts of 
symbolic degradation such as spitting, theft of TIPH flags and attaching a dog’s skull 
to the flagstaff of a TIPH car (PR VII:11). An IDF representative in the JHC at this 
time was quoted as saying, 
“TIPH as already stated previously is neither an organization nor in the position to know if a detention is 
justified or not, or the reason for it” (PR X:9). 
 
On 9 August 2001, unnamed “senior security officers” from Hebron publicly accused 
TIPH of spying for Fatah, and the claims were supported by a former IDF 
Commander.102 Similar accusations later resurfaced, but were, according to the new 
HOM, never substantiated (Øverkil 2004b [interview]). 
- Settler Attitudes  
According to David Wilder (2002 [interview]), Spokesperson of the Jewish 
Community in Hebron, TIPH is biased and provocative, weakens the security of the 
settlers, and has no positive consequences. While in 1994 and 1996 settler protest 
mainly took the form of name-calling, by 1997 observers claimed to have been 
physically obstructed (PRs II:4;IV:3). One settler was involved in a gun-pointing 
incident in 1998 and the year after another was reported to have said: “one day I will 
kill you all”(PRs V:18; VII:10). Threats have later multiplied (Eltervåg 2002 
[interview]). In connection with the near-fatal stone-throwing incident on 17 August 
2001, HOM Karl-Henrik Sjursen said,  
“…The Hebron settlers enjoy total immunity and may act without any fear of prosecution….They are calling us 
‘Nazis’, ‘sons of Hitler’, ‘Gestapo’ and ‘SS’. They take every opportunity to offend us. So far, they have not 
used weapons, only sticks and stones - which may also be lethal. Some of us think they will soon use machine-
guns” (Aftenposten, 27 August 2001).       
  
- Attitudes of Palestinian Civil Society   
I have not been given access to polls on Palestinian attitudes towards TIPH. Yet, 
secondary and private sources reveal some of the findings. These sources, 
corroborated by public statements since 1994 and private conversations in 2002, 
indicate the general mood as being, “good, but not good enough.” Misgivings seem to 
have been linked to at least five rationales:  
                                                                                                                                                        
soldiers and observers in question had been less than 30 metres, and that gun-pointing for the sake of a close-up was “totally 
unacceptable behaviour in any armed force, military or police” (PRs V:18; VI:14; VII:11).   
102 Confer Aftenposten, 9 August 2001; Dudkevitch (2001); Wilder (2001). 
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1) The compromise, of which TIPH was a part, also ensured the continued presence of settlers; 
2) The mandate is too weak to provide any “real” security for the Palestinians of Hebron; 
3) TIPH has at times been unable to fulfil even its mandated tasks; 
4) TIPH is insensitive to local values; 
5) TIPH is an agent of the West, and knowingly or unknowingly serves Israel. 
 
Already before the deployment of TIPH I, threats came in from an apparently Islamist 
source (Johansen 2002a [Interview]). Thus, the “Three Heads” consulted with leading 
Imams prior to deployment, and ensured that they were invited to the Municipality’s 
Welcoming Ceremony and other high-profile receptions. TIPH I was swiftly operative, 
and early events boosted the standing of the mission. Paradoxically, that led to more 
Palestinian threats - namely ones aimed at making observers patrol the nearby village 
of Halhul. Another cause of friction, was an incident in which an observer had 
accepted a flower from a local girl, leading to protest from prominent local women 
(Johansen 2002a [interview]). A wave of bomb-scares occurred in June 1994 and a 
TIPH car was torched in July. While Johansen (2002b [interview]) did not preclude 
that IDF, in addition to disarming the bombs, might also have planted them, the car 
was thought to have been set on fire by a Palestinian (WS 11:1). The waning of 
complaints filed towards the end of TIPH I, despite heavy clashes, might indicate a 
lowering of expectations among Palestinians (WS 11:1). According to Lia (1998:58f), 
polls showed that 20% of the locals thought TIPH reduced the number of clashes, 
whereas 23% felt it contributed to a feeling of security.  
 
With respect to the low-scale TIPH II, there is evidence of disillusionment at TIPH’s 
abilities, and anger at perceived unseemly conduct (Hostens 2003:43; Prusher 1996; 
Ruggi 1996). It seems as if the shortage of observers not only limited TIPH’s ability to 
record incidents, but also the ability to process alleged reports. Moreover, a rise in 
settler activism, including violence in the presence of observers, might have 
undermined TIPH’s credibility as a deterrent. On the other hand, there is evidence of 
friendship between mission members and private Palestinians (Grønningsæter 1996).  
 
During TIPH III, there has been pervasive stone-throwing against TIPH cars, and as 
we have seen, that has affected TIPH’s mode of operations. A poll conducted in the 
spring of 1998 showed that a majority did not believe TIPH had contributed to 
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reducing the number of incidents between Palestinians and Israelis (PR IV:2). Later 
that year, an imam twice accused TIPH of spying for Israel, and of behaving 
indecently (PR IV:2). The charges came to a halt after TIPH had a meeting with the 
religious establishment, but in 2001 they were repeated (Dagbladet 2002 ). Gun-
pointing and shooting against TIPH personnel took place in 1998 and 2000, though the 
shooting remains unclear.103 After a person dressed in Palestinian Police uniform shot 
to death two observers on 26 March 2002, TIPH’s operations were briefly suspended, 
and 35 mission members were sent out of the city (TIPH Press Release, 6 April 2002).  
 
All TIPH missions have had a separate section charged with community relations. 
Apart from fulfilling the humanitarian elements of the mandates, these sections have 
been viewed as important promoters of TIPH’s image in the eyes of Palestinians. 
According to Hostens (2003:47), the community relations projects,  
“…have contributed enormously to acceptance of and respect for TIPH and its work…”  
- Attitudes of Palestinian Local Authorities  
The attitude of Hebron’s Civil Authorities towards TIPH has reflected the public 
mood, perhaps with a slightly more positive nuance. The following quote by Mayor 
Natshe seems to capture a moderately positive, and decidedly polite, yet perhaps a 
somewhat disillusioned or passive approach: 
“TIPH is better than nothing” (Natshe 2002). 
 
The Municipality helped negotiate the rent of the TIPH premises in 1994, and 
bestowed crucial public sanction on the mission by officially receiving it. Yet, the 
Municipality did not establish any formal, day-to-day liaison with TIPH, and Johansen 
missed visions as to how Palestinians might benefit from the international presence. 
After the Yeshiva Students’ incident, Natshe publicly criticised TIPH of 
ineffectiveness, while clearly seeing the potential for using Johansen as a messenger to 
the international community.104 A certain conflict of interests was evident on the issue 
                                                 
103 Both sides accused each other of the shooting, which occurred while a TIPH car was following the entourage of Mary 
Robinson, The UN Commissioner for Human Rights (Dudkevitch 2000).  
104 At the height of the crisis, both Arafat, Peres (who was then Minister of Foreign Affairs) and ex-US President Jimmy 
Carter, were convened in Oslo. Natshe asked Johansen to go there, and present the situation with a view to finding a solution. 
When Johansen declined, feeling that he would best serve the Palestinians of Hebron through his presence, the Municipality 
went over his head to the Norwegian ambassador to Israel, who subsequently ordered Johnsen to go (Johansen 2002a). 
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of stone-throwing against IDF soldiers, as TIPH put pressure on the Municipality to 
control the rioters, and TIPH might have embarrassed the authorities when it 
discovered the dismal hospital facilities offered underprivileged pregnant women. 
TIPH was not invited when a Municipality delegation successfully petitioned IDF to 
release a number of detainees, and the local authorities did not campaign to have the 
TIPH mandate prolonged. At the farewell ceremony, Natshe’s speech opened, 
“We would like to express our great thanks to the TIPH team for the great role that they played, and for the great 
help that they have given to Hebron resident, although the goals of your mandate were to normalize the life in 
Hebron wasn’t achieved” (Draft of speech attached to WS 13 (1994)). 
 
Vice-Mayor Awni al-Zughayer later recalled, 
“Maybe they [TIPH] had some psychological effect, but later we found out that nothing positive happened to us 
as a result of their presence… Of course, we told them that they soothed and calmed the situation… We didn’t 
want to hurt their feelings” (Jerusalem Report, 15 May 1997).  
 
While Natshe credited TIPH II, he also said that the IDF did not take its reports 
seriously. Moreover, TIPH was, it appears, not informed of demonstrations organised 
by the Municipality (Prusher 1996).   
 
After 1997, the Hebron PPF commander replaced the Mayor in the JHC. At least until 
spring 1999, PPF had bi-weekly meetings with TIPH about the security of the mission, 
and has undertaken various measures to safe-guard observers from public threats (PR 
VII:12). On the other hand, the PPF has not consistently enforced a zone of immunity 
from paramilitary operations around the TIPH premises (author’s observation, 2002).  
 
There has been close co-operation between TIPH and the Municipal Hebron 
Reconstruction Committee (HRC), aimed at repopulating the Old City which, 
according to the Committee, had been drained by ca. 80% of its Palestinian residents 
in the period 1987-97(B’Tselem 2003h:2; PR VI:29; Øverkil 2002 [interview]). 
 
All in all, the Hebron local authorities have viewed TIPH’s operations with favour, 
and have not actively limited TIPH’s range of operations any more than TIPH has 
done itself. On the other hand, there have been certain frictions between Palestinian 
interests as understood by TIPH and as understood by the local authorities, in which 
cases the latter have been given priority.   
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-   Informants  
Largely as a result of shortages in manpower, a network of local contacts was 
established during TIPH II. At the same time, a separate Research, Analysis and 
Internal Information unit (RAID) was formed, its aim being to gather information from 
media with a potential bearing on the situation in Hebron. With the expansion of the 
mission in 1997, efforts to promote TIPH’s public image went hand in hand with 
dissemination of instructions on how to contact TIPH.  
 
An important variable with respect to intelligence gathering through individual 
contacts is the trust of informers in intentions and discretion of the receiver. As will 
become clear, TIPH does not pass on the identity of its sources. More problematic is 
perhaps the response to incoming information. In many cases, TIPH would refer the 
complainant to other instances, most prominently, the Israeli Police, and Palestinians 
with a grievance have often balked at the prospect of turning to them (PR V:19). 
Internal Norms and Cognitive Apparatus of Observers  
Obviously, to observe a Human Rights’ violation, you would have to know what a 
Human Rights’ violation is. Thus the cognitive apparatus of observers is essential to 
observation and report-writing. Since there is a two-way relationship between 
institutional norms and individual perspective, I shall treat the two issues combined. 
TIPH would not let me undertake a survey aimed at analysing the Vorverständnis of its 
members. However, the following factors should be noted: 
- a) National and Professional Differences 
All Turkish TIPH members are military officers, whereas nearly all Italians have been 
recruited from the Carabinieri. From the other participating states, there has been a 
mixture of professional backgrounds, but two main groups stand out: Police officers 
and Language experts. Of the latter group, many are also human rights activists. David 
Wilder, spokesperson of the settler community, made the following observation:  
“If an IDF soldier stopped a Palestinian, a Scandinavian would see this as a breach of Human Rights, whereas 
the Italians/Turks would see this as a normal thing, what they have done many times themselves” (Wilder 2002). 
 
Wilder might have an interest in downplaying IDF’s use of force. Yet, one observer 
confirmed his impression of national cleavages within TIPH (2001 [Interview]).  
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- b) Integrating mechanisms 
When arriving in Hebron, TIPH recruits go through an introductory course, in which 
the situation in Hebron is presented in its social and legal aspects. They also attend a 
report-writing seminary, aimed at enabling all mission members – not only observers – 
to write incident reports. During this course, the observers are taught to, 
“…write what they see, not what they think they see. By that I mean, for instance, do not write ‘terrorist,’ but 
rather ‘armed and masked person wearing civilian clothes’” (Knutsen 2002). 
 
The implication is, that objectivity is a) presumed possible and b) the norm. 
 
All mission members share the same Standard Operational Procedures, although the 
relevance of each article may vary from position to position. 
 
Since 1996, it has been the express policy of TIPH to combine language- and 
police/military competence when putting together observer teams. 
 
Incident reports are reviewed by at least three instances before being presented to the 
IDF.105 Observers whose reports are found inadequate are asked to rewrite, furthering 
an internalisation of TIPH’s norms of report-writing.  
 
Two potentially conflicting norms of report-writing, are: 
- Discretion (Do not disclose the identity of Palestinians witnesses, stone-throwers etc.); 
- Reliability (Corroborate the observation as far as possible)   
 
The dilemma is obvious in relation to photographic evidence of incidents, in the 
naming of witnesses, etc. Of course, lack of hard evidence would seem to lower the 
reliability of reports, and could at worst be taken as an excuse for IDF not to treat the 
report in earnest, or to offer an alternative version with as little evidence to support it. 
TIPH seems to have erred on the side of caution, i.e.: withheld identity information, 
while keeping record of it internally. Lately, TIPH has also acquired technical means 
of blurring video images (TIPH LO 2002 [Interview]; Indreberg 2004 [Interview])  
                                                 
105 The instances are the Duty Officer, Deputy Head of Operations and the Report Assessing Group consisting of 
Head of Staff and Head of Operations (Knutsen 2002a; TIPH Job descriptions). 
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- c) Institutional norms as evident in Periodic Reports and official statements 
TIPH promotes itself as neutral. Neutrality in TIPH parlance corresponds to 
impartiality as defined in Chapter 3. In response to bias charges, launched by Wilder 
(2000) in The Jerusalem Post, TIPH’s spokesperson, Henrik Lunden retorted, 
“…Wilder wrote that ‘TIPH has no obligation to observe Arab instigation or violence against Hebron’s Jewish 
citizens.’ This allegation is not factual. TIPH […] is a neutral observer presence charged with the task of 
monitoring how the two parties to the Oslo II agreement and to the Hebron Protocol abide by their common 
understandings in order to promote normalization of daily life for all of Hebron’s citizens. The proof of TIPH’s 
evenhanded reporting is its close coordination and good working relations with both the Palestinian Authority 
and the State of Israel” (Lunden 2001). 
 
Since the overarching question here is to what extent TIPH’s activities aimed at 
providing a feeling of security to the Palestinians of Hebron might have been 
hampered by institutional norms, I shall not discuss the validity of the claim to 
neutrality as such. But it should be noted that neutrality could be defined in relation to 
the mandate or to the parties, 106 and even in the latter case, it could mean either, 
- Levelling the playing field between two unequal actors (consistent with equity of outcome); 
- Relating to unequal actors in a similar way, i.e.: not changing the balance (consistent with equity of 
opportunity).107 
 
I shall argue that TIPH in certain ways has adopted the equity of opportunity 
definition, thereby cementing the pre-existing power structure in Hebron.  
 
The TIPH Periodic Reports to which I have been given access scarcely reflect the 
premise that the Israeli presence in Hebron is an occupation.108 In these reports, the 
laws-of-war are never invoked, and although there are allusions to principles of these 
laws, only such principles that also exist in other legal regimes are mentioned. There is 
not a single precise reference to any body of law. According to Indreberg (2004 
[Interview]), however, Periodic Reports of 2003 have alluded or made reference to 
both the Hague Regulations (HR 1907) and the Fourth Geneva Convention (FGC 
1949), as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR 1948), which 
belongs to another legal regime.  
                                                 
106 If the mandate were biased, a neutral application of it would be biased in effect. Since the TIPH mandate says nothing of 
the Jewish community in Hebron, and is explicitly intended to strengthen the feeling of security of Palestinians, as well as 
their economy, any bona fide application of it would seem to be biased in effect, i.e.: with regard to inter-party balance.  See 
Daniel (1996:61) for a useful discussion of the concept of impartiality. 
107 Neutrality may of course also be defined in relation to a larger context, as it was done in Chapter 3. 
108 Derivatives of the word “occupation” appear only twice within the 7 available Periodic Reports (totalling 146 pages): 
“The TIPH cannot at present have a well-founded opinion on the right of entry into private homes by IDF as an occupying 
force…” (PR I:12); “In connection to these cases, TIPH also observed twice, the presence of children on rooftops occupied 
by IDF soldiers stationary at observation posts” (PR X:10). 
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 Initially, there would seem to be at least four legal regimes by which critique could be 
measured out: 
- The Laws-of-War (Hague Regulations, Geneva Conventions (and –Protocols) and Hague Convention for 
the Protection of Cultural Property (CPCP 1954)(with Protocol));109 
- International Standards of Law-Enforcement (Code of Conduct for Law-Enforcement Officials (1979) 
and Basic Principles for the Use of Force and Firearms by Law-enforcement Officials (1990); 
- The International Human Rights regime (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, etc.); 
- The Laws of the Land110  
   
There are discrepancies among these regimes, particularly between, on the one hand, 
the laws-of-war, and on the other, standards of law-enforcement and Human Rights. 
Whereas the former embody the logic of defence, hinging on friend-from-foe 
discrimination and preventive use of force, the latter two hinge on non-discrimination 
and minimum/reactive use of force. Given the near-universal consensus that the HR 
(1907) and FGC (1949) apply legally to the Israeli occupation, it is remarkable that 
TIPH has left such potent instruments unused for so long. Here are some hypotheses: 
- TIPH has heeded the Israeli claim that the FGC does not apply to its occupation, and has avoided 
positioning on the issue out of fear of compromising its impartial (neutral) status; 
- TIPH has seen that references to the FGC would either lead to condemnation of the settlements as such - or 
if applied eclectically, to logical inconsistency; 
- TIPH has perceived the incompatibility of the laws-of-war and the Human Rights regime, and has 
considered the latter more relevant or useful; 
- TIPH has feared that invoking the FGC would prompt Israel to cancel the mission; 
- TIPH has been led by Police officers to whom the paradigm of law-enforcement comes more naturally than 
the paradigm of war; 
- TIPH has interpreted the mandate restrictively, and only done what the mandate explicitly allows it to do, 
rather than all that the mandate does not disallow. 
 
The MOU does not put express limits on the use of law, simply stating that,  
“…TIPH will elaborate daily situation report[s] based on internationally recognized human rights standards.”  
 
What TIPH has done in the period January 1997- January 2000, is to allude this clause 
of the MOU, refer to the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, the Hebron Protocol, 
and the TIPH Agreement. On one occasion, TIPH referred to “military standards and 
international law”, on another, to “fundamental principles of policing” and on a third 
                                                 
109 The Hague Regulations (HR 1907) are accepted by Israel as customary international law (Roberts 1992:45). Israel has 
ratified the Geneva Conventions (1949), but not the Geneva Protocols (Roberts and Guellf 2000:358;495). However, parts of 
the latter, particularly those articles which pertain to discrimination between combatants and non-combatants, are considered 
customary international law, and are therefore binding on Israel (HRW 2001:19). Despite its ratification, Israel does not 
accept that the Fourth Geneva Convention (FGC 1949) is de jure applicable to its occupations. Israel has ratified The Hague 
Cultural Property Convention (1954) and acceded to its Protocol (Roberts and Guellf 2000:403).  
110 According to von Glahn (1996: ) there are three law systems within an occupied territory: a) Pre-existing national law (in 
this case Jordanian and British Mandatory law); b) Military orders of the Occupier; c) international law (i.e.: the Laws-of-
War). This picture is complicated in this instance by Israel extending its legislature to state citizens outside the borders of 
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to unspecified Israeli Open Fire Regulations (PRs I:12; II:8; V:15). After 1999, there 
have also been references to the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum.  
 
The only Periodic Report that structured its critique according to a set of norms 
(conceived of as Human Rights) was the first one.111 All later available Periodic 
Reports have criticised instances that are problematic with regard to the laws-of-war as 
well as to Human Rights/Standards of Policing, but infested terms such as war crimes, 
international delinquencies, violations etc. have typically been avoided. Below I 
compare the utility of these regimes in the Hebron context:  
Table 10: Comparison of the Laws-of-War with the Human Rights’ Regime/Standards of Policing 
Utility of Regime  
The Laws-of-War The Human Rights 
regime/Standards of Policing 
Use of armed force against stone-
throwers? 
Permissible in so far as the stone-
throwers are de facto combatants. 
Proportionality remains an 
overriding principle.112
Forbidden: everybody has the right 
to life. (Exception: as last resort in 
order to save lives). 
Expropriation of property? Forbidden. Requisition is 
permissible of movable goods, and 
perhaps immovables, but regulated 
Everybody has a right to property, 
but this is generally not interpreted 
as prohibiting expropriation113  
Hindrance of education? Forbidden Forbidden 
Equality of rights? Civilians of the occupied territories 
are protected, while settlers are not. 
Regular combatants of both sides 
have equal privileges, while 
irregulars have very few rights. 
All have equal rights, unless 
convicted of ordinary crime. 
Hindrance of medical aid? Forbidden, but searches of 
ambulances are permissible 
Forbidden 
Sweeping curfews? Forbidden as collective punishment 
Permissible as proportionate 
defensive measure, but regulated 
Forbidden. Everybody has the right 
to freedom of movement (Art. 13). 
Use of public land and water 
resources by settlers? 
Forbidden Not forbidden 
Destruction of private property? Permissible as act of defence, 
Forbidden as act of retaliation 
Forbidden (but may be circum-
vented through expropriation) 
Shooting without warning? Permissible, if target is lawful and 
shooter is regular combatant 
Only as last resort, in order to save 
lives, and after warning shot 
Armed under-cover operations? Forbidden Permissible, but regulated 
                                                                                                                                                        
Israel. In theory, Israeli convicts in the West Bank could be tried according to Israeli or Jordanian law, but in practice, Israeli 
law has been applied (Btselem 1994:8).   
111 The First Periodic Report, was structured deductively, i.e.: the chapters would be named, Right to Life, Right to Equality, 
etc. Later reports were structured inductively, i.e.: chapters would be called, Intervention by Security Forces, Minor Clashes 
and Stonethrowing etc. The former disposition clearly spelled out the norms that were considered violated, while the latter 
put emphasis on describing the incident, and less on holding it to a standard. Incidents were characterised, though, mainly by 
reference to the Interim Agreement, the Hebron Protocol, the TIPH Agreement, and the MOU, but also by unspecified 
Human Rights Standards. For example, PR II would say, “Such use of force, seen as a whole, may seem disproportionate to 
the threat posed by stone throwing children and youngsters. The Israeli security forces seem to lack the capability to give 
flexible response. Ultimately this is a question of fundamental principles of policing, which tie up with internationally 
recognised human rights standards” (PR II:8). 
112 Confer von Glahn (1996:671f) 
113 Compare UDHR (1948, Art. 17) with von Glahn (1996:202). 
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What is immediately clear, is that TIPH’s avoidance of the war paradigm, has made 
critique of settlement-related matters, except for lacking law-enforcement against 
violent settlers, more difficult. On the other hand, the law-enforcement paradigm 
might have strengthened TIPH’s hand on the issue of crowd control methods. TIPH 
critique, raised within a Human Rights-framework has been dismissed in the JHC in 
terms of the war paradigm. It should be remembered in this context, that the Israeli 
Supreme Court has ruled that,  
“The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not intended for dealing with factual circumstances such as 
those before us, i.e. in a territory under military government which is being administered as such in the wake of a 
war, and so long as the situation of war continues.”114  
 
A frequently alluded clause is, Article 1 of the TIPH Agreement, stating that, 
TIPH will assist in monitoring and reporting the efforts to maintain normal life in the City of Hebron 
 
As Normalisation in practice has been the fundamental precept of TIPH reports, one 
might expect TIPH to have a clearly defined vision of what that would mean. 
According to TIPH’s Research Officer 1, Andreas Indreberg (2004 [Interview]), no 
such definition exists. While ambiguity on this point was probably essential to 
reaching an agreement in the first place, both sides have retained their own definition. 
Palestinians ultimately saw normality as a change of the status quo ante, i.e.: IDF 
redeployment outside the city, while the settlers must either go or accept Palestinian 
citizenship. Continued settler presence was seen as a strictly interim arrangement, only 
acceptable if counterbalanced by an international peacekeeping force. 115  To the 
Israelis, meanwhile, normality meant a reversal to the status quo ante, i.e.: quiet and 
order while the Israeli civilian presence was upheld under IDF security guarantee – in 
the absence of a final status agreement - indefinitely. So, what could be read of TIPH’s 
conceptualisation of normality from applied discourse? Here is a select sample:    
 
For example, normality meant equality before the law (in a local context):  
“TIPH considers a guaranteed equal treatment of and equal protection for Palestinian and Jewish inhabitants as 
an essential prerequisite for a development towards normalisation” (PR VII:4). 
 
                                                 
114 HC 629/82, Mustafa et al. v. The Military Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region, Piskei Din 37 [1]158, 161. Cited 
in Qupty (1992:123).  
115 For evidence that the Palestinian conceptualisation of normality as agreed upon was consistent, see, Arsheed 
(1996); Erakat (2002 [interview]); Prusher (1996). Uri Savir (1999:132f) partly explains of how so many 
Palestinians could come to believe in this interpretation which had little solid basis in the written agreements.  
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As for construction/rehabilitation works, TIPH generally formulated its 
recommendations as if equal rights were the norm. In some cases TIPH advocated 
Palestinian projects while objecting to Israeli ones, in effect promoting a particularist 
concept of justice. But it was never said explicitly that Palestinians should have 
exclusive or greater rights in this regard.116
 
Moreover, normality meant a reduction of impediments to the free flow of people and 
goods, such as roadblocks, checkpoints, hostile crowds and strikes: 
“A major obstacle to the normalisation of life in Hebron, the closure of several streets, still persisted”(PR VI:4f). 
 
“Of paramount importance is the capability and determination to intervene and put an end to public disorder 
whenever it occurs. It is also very important that the PPF treat Israelis travelling in Area H1 correctly and with 
due respect” (PR II:18). 
 
“On 8 October [1998] al Fatah proclaimed a general strike in solidarity with the population in H2 area. All 
shops, offices and schools were closed, and the PPF declared that it would not intervene in the clashes. TIPH 
considers this approach an impediment to normalisation of life in Hebron” (PR V:14). 
 
Normality also meant a reduction in threats and violence, regardless of actor: 
“TIPH considers the shootings [by Palestinians] as very serious incidents. They pose a threat to the security of 
all the inhabitants of H2 and are also reason for the severe security measures. As such they are an impediment 
for the normalisation of life in the city. Furthermore, settlers moving in the city with weapons, even if they are in 
possession of the necessary license, is considered by TIPH to seriously affect the Palestinians’ feeling of 
security” (PR VI:19). 
 
“The continued expansion of the settlements as well as the provocative behaviour of some settlers on one hand, 
and the repeated daily stone throwing by Palestinians on the other, impede a normalisation of life in Hebron” 
(PR IV:11). 
 
What I find striking about these examples is the symmetry they express. TIPH has 
argued as if inter-communal equality were the norm, not Palestinian exclusivity. None 
of the available Periodic Reports have stated that the settlements are illegal, much less 
that it is an individual obligation on Israeli soldiers to defy orders that run contrary to 
the laws-of-war. Instead, 
“…Initiatives are needed in order to present the TIPH… as an agent of stability for both sides… It will be a 
challenge for TIPH, if the mission is extended, to embark upon a course of bridgebuilding – between TIPH and 
the Jewish community and above all between the two population groups – Jews and Palestinians” (PR I:14). 
 
                                                 
 116 The following example shows that TIPH, even when promoting Palestinian projects and denouncing Israeli ones did not 
invoke international law, but merely Israeli-Palestinian agreements. According to two subsequent Periodic Reports signed by 
the same HOM:  “The parties committed themselves in the ‘Protocol concerning the Redeployment in Hebron’ (paragraph 
11) to preserve the historic character of the city ‘in a way which does not harm or change that character in any part of the 
city.’ The building expansions in Avraham Avinu and Beit Romano clearly appear to be in contradiction to these provisions” 
(PR VI:29). And conversely: “Finally, TIPH was closely involved in a good working relationship with the Hebron 
Rehabilitation Committee regarding the final work on the first and only children’s playground in the Old City” (PR VII:9). 
Note that exclusivity of Palestinian rights was not part of the argument, only preservation of  “historic character”. That 
argument would of course seem to be undermined by the promotion of a playground – an anachronism in historic Hebron.    
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There were, as shown above in relation to construction, certain qualifications to this 
picture, and TIPH did not later endorse the settler presence in such unequivocal terms. 
On the other hand, neither has TIPH advocated the expulsion of the settlers (Indreberg 
2004 [Interview]). To what extent has this neutrality been a deliberate policy, and to 
what extent has it been a result of the habitus of TIPH’s leaders? According to PR VI, 
“…the reports do not elaborate on the historical background of the actual problems encountered in Hebron, and 
they do not go into political discussions” (PR VI:8). 
 
While the statements on normality above might be interpreted as tactical, in the sense 
that they would run as if inter-communal equality were the norm, while the real 
agenda was Palestinian exclusivity, the latter quote seems to go to the core of the 
conceptual apparatus of its authors. By categorising the conflict over the West Bank as 
political - not legal, one has in fact adopted the Israeli frame of reference. Whether 
this was indeed a “Freudian slip” or a carefully chosen statement remains a question. 
What is clear is, that there have been multiple fora for policy discussions, and that 
considerations of mandate extension have entered into the formulation of policies.117 
Indreberg (2004 [interview]), elaborated on the practical definition of normality thus: 
“…My interpretation of it is as follows: If we go back to 1997, what was it they perceived as abnormal then? I 
think the clue may be found in the Hebron Protocol, Article 7, which is titled, ‘Normalization of Life in the Old 
City.’ Paragraph b, subsections 1 and 2, explicitly name the opening of the wholesale market and the Shuhada 
Street for vehicular traffic. Subsection 9 commits the parties to the free movement of people, goods and vehicles. 
Moreover, economic activity, avoidance of friction and clashes, etc. are endorsed within the agreement. A more 
concrete definition than that, we do not have. The application of the principle has been, to a great extent, 
common sense…” 
 
As for the settlements, Indreberg (2004) [interview]) said, 
“The only thing we have to guide us, is how big the settlements were in 1997”. 
 
Although the TIPH mandate is exclusively concerned with the (feeling of) security of 
Palestinians, and although the settlers are not protected by the HR (1907) or the FGC 
(1949),118 TIPH has officially interpreted its mandate to include observation on behalf 
of the settler community, premised its argumentation on “equal rights” and interpreted 
normality as the situation prevailing immediately before the 1994 massacre, i.e.: a 
situation accrued as a result of irregular and illegal warfare. It is a serious question, 
                                                 
117 For example, conviction that TIPH inter-positioning would provoke Israel to cancel the mission was a major 
reason why TIPH avoided such a policy (Øverkil 2004b [Interview]).  
118 See von Glahn (1992:348) for a discussion of the purposes of the Hague Regulations. Protected persons of the 
FGC (1949) are defined by Art. 4 as “those who, … find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the 
hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.” 
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whether the Oslo agreements and the Hebron Protocol in particular conform with 
Articles 8 and 47 of the FGC (1949). On the other hand, equal rights in Hebron would 
mean a world of difference to the city’s Palestinians, and the pragmatic approach of 
TIPH, has been a prerequisite for its continued existence.     
Avenues of Influence 
While the gathering of information and formulation of reports are presumably essential 
to the impact of TIPH, so is the communication of these reports. Below, I shall focus 
on the Mandated Structures of Communication of the Hebron regime, and briefly look 
into the unofficial ones. First, a few general notes:  
 
The primary goal of TIPH’s reporting activity, as understood by TIPH, has been to 
influence the behaviour of Israelis in Hebron - civilian and military. Theoretically, that 
could be achieved through direct contact, or by various paths of indirect contact, not 
the least through influencing Palestinians. Infinite pathways of influence may be 
drawn into the model below. I shall, however, concentrate on these:  
- TIPH – settlers; 
- TIPH – local IDF/Police – settlers; 
- TIPH –  local Palestinians –  local IDF/Police – settlers; 
- TIPH – PPF – local Palestinians –  local IDF/Police – settlers; 
- TIPH – Israeli authority – local IDF/Police – settlers; 
- TIPH – Israeli media –  Israeli authority – local IDF/Police – settlers; 
- TIPH – diplomatic offices of participating countries – Israeli authority – local IDF/Police – settlers 
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Common to the TIPH mandates is their limiting of means of public pressure. In the 
section of the first MOU that dealt with reports, the highly significant parenthesis “(not 
for public use)” was unconventionally sneaked into the text. It has since remained, and 
TIPH has adopted a very strict interpretation.  
Mandated Structures of Communication 
On paper, the trend in the development of the official fora of the Hebron Regime, has 
been one of diminishing status and potential for multilateral leverage - but at the same 
time, of increasing local instrumentality. In practice, the trilateral fora have broken 
down, while TIPH has tried to compensate through local, bilateral, contact, and 
leverage through diplomatic channels.  
 
TIPH I    
The bodies to receive TIPH reports, according to the first TIPH mandate, were,  
 
- The Joint Hebron Committee (JHC), consisting of the Mayor of Hebron and the Head of the Israeli Civil 
Administration (i.e.: the Governor), plus one additional unspecified representative from each side; 
- The Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee (JLC), a high-level bilateral body established pursuant to 
the DOP (1993) to deal with “issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interests and disputes” 
(DOP, Art. X); 
- The Chair of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee of the Donors (AHLC), a multilateral ad-hoc committee 
established to co-ordinate international economic aid to the embryonic Palestinian National Authority. 
Norway chaired the AHLC.119 
 
The JHC was to receive reports on specific incidents, and was to meet with TIPH bi-
weekly (TIPH Agreement 1994, A.5.). The JLC and AHLC were to receive reports 
periodically, and no meetings were stipulated with TIPH.120 The structural weakness 
of this regime lay in at least two aspects: The multilateral component (AHLC) was not 
a likely deterrent vis-à-vis Israelis, since it was only funding the PNA. Secondly, the 
Israeli Governor was head of the Israeli Civil Administration (ICA), but not of the 
soldiers in the streets of Hebron. The latter were subordinate to his equal in rank, the 
Hebron Brigade Commander. In practice, the Deputy Brigade Commander would also 
meet in the JHC on special request (Johansen 2002a [interview]).   
- TIPH II 
In 1996, the mandatory receivers of TIPH reports were: 
                                                 
119 In 1999, EU became co-chair of AHLC. By then, AHLC was no longer part of the Hebron regime. 
120 The mandate did not define the term “periodical”. 
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- The Joint Hebron Committee (JHC), similar in composition to TIPH I; 
- The Monitoring and Steering Committee (MSC), a sub-committee to the JLC comprising the heads of each 
party from five joint special-task committees, established pursuant to the Interim Agreement (1995, Art. 
XXVI). 
 
The immediately striking contrast to the TIPH I structure, was the elimination of the 
multilateral component, AHLC. Again, JHC was to review specific incident reports, 
and was to meet with TIPH every two weeks. Nothing was said specifically about 
MSC meetings, but its reports from TIPH were to be periodical. The substitution of 
JLC with MSC could be seen as a symbolic degradation, but on the other hand, at least 
on paper, the MSC was the potential “nerve-centre” of the Israeli-Palestinian co-
operation, as it oversaw the work of the special-task committees directly, and was 
smaller and, it would appear, more operational than the JLC.121  
- TIPH III 
The mandatory bodies of the Hebron Regime after 1997 have been, 
- The Joint Hebron Committee (JHC), but with changes in its composition. Now, the Palestinian side was to 
be represented by the Police Commander of the Hebron District, and the Palestinian Head of the Hebron 
District Civil Liaison Office (DCL), established pursuant to the Interim Agreement (1995, Art. I.6.). The 
Israeli side was to be represented by the IDF Brigade Commander and the Head of the Israeli delegation to 
the DCL, i.e.: the person hitherto titled “Governor.” 
- The Monitoring and Steering Committee (MSC), similar to TIPH II; 
- A Sub-committee to the MSC (sub-MSC), comprising one representative of each side to the MSC and 
unspecified TIPH representatives; 
- The Joint District Coordination Office (DCO), Established pursuant to the Interim Agreement (1995, Art. 
XII.3.).  
 
Again, JHC was to receive Incident Reports, and MSC to receive Periodic reports. The 
frequency of JHC meetings was upgraded to once a week. Nothing was said of reports 
to the MSC Sub-Committee, but it was to convene… 
“…in order to discuss matters of policy on a bi-weekly basis or on the request of the TIPH” (TIPH Agreement 
1997, Art. 7).  
 
The DCO was a separate, continually operative office, established to co-ordinate IDF 
and PPF operations. According to the TIPH Agreement,  
“Representatives of the TIPH shall be situated at the District Coordination Office (“DCO”) in Har Manoah/Jabel 
Manoah and may also be present at the DCO sub-office in the city of Hebron, in order to coordinate TIPH 
activity with both sides” (TIPH Agreement 1997, Art. 7). 
  
In practice, the Hebron Regime began to falter already in the spring of 1997. JHC 
meetings were postponed, and the parties decided that it was enough to meet bi-weekly 
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(PR I:9). Despite repeated calls by TIPH, neither the MSC nor the sub-MSC convened 
until February 1999, and though the subsequent meetings were referred to as “MSC-
meetings”, they comprised only the sub-MSC (Indregard 2004 [interview]; PR 
VI:15f). TIPH would nevertheless keep faxing its Periodic Reports roughly four times 
a year. In 1999, the pace of the JHC was temporarily disrupted, and after May 2001, 
the meetings came to a complete halt. The same was the case of MSC/sub-MSC 
meetings after November 2001.122 As noted above, after some foot-dragging, TIPH 
was allowed to take part in the PPF/IDF co-ordination meetings and to have a Liaisons 
Officer stationed there permanently (PR I:9f; II:4). However, TIPH was not satisfied 
with the IDF information policy, and since the beginning of 1999, the permanent 
presence was supplanted by an “effective system of liaisons officers” (PRs I:9; II:4; 
VI:8). By September 2001, the DCO did no longer function as a co-ordinating centre, 
and Palestinian clerks were thrown out after the November al-Jihad attack (TIPH 
Observer 2001 [interview]; Keller 2002). 
 
Perhaps the most crucial organ of the Hebron regime, is the Joint Hebron Committee 
(JHC). According to Øverkil (2002 [interview]),  
“JHC is the main key for us to fulfil the mandate. That is the place for discussing reports. There is the possibility 
of response, further questions, and comments” (Øverkil 2002 [interview]). 
 
For as long as it functioned, the JHC would meet interchangeably in the Headquarters 
of IDF, PPF and TIPH. TIPH would call and chair these meetings, and the agenda 
would be organised according to topics such as “behaviour of IDF on rooftops”, 
“freedom of movement” etc. (Øverkil 2002 [interview]). The physical arrangement 
would be one of tables put up in the shape of a horse’s shoe, the Israeli and Palestinian 
delegations facing each other, with TIPH placed at the high end (TIPH Internet site).  
 
The physical arrangement would seem compatible with both an arbitration- and a 
mediation scenario, and there are indications that the role of TIPH has been somewhat 
                                                                                                                                                        
121 Confer Principal-Agent theory. Popularly, one might say that the MSC’s subordination to the JLC was analogous to an 
Executive’s subordination to a Legislature.  
122 In mid-March 2002 Øverkil stated that he did not see the point in calling another MSC meeting before the JHC was 
operative (Øverkil 2002).   
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in flux. In some cases, HOM would conclude on the issues discussed, while in others, 
he would merely sum up the arguments of the two sides.123 According to Øverkil,  
I am usually strict with agenda and time at home, but it doesn’t work that way here. As I see it, what matters is to 
recognise your function. TIPH are here as facilitators, and the important thing is to get the parties to talk to each 
other. When the discussion is going, I often sit back for a while and let them have their say. Sometimes, they 
start talking to each other in a language I don’t understand. It is quite common that they are fluent in both Arabic 
and Hebrew. On such occasions, I would sit back and let them go on for a while, and then I would say, “If you 
think this is important to me, could you please fill me in?” (Øverkil 2002 [interview]). 
 
TIPH has no mandatory links to the Israeli Police/Border Police, but representatives of 
these organisations were in time included in the Israeli delegation to the JHC – a 
temporary strengthening of the regime, since the Police, according to Israeli 
instructions, has primary responsibility for law-enforcement vis-à-vis settlers (Kessler 
2002[interview]; Øverkil 2002[interview]).       
Un-Mandated Structures of Communication 
Given the complexity and sensitivity of the issue, I have shall make no pretence of 
presenting the full picture of TIPH’s influence through extra-mandatory channels. 
However, there are indications that such avenues have been quite important. One 
general finding is that TIPH’s ability to influence the IDF directly and elicit leverage 
through Israeli intermediaries in high positions has diminished. Thus, the reliance on 
international pressure has increased, but TIPH has run into problems there too.  
- Influencing IDF through direct contact 
It would seem a general liability of trilateral venues, such as the JHC, that 
considerations of face-saving might deflect focus from the practical issues at hand. 
According to Kjell Johansen, the Head of TIPH I, 
“Most of what we were able to fix, we drew the attention to through informal, face-to-face meetings between 
myself and the Israeli officers. When you get close to them… that was when we were able to talk seriously” 
(Johansen 2002b [interview]).  
 
While Johansen had had tough altercations with the Hebron Commander prior to 
deployment, he sensed a change in attitude once the mission was operative, and in the 
end the Commander was “almost friendly” (Johansen 2002a [interview]).  
 
The most stable contact between TIPH and IDF during TIPH III has gone through the 
liaisons’ offices of both sides. This connection has been almost daily, despite the 
                                                 
123 See e.g.: WS 11:1; PRs I:13; IV:10; V:15; VI:5;17. 
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disintegration of the mandatory bodies (Øverkil 2002 [interview]). TIPH would often 
obtain intervention by the Israeli Liaisons’ Officer in cases where observers were held 
back, and the communication has been characterised as anything from “business-like” 
to “friendly” (PR I:8;VII:10). Still, over time, the IDF has symbolically de-prioritised 
the link to TIPH. Whereas the IDF Liaison in 1994 had the rank of Captain, he was 
just a regular soldier by 2002 (Rodan 1995; TIPH LO 2002 [interview]). 
 
On the senior and intermediate level, there have until early 2002 been regular meetings 
at the DCL concerning building-, working- and travel permits, as well as meetings 
between HOM and the Brigade Commander on current topics. However, only three 
meetings were held between TIPH and the Brigade Commander in 2002, and they 
were unproductive (Øverkil 2004a [interview]). Two meetings were held in 2003. 
- Influencing IDF through high-level contact 
According to Johansen (2002a [interview]), the Head of the IDF Liaisons’ branch, 
Brigadier General Baruch Spiegel, once intervened in operational matters in Hebron 
on his request.124 Johansen described their relationship thus:   
“After a while, we got a professional, if not jovial, then in any case a congenial co-operative relationship. I 
discovered that the Israelis in many ways are a bit like us Norweigians: Straight to the point, and not so much 
“courtesy”. In the end, Spiegel and I were nearly buddies, and I told him exactly what I felt about things – and 
got a straight message in return. I actually think he appreciated this kind of relationship” (Johansen 2002a 
[interview]). 
 
Johansen met with Peres, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, and throughout TIPH III, 
there have been meetings between TIPH seniors, and prominent Israeli representatives 
of IDF and IMFA.125 When unnamed “senior security officers” accused TIPH of 
handing military intelligence to Fatah in August 2001, HOM sought official backing 
by the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Chief of General Staff. It appears he 
got their private assurances that they did not believe the accusations (Aftenposten, 27 
August 2001). I do not know what communication took place in IDF fora after that, 
but as far as I know, neither these, nor the IDF Spokesperson publicly defended TIPH. 
                                                 
124  See “The vegetable market” below. 
125  See e.g.: PR (X:5). As for the current situation, according to Indreberg (2004 [interview]), TIPH’s Head of 
Staff (HST) is the person most regularly communicating with IMFA. Depending on the person, such contacts 
take place between once a week and once a month. The highest-level TIPH-IDF meeting in 2003, to Indreberg’s 
knowledge, was between HOM and the IDF Commander of Judea and Samaria (Indreberg 2004 [interview]). 
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- Influencing IDF through the Court System 
According to a Middle East Watch report issued in 1993, cover-ups of illegal acts 
committed by IDF soldiers involved all levels between rank-and-file co-ordination of 
cover stories to the Judge Advocate’s failure to ensure good-faith investigations 
(MEW 1993:17ff). In that perspective, it would seem relevant to the security of 
Palestinians if TIPH were able to limit the space of manoeuvre for IDF violators and 
their sympathisers. According to TIPH’s Legal Adviser, TIPH reports have not been 
used in courts (TIPH LA 2002 [interview]). Moreover, 
- TIPH observers may not testify in court, due to their diplomatic status (Eltervåg 2002 [interview]); 
- TIPH reports do have the quality needed for serving as court evidence (Knutsen 2002 [interview]); 
- While TIPH does not give its incident reports to others than the local IDF and PPF Commanders, there are 
no mandatory limitations as to how the parties may use such reports (Eltervåg 2002 interview]). 
- Influencing IDF through Palestinians 
The Heads of TIPH I quickly came to view the conduct of Palestinians as the prime 
explanatory variable of IDF policies. The perceived causal direction is clear from 
statements like,   
“Clashes…mainly… caused by stone throwing by young Palestinians with response from the IDF” (WS 4:3). 
 
Accordingly, pressure was put on Mayor Natshe to stop the violent protests. A weekly 
summary signed by the Danish and Italian Deputy Heads of Mission put it thus,  
“The returning ‘Friday clashes’ between young Palestinian Intefada boys and IDF seems to be well organized 
even with assistance ‘from some leaders’ from outside Hebron. TIPH will through the Liaison Office to PLO try 
to stop these Fridays stonethrowings and IDF will proceed with the opening of the city ... TIPH has the 
information that as long as these incidents are occuring on every Friday, there will be no further opening of the 
closures of the city of Hebron. TIPH has through the LO to the Palestinians explained the situation and asked the 
responsible authorities to bring their influence to bear, and stop these incidents and then hopefully the 
normalisation and lifting of roadblocks and obsticles will continue. TIPH can then proceed towards fulfilling it’s 
mandate” (WS 10:3).       
 
While Palestinian protests gradually waned towards the end of TIPH I, there are 
probable explanations to that trend, other than Municipal intervention - especially the 
fact that IDF closed the city to Palestinians from surrounding villages. IDF counter-
rioting also grew less heavy-handed. The latter could be seen an effect of Palestinian 
pacification, but it could also be a cause.  
 
TIPH I also, through its Civilian Affairs Section (CAS), undertook a mapping of needs 
in the Hebron Community, reported such needs to the Home Governments and 
launched limited projects such as football matches and psychological treatment for 
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children victimised by the Mosque massacre. It seems clear that the underlying 
rationale for CAS’ activities was to reduce the “tension level”, and thereby avert 
potential clashes - the ultimate aim being to induce IDF to reciprocate in terms of 
opening roadblocks etc.      
 
At least during the years 1997-1999, TIPH continued to see local IDF policies as 
greatly influenced by Palestinian acts. As shown above, TIPH would explicitly argue 
that Palestinian shooting attacks were the reason for the severe security measures, i.e.: 
a semi-causal relationship between Palestinian action and IDF response (PR VI:19). 
The PPF was therefore urged to intervene against so-called rioters, and the 
determination of intervention was a major criterion in TIPH’s appraisal (PRs I:15; 
V:16; VI:5;21). Senior-level meetings between TIPH and PPF have taken place bi-
weekly. Occasional démarches have been sent to the PNA in response to TIPH reports, 
but these have probably focused on the security of TIPH, rather than denouncing 
resistance as such. However, in December 2002, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs strongly condemned an attack, at the time thought to have targeted settlers.  
 
After 1997, TIPH expanded its Community Relations projects, focusing especially on 
underprivileged groups such as women, handicapped, children and poor. In addition to 
the projects where TIPH has played an active role, the mission has also funded a large 
number of independent local initiatives, mainly with one-time contributions. When 
IDF reinvaded H-1 in June 2002, TIPH supported Palestinian families under curfew 
with 4000 food deliveries (TIPH Press Release, 29 June 2002). It would seem that over 
time, the instrumental approach to such aid as a means to pacify the Palestinian 
population has diminished, being replaced with a more immediate perspective of 
abetting urgent needs.       
- Influencing IDF through diplomatic channels 
TIPH I lobbied extensively through the local representation of the Participating 
countries, but Johansen was very apprehensive about calling for high-level action by 
the Foreign Ministries (Johansen 2002b). Only after TIPH was asked to stay off the 
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streets during the events following the Yeshiva students’ incident,126 did he 
recommend such intervention. The Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs subsequently 
told the press that he was contemplating an official protest (Immanuel and Pinkas 
1994). Apparently that was pre-empted by IDF lifting the curfew.  
 
During TIPH II, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs raised issues related to 
TIPH’s mandated tasks during a visit to Israel - apparently with success (See below). 
 
After the establishment of TIPH III, the need for co-ordination among the participating 
countries and guidance of TIPH became pressing. A Local Contact Group (LCG) was 
established in 1998, consisting generally of “number two” from each Embassy plus 
HOM and the Senior National Representatives (SNRs) of each participating country. 
LCG meetings are held roughly 4 times a year and often function as a preparatory 
meeting to the so-called Capital Meetings (Eltervåg 2002 [interview]). LCG also 
functions as an ad-hoc group linking HOM with IMFA. Capital Meetings are held 
twice a year, bringing together 2-4 senior representatives of the Foreign Ministries of 
the participating states (Eltervåg 2002; Øverkil 2002 [interviews]).127     
 
Parallel with the erosion of mandatory institutions, there has been an upsurge in 
TIPH’s use of diplomatic instruments. According to Sevje (2001), by February 2001, 
no official protest had been launched from Norway as a result of TIPH reports. An odd 
year later, there had been several démarches, both concerted and unilateral ones 
(Bjørnsgaard 2002; Eltervåg 2002 [interviews]). By then, TIPH had a clear vision of 
its available instruments from Liaison level to Ministerial meeting (Øverkil 2002 
[interview]). However, among the TIPH countries there have been different 
approaches to the follow-up of reported incidents. Some countries favour a meticulous, 
confrontational line, while others, including Norway, wish to calibrate responses with 
a view to political developments and foreseeable consequences (Bjørnsgaard 2002). 
                                                 
126 See Chapter 2, page 14 
127 Capital Meetings are generally alternating between the participating states and the Middle East (Eltervåg 2002). 
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- Influencing IDF through Mass Media 
Though reports of TIPH I were not for public use, its Spokesperson, Bjarne Sørensen, 
was frequently quoted in Israeli press, on occasion complaining of IDF policies. The 
statements were generally given to journalists who by their own initiative contacted 
the mission, and it is therefore doubtful that this avenue of influence was proactively 
exploited by TIPH.  
 
TIPH has scrupulously observed the discreteness of reports, and the Israeli media has, 
according to Øverkil (2002 [interview]) not been used as a channel of critique or 
inducement vis-à-vis IDF. Yet, whenever critique has been launched against the 
mission in mass media, TIPH has used similar channels to refute the charges. TIPH 
has since 2001 prioritised work to improve its public edge, and now regularly releases 
press briefs on its Internet site. 
- Influencing the Settlers through Direct Contact 
Influencing the behaviour of settlers has been a main objective for TIPH, not 
surprising, considering the historical rationale for the mission. However, direct 
communication has not been a favoured strategy. The Heads of TIPH I did not initiate 
contact at all, but the settlers were eager to meet, and successfully obtained a low-level 
meeting through IDF lobbying (Johansen 2002a [interview]).  
 
In 1997 TIPH attempted a more positive approach. Settler spokesmen would hold 
lectures about the Jewish history of Hebron, and would take observers for a guided 
tour through the Abraham Shrine (Wilder 2002 [interview]). By summer 1998, events 
had led to a freezing of relations, but TIPH nevertheless went along with an IDF 
normalisation initiative by meeting a delegation from Kiryat Arba (PR IV:3). Despite 
these petty ouvertures and some disarming statements, the preferred avenue of 
influence with regard to the settlers has not been inducement, but advocacy of 
IDF/Police strictness. HOM met with settler spokesmen in June 2002, but the meeting 
was not initiated by TIPH (TIPH Press Release, 16 June 2002).   
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- Influencing the Settlers through Intermediaries 
As noted above, efforts aimed at influencing settler conduct have with little variation 
gone through insisting on IDF/Police enforcement. The task has apparently been 
complicated by three factors: 
- Genuine confusion among IDF soldiers and officers as to their powers vis-à-vis non-Palestinians; 
- Various shortcomings of the Hebron Police force; 
- Close links between the settlers and Israeli officers. 
 
Several sources reveal that IDF soldiers do not believe it falls within their duty to 
ensure public life and safety as long as the offender is not a Palestinian.128 This 
misconception, which at least at times has extended to the Brigade Commander,129 is 
hard to explain in light of the written directives of the IDF.130 TIPH was informed that 
soldiers and Border Policemen do have policing powers vis-à-vis settlers already in 
spring 1997 (PR I:12). Despite this, soldiers continued to believe that dealing with 
misbehaving settlers is a Police task (HRW 2001:53; PR II:13). The Hebron Police 
force is small, and according to the exiled Palestinian journalist, Kawther Salam (c 
[Internet site]), composed of a ragged lot, from which conscientious officers are prone 
to be excluded. Salam (d [Internet site]) relates that even two Police Commanders 
were replaced, after settler lobbying in collaboration with the IDF Brigade 
Commander.131 Palestinian complainants who turn to the Police, have often been 
referred to another Police station at the Givat Ha’avot settlement which is defined as 
part of Kiryat Arba, but physically is part of Hebron city.132 The notoriously long 
waiting time, the reputation of lackadaisical police-work, and fear of violence from the 
                                                 
128 Confer B’Tselem (1994a:22ff); HR (1907, Art. 43); HRW (2001:53); PRs (I:12; II:13; IV:14). In practice, there 
seems to be three types of IDF response to disturbances by individuals or small groups that do not cause bodily injury: 
Palestinians will be detained or arrested, or if the person tries to flee or disobeys orders, he/she might be beaten or shot 
(Caton 2002; Hamad 2002; PR V:11). (It should be remembered that merely walking outside during curfew is considered a 
disturbance); Foreigners will be detained, until the Police takes over; Israelis will either go unchecked, or the soldier will 
write a report about the incident, which might lead to Police investigation (B’Tselem 1994a:22ff). It appears that soldiers 
have also, occasionally, been ordered to evict squatting settlers. As for individual disturbances that cause bodily harm or 
threaten to do so, it seems that Palestinian threats have increasingly been eliminated under military rules of engagement, 
while the data material is too scant to say anything in general terms about Israeli immediate threats. Baruch Goldstein was 
not restrained, and the investigative Shamgar Commission revealed that many soldiers interpreted their open-fire regulations 
so as to preclude any fire against Jews (Gordon 1994). Noam Friedman, an Israeli soldier who opened fire on shopping 
Palestinians on 1 January 1997 was held down by a fellow soldier (Zananiri 1997).     
129 Brigade Commander Noam Tibon was cited in HRW (2001:53 (Original source: Shragai 2001)) to the effect that, “The 
law is toothless here. I have no means to remove the [settler] hooligans.” 
130 According to Protocol No. 118:6, “As a rule, handling the investigation and trying Jewish settlers and demonstrators are 
the responsibility of the Israel Police Department; making arrests will be the responsibility of the IDF.” Cited in B’Tselem 
(1994a:22). See also page 23, and; B’Tselem (2001b:19). 
131 The Police Commanders in question were Ish Yamini and Efraim Arditi, nd the Brigade Commander was Yigal Sharon. a
132 Being defined as part of Kiryat Arba, the station is outside TIPH’s AOR.  
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local settlers have been given as reasons by Palestinians for not going there (PRs 
IV:10; VI:26; Salam d [Internet site]).133 As for IDF-settler links, liaison-level 
meetings are daily, and settler representatives meet with high-level IDF officers from 
once a week to once a month (Wilder 2002 [interview]). Some officers serving with 
IDF in Hebron are living in the West Bank when off reserves’ duty (PR I:15; HRW 
2001:31; Rodan 1995).  
 
According to an IDF liaison officer living in Kiryat Arba, TIPH I proposed a 
comprehensive security plan for Hebron, including general disarmament of the settlers 
(Rodan 1995). That was not realised. In later TIPH Periodic Reports, the charge of 
selective law-enforcement is frequent. After establishing that IDF had police powers 
with regard to settlers, TIPH has many times urged IDF intervention in the absence of 
police, or in cases of urgency, and has proposed to expand the police force (PRs I:12; 
II:13 IV:10;14). Despite all the arguments to the contrary, Col. Tariq Zayd, the local 
PPF commander, in July 1997 credited TIPH with doing a “good job” and stated that,  
“The settlers have stopped their provocations, and we do not anticipate any more leaflets like the one that 
depicted the Prophet Mohammed as a pig” (Bushinsky 1997).  
Tangible Results 
After having assessed the capabilities and strategies of TIPH, it is now time to review 
its achievements. I shall focus narrowly on security, conceived of as security from 
Israeli threats, leaving intra-Palestinian threats and the general humanitarian aspects of 
the mission aside.  
- The Ability to Stay  
Considering that TIPH’s mandated periods are of only 3 months’ duration, its ability to 
stay in the field for more than 7 years must be seen as a success in itself. This has been 
possible despite 4 critical developments, 
- The breakdown of the peace process; 
- The election to Israeli premiership of Ariel Sharon, a staunch opponent of TIPH I; 
- The killing of TIPH observers, eroding support for the mission in contributing countries; 
- The inability to hinder a deterioration of the situation for Palestinians, eroding support for the mission in 
Hebron, and potentially, at home.  
 
                                                 
133 In 1998, on TIPH’s suggestion, a new gate was installed, which made it possible to enter the station without passing 
through the settlement. However, after the outbreak of the second Intifada Palestinians fear sniper fire outside the gate (Salam 
d [Internet site]). 
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On the contrary, TIPH has shown signs of becoming institutionalised. The mission’s 
mandate is now routinely renewed by 6 months. According to Bjørnsgaard (2002 
[inteview]), the diplomatic costs of closing the mission have become so great that it is 
improbable that Israel will do so unilaterally.   
- The Initial Negotiations 
IDF won several victories during the MOU negotiations in 1994, partly truncating the 
mandate as outlined in the TIPH Agreement. Yet, Johansen was able to hold some 
crucial ground: Mobile patrols were conceded to, and access to the Old City was 
secured. The episode showed that the IDF Commander would try to circumscribe the 
mission but would refrain from actions that could lead to its premature withdrawal. 
The knowledge that local IDF had “blinked first” was to be exploited.  
- The Entry    
After some disagreement, the Heads of TIPH I concluded that the new observers could 
not be seen to be escorted by the ones they were supposed to observe. It was therefore 
agreed that IDF should leave the convoy at the city limit, and stay out of the picture for 
the day. When the Heads left City Hall after a reception ceremony, they discovered 
that some 1000 Palestinian onlookers were in uproar over an IDF transport truck that 
had just passed through the crowd in contravention of the previous understanding. 
Seeing another truck approaching, Johansen blocked its passage, and brusquely told an 
IDF Major to find another way, unless he would be “personally responsible for 
breaking an international agreement.” The Major complied (Johansen 2002b). 
- Improvements During TIPH I  
Two days before the deployment of TIPH I, a partial curfew was lifted (Immanuel 
1994a). IDF also dismantled a number of roadblocks in the following days (WS 1:1). 
After a period of clampdown, following the Yeshiva students’ incident, IDF renewed 
its détente policies. The shift was marked, and came just after TIPH had sent a fax 
home containing the following contemplation: 
“The vast difference between the promises from high-level IDF and the actions taking place by IDF in Hebron, 
rises the question if the local IDF command is under sufficient control from higher level” (TIPH 1 weekly 
summary 5:3). 
 
In its seventh week of operations, TIPH listed the following improvements:  
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1) [Casualties] have decreased significantly 
2) Killed have been none 
3) Live rounds fired have decreased significantly  
4) Clashes have decreased to less than a handful 
5) Arrests have decreased 
6) Checkpoints and roadblocks have been reduced 
7) Separation walls have decreased 
8) Curfews and military closures have been imposed less than before and for shorter time periods 
9) Observed incidents of graver nature have steadily been going down 
10) Incidents involving settler-made activities in the city have decreased 
11) Incidents involving stone throwing Palestinians have decreased 
(WS 7:2)  
 
While some of these points would seem overlapping, and there are other 
methodological reservations, the data shows, at least, that the three Heads found the 
mission’s presence meaningful. After the killing of Sarit Prigal, there were new 
setbacks. But Johansen noted increasing expediency in the issuance of travel permits 
and a stop to IDF harassment of applicants waiting outside the Civil Administration 
building (Johansen 2002a [interview]). Upon the end of TIPH I, Sørensen said of the 
recent clashes that,  
“Soldiers behave in a totally different way now. They just pull back for 30 minutes and then the problem is 
solved. They don’t confront with force. The Palestinians get a little frustrated by this” (Immanuel 1994c). 
 
As shown above, the Palestinian appraisal was more reserved. That must nevertheless 
be seen in light of preconceived expectations, which might have been exaggerated. 
There were a number of factors other than TIPH’s observation activities that might 
explain the changes in IDF conduct, but neither should one ignore the following facts: 
- TIPH did have access to key decision-makers; 
- TIPH did exert pressure on those decision-makers; 
-  Specific changes in IDF policies coincided with TIPH pressure on those particular issues. 
- Opening of the Abraham Shrine 
During the course of TIPH I, the Heads put great emphasis on reopening the Abraham 
Shrine. IDF, on its part, went to lengths in order to reassure TIPH that the delay was 
due only to instalment of security measures. The shrine was opened three months after 
TIPH’s departure, but it seems probable that TIPH’s insistence on the issue could have 
geared up its effectuation. 
- Facilitating Redeployment 
The Mandate of TIPH II explicitly linked the mission to the agreed-upon redeployment 
of IDF from H-1 (TIPH Agreement 1996, Art. 1;4). When redeployment dragged out, 
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the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs threatened to withdraw TIPH, unless 
progress was made. Again, it is theoretically impossible to assert a causal link from 
this threat to the subsequent redeployment, but the possibility remains to be disproved. 
- Disciplinary Action against Soldiers 
With regard to disciplinary action taken against soldiers as a result of TIPH reports, 
the data material is very scant. There are however some indications that it has 
occurred.  As for TIPH II, The Jerusalem Times reported that,  
“one soldier was given disciplinary action as a result of a report. Another report has resulted in an investigation 
of tire-puncturing by settlers” (Ruggi 1996). 
 
This seems consistent with a report by the Christian Science Monitor saying,  
“Mr Yttervik [TIPH spokesperson] says that they had one soldier removed from his post and one settler arrested” 
(Prusher 1996). 
 
IDF has repeatedly informed TIPH that it has investigated, indicted and punished 
offenders.134 TIPH’s response to such information has often been less than enthusiastic 
though, its reservations centring on issues such as lacking statistics, lacking impact on 
general soldier conduct, and lacking will to pursue soldiers after leaving Hebron (PRs 
II:11; IV:23; VII:11). But TIPH has also noted positive changes, and praised 
commanders for a genuine interest in the well-being of Hebron’s citizens and for 
specific steps to improve soldier attitudes (PR II:4;18; PR V:3). However, according to 
B’tselem, only one out of 49 cases of brutality by Israeli security personnel reported to 
them between September 2000 and January 2003 had led to conviction (Filkins 2003).  
 
In 2003, 15 Border Policemen were indicted for one killing, threats, theft, obstruction 
of justice and lesser forms of violence. The Hebron Company was as a consequence 
disbanded (B’Tselem 2003h:17ff). TIPH’s involvement is unclear, but according to 
Amayreh (2003) it played “an important role in apprehending three Border Policemen”  
- Changes in IDF Response to Riots 
While Sørensen’s contention that IDF’s response to riots had changed is susceptible to 
various kinds of critique,135 qualitative data from TIPH III corroborates his general 
                                                 
134  See PRs II:11; IV:8; V:3;12; VI:23. 
135 One should as a rule treat self-referring sources with caution, particularly when the assessment of the self is positive. 
Moreover, it could be noted, that the reference to IDF conduct is not supported by quantitative data; that Sørensen would 
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finding that IDF would adjust to TIPH reports. Two periods of curfew in the autumn of 
1998 offer an illustrative example:  
During the first curfew (21-31 August 1998), IDF was criticised for  
- Brutality and humiliation in relation to breakers of the curfew (PR V:11); 
- Withholding patients at checkpoints, resulting in the death of two Palestinian babies (PR V:12); 
- Allowing the settlers to rampage, steal, and stone journalists (PR V:12). 
 
On the other hand, IDF was commended for,  
- Restraint in response to protesters on the borderline between H-1 and H-2 (PR V:12). 
 
During the second curfew (1-12 October 1998), IDF was criticised for 
- Clamping down on protesters on the H-1/H-2 borderline with disproportionate force (PR V13; see also 15).  
 
On the other hand IDF was commended for, 
- Determined intervention vis-à-vis rampaging settlers (PR V:13; see also 15); 
- Allowing patients to pass through checkpoints swiftly (PR V:13); 
- Treating breakers of the curfew leniently (PR V:13f). 
 
There are, as far as I can see, no other factor that can explain the total revision of 
tactics, applied in similar circumstances within a short span of time, as convincingly as 
learning from TIPH critique.136
- End to Gun-Pointing 
In 1998-1999, soldiers were reported to have pointed their guns at observers on four 
occasions (PR V:18; PR VI:14; PR VII:11). The malpractice was initially defended, on 
the grounds that the soldiers used their telescope sights as binoculars, but TIPH finally 
got its message through (PR VI:14). This had limited bearings on the situation of 
Palestinians, though, as soldiers would not stop pointing their guns at them.    
- Confiscation of ID Cards 
While the Palestinian charge of IDF soldiers confiscating or destroying ID Cards was 
frequent during TIPH I, and prevailed until late 1997, later Periodic Reports do not 
mention this as a problem (WS 6:2; PR II:12).    
                                                                                                                                                        
have a limited time-horizon, not really being able to say what the conduct was like before TIPH came to the city; and that, in 
any case, he was not himself an observer, but must be regarded as a secondary source.  
136 I find the possibility that this was written in order to demonstrate TIPH’s effectiveness to be over-speculative. Due to the 
organisation of the material, I believe one would hardly detect the pattern above, unless one was consciously searching for 
signs of TIPH influence. Moreover, TIPH reports make no secret of its failed efforts. Finally, demonstrating efficiency might 
even prove counter-productive, since it could, theoretically, prompt Israel to shut TIPH down. Other indications that TIPH 
has influenced the conduct of soldiers may be found in, CPT 18 February 2002; PR II:10;18; TIPH LO (2002 [interview]; 
TIPH observer (2002 [interview]); Weizman (2000); Wilder (2000;2002[interview]); and by comparing WS 6:1 to WS 8:3) 
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• Moderation in General Conduct 
Both in 1994 and during TIPH III, negative changes in the general conduct of soldiers 
was linked to the arrival of new troops (WS 9:1; PR V:16; PR VII:15). One way of 
explaining this pattern, is by presuming a gradual improvement in the conduct of each 
contingent during their service in Hebron. In this scenario, new recruits would upon 
their deployment reflect a general IDF culture, only to internalise the particularities of 
Hebron over time. Since the particularities of Hebron would largely suggest a higher 
conflict level than normal, TIPH stands out as one among very few moderating 
factors.137 In 1997, the IDF commander informed TIPH that he had introduced a 
training program of cultural sensitivity (PR II:12). TIPH was later reassured that,  
“Soldiers are informed that bad behaviour is contrary to internal military conduct and ruins the good relationship 
with the Palestinians” (PR IV:8). 
 
In the subsequent Periodical Report TIPH concluded that,  
“TIPH has observed an improvement in the behaviour of the IDF soldiers at the observation posts, as no cases of 
unprofessional behaviour have been reported since May” (PR IV:9).  
 
However, there are also several examples of non-improvement after promises, and 
some cases of retraction of promises (PR IV:4; PR V:8; PR IV:9~PR X:10).  
- Opening of the Shuhada Street 
Opening of the Shuhada Street had been perhaps the prime objective for the 
Palestinians of Hebron since its closure in February 1994. The settlers had strongly 
opposed any such move, because it would endanger the settlement of Beit Hadassah. 
In the Interim Agreement (1995), the Hebron Protocol (1997) and the Sharm el-Sheikh 
Memorandum (1999) Israel committed itself to reopening this road and despite partly 
violent protests, it was gradually opened to public transport in 1999. After Sepember 
2000, only pedestrians living in the street were allowed passage (B’Tselem 2003h:28). 
- The Vegetable Market 
Another major TIPH objective, has been the reopening of the wholesale Vegetable 
Market, which was closed during the unrest following Goldstein’s massacre. Settler 
opposition to this has focused on two arguments: 
1) It would endanger the settlement of Avraham Avinu; 
2) It would be placed on land that belonged to Jews prior to the 1929 massacre. 
 
                                                 
137 TIPH was occasionally invited to present its mandate to soldiers and police officers (PR IV:4). 
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When TIPH I arrived in 1994, Israel signalled willingness reopen the Market. When 
that failed to materialise, a huge demonstration was organised, leading to a nervous 
stand-off between seething Palestinians and armed soldiers. IDF prepared to use tear-
gas in order to spread the crowd. In this situation, TIPH was able to obtain the 
intervention of Brig. Gen. Spiegel, (outside the chain of command), and in stead of 
using force, IDF let half the Market remain open. It was a short-lived achievement, 
though, as it was closed down again in the wake of the Yeshiva students’ incident,138 
and not reopened during TIPH I, despite intense lobbying (TIPH letter, 31 July 1994).  
 
Market reopening was scheduled in the Interim Agreement, and it appears that some 
commercial activity was allowed there in 1996.139 After that, despite similar provisions 
in the Hebron Protocol, the Market remained closed. It was discussed in numerous 
JHC meetings - the Israeli side demanding that a wall be built in front of the stalls, in 
order to protect Avraham Avinu (PR X:5). To Palestinians, the issue is still unsolved.  
- Eases to Curfews 
TIPH has many times petitioned commanders to ease curfews. During the almost 
permanent curfew of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, TIPH obtained amnesties for 
schoolchildren and teachers. According to HOM Jan Kristensen, TIPH was also 
instrumental in getting IDF to finally end the prolonged curfew (Amayreh 2003).  
- IDF Changes in Approach to Settlers 
According to a B’Tselem report of March 1994,  
The Israeli government has been derelict in its duty to protect the life, person, and property of Palestinians from 
attacks by Israeli civilians in the Territories. The authorities have adopted an undeclared policy of absolution, 
compromise, and mitigation for Israeli civilians who harm the Palestinians… The Israeli authorities discriminate 
between Israelis and Palestinians in enforcing the law… (B’Tselem 1994a:82). 
 
Discriminate law-enforcement has indeed been one of TIPH’s most frequent 
complaints. These are some of the issues raised in available TIPH Reports: 
- Allowance of Israeli civilians to wear arms, even apparent minors (WS 6:1; PR I:15; V:18; VI:18f;24); 
- Allowance of settlers to steal and destroy Palestinian property (PR IV:9f; V:12;18); 
- Allowance of violence against Palestinians (PR 1:12; II:13; V:18; VI:24f 
- Allowance of settlers to stay in military positions (PRs IV:9; V:18; X:6f;10); 
- One-sided intervention in scuffles, no matter who started the fight (PRs IV:10;14; V:12;17f; VI:25;VII:19); 
- One-sided law-enforcement against illegal construction (PR I:13; II:13f); 
- Failure to evict Israelis from Palestinian-owned houses (PR IV:12f) 
                                                 
138 See Chapter 2, page 14 
139 Confer Interim Agreement (1995, Annex I, Art VII (7)a); cAtawneh (1996); Fahel (1996); Zananiri (1996). 
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Armament 
With respect to armament, TIPH has achieved little. TIPH did not succeed in having 
the settlers disarmed in 1994. In 1998, some settlers who had been disarmed after the 
Mosque massacre due to criminal records, had their weapons returned on the initiative 
of Maj. Gen. Moshe Ya’alon, then O.C. Central Command (Sockol 1998).  
 
Violence and Harassment against Palestinians 
When comparing the number of Palestinian deaths caused by settlers to those caused 
by Israeli security forces, there has been a significant reduction in the proportion of 
settler killings coinciding with the presence of TIPH.140 The qualitative material does 
not show any similar overall trend in non-lethal violence, but there have clearly been 
periodical fluctuations. Sources indicate an increased risk of violence associated with,  
- Fridays and Saturdays; 
- Religious holidays and symbolic anniversaries; 
- Attacks on Israelis; 
- Political uncertainty, due to elections, diplomatic pressure, Palestinian deliberations on cease-fire, etc. 
 
Most of these findings are statistically reviewed below. 
 
In the available TIPH reports, there is a growing tendency of IDF intervention against 
settler harassment, but as far as TIPH observed, there was “little predictability”, and 
only Palestinians were arrested - even in incidents clearly fomented by settlers. (PRs 
IV:10;14; V:12;18; VI:25;VII:19).141 During 1998, IDF kept claiming increasing 
numbers of Israeli arrests, a claim supported by settler sources, but conflicting with 
others (Freeman 1998; Sockol 1998; PR VI:25). These arrests were rarely made on the 
spot, though, and it is unclear whether they were a) made by the IDF itself; and b) 
made on the basis of direct harassment of Palestinians.142 Alternative data indicate an 
opposite development, i.e.: towards softer tactics. For example, AP (1998) reported 
                                                 
140 During the period of statistical review (December 1987-February 2002), altogether 151 Palestinians were killed by Israelis 
in Hebron. Of these, 38 were killed by settlers, and 113 by security forces. Only 1 Palestinian was killed by settlers during the 
period of review, while TIPH was present. In comparison, Israeli security forces killed 59 before and between the TIPH 
missions, and 54 while the observers were in the city. Even if we disregard all the victims of Goldstein’s massacre (29), the 
change in ratio between settler- and security force killings is significant at .05 significance level (Chi square: 4.529 / df=1).     
141 There are only two reported arrests of settlers within the available reports. One settler woman was arrested on 28 
September 1998, while a man was arrested sometime between November 1999 and January 2000 (PRs V:12; X:9). However, 
one report stated that “TIPH is aware that the Israeli Police are monitoring the behaviour of a few notorious settlers very 
closely, investigating them and interrogating them, and even arresting them several times for short periods (PR V:18).    
142 There is data suggesting that settlers had been organising militias, at least since 1997 (RAI 1997a). Such activity would 
offer another rationale for arrest.  
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that a new set of secret instructions were given to Israeli security forces not to use live 
bullets or steel coated rubber pellets against Jewish protesters.  
 
Settler-Soldier intermingling 
Concerning Israeli civilians in military observation posts and positions, TIPH in 1998 
elicited a commitment from the IDF commander to have that stopped (PR IV:9). 
Subsequently, TIPH observed an improvement, but IDF later reverted, defending the 
malpractice as “not of TIPH concern” (PR X:10). In March 2002, I made one 
observation of settler children playing inside an IDF armoured personnel carrier.  
 
Destruction of Property, Illegal Construction and Squatting 
With respect to destruction of Palestinian property, there is no clear trend. Settlers 
went on the rampage in 1994, 1998, 2001and 2002. Throughout the period, there is 
evidence of confusion among Israeli soldiers as to their powers and responsibilities 
vis-à-vis the settlers (HRW 2001:53; PRs I:12; II:13; IV:14). On the other hand, there 
are indications that soldiers have been ordered to clean up after settlers. There are also 
instances, as exemplified above, of TIPH critique, shortly followed by praise of 
efficient intervention (WS 6:1~WS 8:3; PR V:15). As for leniency with respect to 
illegal construction, the charge was made repeatedly in TIPH Periodic Reports (PR 
II:13f; PR IV:11). It appears that the argument was pre-empted, not by enforcement, 
but by unilateral legalisation (and funding) of settler construction projects (PR V:18). 
 
There are examples of police evicting settlers from Palestinian houses after TIPH had 
put pressure on the IDF (PR IV:12f). But there is no clear trend towards firmer policies 
in this regard. On the contrary, house occupations appear to have increased (B’Tselem 
2003h). In some cases, settlers have returned after being evicted (PR IV:12f; V:20;).   
 
Miscellaneous 
Other examples of curtailment/law-enforcement against settlers include,  
- Conviction of a young settler woman for posting a charicature of the Prophet Muhammad as a pig on the 
doors of Palestinian homes in 1997;  
- Demolition of a shrine commemorating Baruch Goldstein in 1999 (PR X:3);  
- Hindering a Purim celebration at Goldstein’s tomb in 2001 (HRW 2001:52);  
- Legal proceedings against settler boys who vandalised a TIPH car, endangering its drivers in 2001;  
- Eviction of settlers squatting on Palestinian-owned land after the November 2002 al-Jihad attack. 
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On 1 April 2001, a gas canister exploded inside a Palestinian house in H-2, injuring 6 
Border Police officers. The IDF commander accused settlers of having rigged it, and 
ordered soldiers not to accept food or candy from them (HRW 2001:53). 
 
Despite these examples of apparent influence, it seems clear that TIPH has not been 
able to improve the general situation of Palestinians in Hebron, or even to halt its 
deterioration. This is particularly true of those living in H-2. The curfews that used to 
be of up to 10 days’ duration during 1997, were during the al-Aqsa Intifada,143 
practically constant, only lifted for short hours every few days, in order to let 
Palestinians buy the essential foods and medicine (Knutsen 2003b [e-mail]). For many, 
the inability to work resulted in dire debts. Meanwhile soldiers fired into civilian areas, 
hurting persons and properties. Such shooting often came in response to Palestinian 
fire, but sometimes it appeared unprovoked (HRW 2001:32;35;37). Recent reports of 
Human Rights organisations and testimonies by private Palestinians raise concerns 
about a culture of illegal violence among Israeli Border Police, as well as IDF and 
Police failure to intervene and investigate cases in which Palestinians are victims of 
settler violence (Banat 2002; B’tselem 2003a;b;c;d;e;h Hamad 2002; HRW 2001:50ff). 
 
Statistics 
An observation of TIPH efforts closely followed by a change in IDF policy does not 
necessarily mean that TIPH caused the change in policy. There could be other reasons. 
To limit the pitfalls of spuriousness, and genuine coincidence, it is useful to 
complement the qualitative approach with a statistical analysis at the aggregate level. 
Below, I use quantitative data, to answer three questions:  
1) Has there been a reduction in lethal violence against Palestinians coinciding with TIPH? 
2) If there has been such a reduction, is it limited to Hebron, or is the trend paralleled in other cities? 
3) Are there other plausible explanations to the variations in violence? 
 
A multiple linear regression (OLS), taking Palestinian conflict-related deaths as the 
dependent variable, and city-months of Hebron, Nablus, Ramallah and Khan Younis 
from December 1987 through February 2002 as units, yielded the following results:144     
 
                                                 
143 The Intifada has lasted since late September 2000.  
144 For a closer explanation of the method and/or examination of the control variables, see Chapter 3. 
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The model’s R2 = 0,205. This means that the assessed variables account for more than 
20% of the variance in killings during the city-months in question. The remaining 80% 
are unexplained by the model. That is not unexpected. As noted in Chapter 3, the 
model is based on structural variables, leaving all incident-specific circumstances out, 
and it is obvious that such factors are vital to the decision to fire a weapon, etc.  
 
Table 11: Multivariate OLS Regression. Dependent Variable: Number of Palestinians Killed by Israelis. 
Independent Variables b145  ß 146 P147  
Constant -,498  ,489 
Month (1-171) ,008969 ,197 ,358 Time 
Month2 ,0001762 ,171 ,052 
Dummy: Nablus -,03024 -,006 ,914 
Dummy: Ramallah/al-Birah -,471 -,091 ,094 
Space 
Dummy: Khan Younis -,305 -,059 ,279 
Dummy: Rabin Government ,403 ,076 ,321 
Dummy: Peres Government ,155 ,014 ,825 
Dummy: Netanyahu Government -,208 -,038 ,778 
Dummy: Barak Government -,420 -,060 ,707 
Dummy: Sharon Government ,379 ,043 ,794 
Israeli 
politics148
Dummy: Israeli Elections Announced -,122 -,018 ,714 
PNA in place -,428 -,095 ,306 Palestinian 
politics Declared Intifada ,04912 ,011 ,889 
Palestinian days of significance ,02186 ,055 ,124 Cultural 
factors Jewish days of significance ,004038 ,005 ,883 
Number of Israelis killed within city-month 1,416 ,240 ,000 Conflict 
killings No. of Palestinians killed in previous month ,242 ,230 ,000 
TIPH presence -,119 -,016 ,919 
Number of TIPH observers ,002484 -,037 ,757 
TIPH * Likud in Government ,329 ,038 ,578 Interaction 
variables TIPH * Israelis killed -2,096 -,133 ,001 
Observer 
variables 
CPT presence -,03642 -,005 ,953 
 
Time: The Time variables indicate that the general trend of Palestinian Deaths 
throughout the period examined have initially fallen, and then risen again. Notably, 
                                                 
145 Unstandardised Coefficient 
146 Standardised Coefficient 
147 Significance Indicator, showing the probability of the result under statistical independence. As long as p< 0,1 the result is 
significant at the 10% level. 
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this trend is not sufficiently explained through the other variables entered, as it remains 
significant at the 10% level despite statistical control. 
 
Space: Not surprisingly, there are differences in the general level of violence against 
Palestinians in the cities examined. The findings reinforce the impression of Hebron as 
a particularly violent city, but only Ramallah/al-Birah is significantly safer.   
 
Israeli Politics: The findings indicate that shifts in Israeli Governments per se scarcely 
affect the violence suffered by Palestinians. There are furthermore no systematic 
reductions/increases associated with election campaigns. 
     
Palestinian Politics: In themselves, declarations of Intifada do not imperil Palestinians 
significantly.149 There are indications that the security of Palestinians has improved as 
a result of the establishment of the PNA, but the finding is not statistically significant 
and the possibility of coincidence remains. 
 
Days of significance: Perhaps surprisingly, Jewish holidays do not in themselves 
increase the danger to Palestinians. On the other hand, it is quite plausible, that the 
chance of being killed increases during months associated with Palestinian 
remembrance, although the finding is not statistically significant.150  
 
Israelis killed: The single strongest determinant of Palestinian conflict-related deaths 
is the coinciding killing of Israelis. However, the data do not say which killing took 
place first and which one is the “cause” of the other. On the other hand, there is 
evidence of a pattern of crises, i.e.: killings are responded to in kind whenever they 
occur, and come in waves, rather than lie at a steady level. The highly significant auto-
correlation variable only reinforces this picture.    
 
                                                                                                                                                        
148 Reference Category = Governments led by Yitzhaq Shamir (December 1987- June 1992).  
149 As will soon become clear, this is a truth with some important qualifications. 
150 The finding is almost significant at 10% significance level. 
 
 
97
Observer variables: The fact that most of the observer variables are insignificant 
should not be taken as evidence that observers do not matter. On the contrary, the main 
finding is positive, namely that there is extremely good reason to believe that the 
presence of observers (whether they are from TIPH or from the CPT) reduce the 
danger to Palestinians in months of crisis, i.e.: months in which Israelis are killed.151 
Apart from such crises, however, there is no discernible ameliorating effect. 
 
• Variations of the Analysis 
I repeated the analysis, but changed the dependent variable so as to count only the 
deaths of civilian Palestinians. The findings closely resembled those described above.  
 
In a third and fourth analysis, I compared the effect of observers upon the number of 
Palestinians killed by Israeli civilians as opposed to Palestinians killed by Israeli 
security forces. It appeared that the ameliorating effect of observers in times of crisis 
was confined to the threat from security forces, i.e.: no significant effect was 
established in relation to killings committed by settlers. This was rather surprising, 
considering the above-mentioned structural change of conflict coinciding with the 
observer presence.152 With respect to deaths caused by Israeli civilians, all the cities of 
comparison were significantly safer than Hebron.153 Moreover, Number of Palestinian 
days of significance, correlated positively with number of deaths caused by Israeli 
civilians, while Declared intifada and Existence of a Palestinian Authority 
significantly reduced the danger posed by settlers.154 As for security force killings, 
Declared intifada significantly increased the threat to Palestinians. The structural shift, 
implying that settlers kill relatively fewer Palestinians, while soldiers kill relatively 
more, should not be attributed to TIPH, but to political factors.    
                                                 
151 The finding is statistically significant at 1% significance level. 
152 See footnote 140, page 93. 
153 Nablus: β=-,144 / p=,015; Ramallah/al-Birah: β=-,140 / p=,018; Khan Younis: β=-,137 / p=,020.  
154 Palestinian days of significance: β=,079/p=,041; PNA in place: β=-,288/p=,005; Declared Intifada: β=-,274/ p=,001  
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Chapter VI: How Does TIPH Work? 
Introduction 
Although the situation of Hebron’s Palestinian population has fluctuated, and in many 
respects deteriorated during TIPH’s presence, there is, as shown in chapter 5, reason to 
believe that TIPH has served as a buffer, inhibiting an otherwise even more serious 
development. This is remarkable, given the weakness of the underlying theory and the 
mainly contradictory expectations of realism. In this chapter, I assess various 
hypothetical explanations of TIPH’s effect. For the sake of visualisation, I use a set of 
informal models corresponding to the theories of violence introduced in Chapter 3. 
  
Table 12: Relevant Conceptualisations within the Realist and the Humanist Perspective 
Perspective Basic unit Motivation for 
violence 
Conflict Peace Means of 
averting 
violence 
Conflict 
solution 
Third party role 
Realism Proactive, 
rational 
actors 
Interests, 
Security 
Structural / 
Objective / 
Instrumental  
Negative 
peace 
Deterrence, 
Punishment 
Compromise 
settlement / 
Separation 
Enforcement 
(Peacekeeping) 
Humanism Reactive, 
emotional 
subjects 
Fear, Anger, 
Frustration, 
Imitation, 
Norms 
Processual / 
Subjective / 
Provoked 
Positive 
peace 
Appease-
ment, 
Accomo-
dation 
Resolution / 
Integration 
Peacebuilding 
(Peacekeeping) 
Assessing TIPH from a Realist Perspective 
From a political realist point of view, these would be natural objections to TIPH:  
- TIPH does not have an enforcement mandate;  
- TIPH does not have weapons - the symbols of power that might possibly render enforcement superfluous; 
- The separation of forces in Hebron is imperfect; 
- The relevant “forces” in Hebron comprise irregulars/civilians on both sides, which means that central 
authority is at best informal, and the potential for disciplining rejectionists is limited.  
 
The initial prediction of realism would be that TIPH should have no effect, and in so 
far as it did, the effect would be counter-intentional, i.e.: to encourage Palestinians to 
futile opposition, and, given the Israeli superior capabilities, disaster. Yet, there are a 
few potentially ameliorating functions reconcilable with realist logic:  
 
- Information transmission (In so far as Hebron can be regarded as an Assurance game); 
- Boosting of the peace dividend;  
- Linking of the local game to games played by Israel at the international level.   
- TIPH as a Window 
The first conceivable function of TIPH within the realist perspective would be to 
convey enough reliable information between the parties to feel trusted, so that one 
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need not fear the fear of the other. Since enhancement of transparency would only 
have a pacifying effect in Assurance games, these questions arise:  
- Is Hebron an Assuance game? If temporarily, when? 
- Did the parties expect TIPH to enhance transparency sufficiently to pre-empt the rationale for pre-emption?  
 
At first glance, it would seem possible to construe Hebron as an Assurance game. The 
fact that Israel allowed the PNA to take security responsibility in the major part of the 
city indicates that Israeli decision-makers prioritised the lighter administrative burden 
above the loss of direct control. In other words, co-operation was preferred to 
hegemony. This is consistent with the Oslo process as a whole, with Israeli withdrawal 
from H-1 after raids, and with the recurrent plans for Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, 
etc. Counter-arguments could be drawn from assertive statements by Israeli leaders, 
from the fact that redeployment only came about after intense international pressure, 
and that the burden of administration was only marginally relieved. It is harder to 
support assurance game preferences on the Palestinian side. There is little doubt that 
the PLO/PNA preferred unilateral control of the city, to shared control. But in a larger 
perspective, it seems plausible that the PLO/PNA would not stake the benefits of a 
continued peace process on full control in Hebron. It is furthermore possible to argue 
that the relevant decision-makers preferred a compromise with Israel to all-out victory, 
and that the disciplining capability of the PLO/PNA was sufficient to guide the 
policies of PPF locally. This would seem empirically supported by the fact that PPF 
intervened against rioters in Hebron. Also Mayor Natshe’s assurances of rights for the 
city’s Jews, as well as promises of quiet by Jibril Rajoub, the Commander of the 
Preventive Security Forces in the West Bank, could be taken as indicative. On the 
other hand, TIPH’s appraisal of PPF was not always positive, and Palestinian co-
operation was, it appears, hesitant for as long as it lasted (PR IV:6). 
 
So what about TIPH’s information transmission, or rather – the parties’ expectations 
of the co-ordinating mechanisms of the Hebron regime?  
 
In 1994, IDF used TIPH to assure the Palestinians of their intention to re-open the 
Abraham Mosque and to show that the pipeline system was not rigged to favour the 
settlements. Similarly, TIPH II was offered by the Peres government as a confidence 
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building measure (Lia 1998:62f). As for TIPH III, some early events must have had a 
corrosive effect on the climate of trust:  
- The unabated construction projects in H-2; 
- The initiation of the Har Homa construction project (March 1997); 
- The controversy over the wall that was intended to protect Avraham Avinu from the Wholesale Market, and 
the subsequent non-opening of the Market (March 1997); 
- The killings of four Palestinians (April 1997); 
- The clashes, in which PPF did not decisively intervene, and in which many Palestinians were injured, 
including PPF officers, allegedly shot in the back by IDF soldiers, while attempting to hold back the 
protesters (March-July 1997); 
- The standoff between IDF and PPF at the Tarkumiyyah road, a contested spot (July 1997).     
 
Despite this, TIPH did report of increasing co-operation between the security forces. 
TIPH was not, however, included in the day-to-day working relationship at the DCO, 
which suggests that the parties must have viewed themselves as better off without 
third-party meddling. In time that was partly rectified, and some TIPH reports give an 
impression of genuine concern among the Israeli JHC representatives for the well-
being of the city’s Palestinians, and of a forthcoming attitude on both sides at the 
liaison level. Still, the question remains, if the parties appreciated the robustness that 
only a third party might add to a co-operative arrangement between historical enemies. 
The parties seem, with some notable exceptions,155 to have played with “hidden 
cards”, and did not use TIPH actively to reassure each other, or to signal trust.156 TIPH 
might have undermined its credibility as an information transmitter with statements 
such as, “TIPH cannot be present at all times”, but it must be remembered that 
intelligence transmission was not a mandated task of TIPH. Eventually, TIPH was 
accused by individuals on both sides, of delivering intelligence to the adversary. 
Whether or not there was any truth in these claims, the episode shows that the accusers 
did not trust each other, and were therefore not attuned to the logic of transparency. 
Given the displayed attitudes, I believe it is fair to say that Hebron did not constitute 
an Assurance game after Summer 2000, and in so far as it did, TIPH did not reduce the 
prospects of offensive action to the degree that pre-emption lost its relevance.  
                                                 
155 One example could be the co-ordination of settler transports to Tel Rumeida, passing through parts of H-1 during the 
reconstruction of Shuhada Street in 1997.  
156 For example, IDF denied TIPH access to places within AOR, and prevented photography (PR IV:4). Moreover, IDF did 
not give TIPH information on detainees that could have reassured relatives of their humane treatment (PR IV:4). 
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- TIPH as Santa Claus 
To what extent did TIPH increase the lure of peace by offering decision-makers side-
payments, contingent on conciliation?  
 
The paradox is that, security for the Palestinians would initially have to be bought 
from the Israelis. However, TIPH invested almost exclusively in Palestinian 
companies through lease of cars, real estate, provisions, etc.157 Thus TIPH did not have 
much to offer local Israeli decision-makers, except for honourable review.158 (And in 
conflict, even praise has a tinge, when coming from a non-ally). Nevertheless, if TIPH 
could induce Palestinian decision-makers to pursue conciliation, that would be in 
Israel’s interest, and in the personal interest of IDF officers in Hebron, since superiors 
would equal quiet with control.  
 
As regards payments through honourable review, my personal impression of the 
available TIPH reports is that, in many cases, TIPH missed opportunities to credit 
Israeli officers for positive action.159 By this, I do not mean that the reports were out of 
tune with reality. Moreover, unduly laudable reviews would clearly have provoked the 
Palestinians. Still, the question remains, if more could have been achieved through 
widening the gap between the stick and the carrot - by offering more carrots? 
 
As for conciliation,160 from the IDF point of view, the question was whether co-
operation or unilateralism was the more efficient means of delivering quiet. TIPH did 
put its weight behind Israeli demands for Palestinian riot control, and during TIPH I 
there is evidence that IDF valued TIPH’s contribution (Susser 1994). Also during 
TIPH II, there was little violent Palestinian activism, and although TIPH has probably 
represented an annoyance to local Commanders, it is possible that individuals on 
                                                 
157 Eltervåg (2002), speaking of the preparations in 1994 stated, “Our basic philosophy was that everything which might be 
obtained locally, should indeed be bought locally – in Hebron or in the West Bank. The cars were leased in East-Jerusalem.” 
The communications equipment, however, was bought in Israel (Johansen 2002a). 
158 This being said, it is not wholly unlikely that TIPH has functioned as a catalyst for Israeli business in Hebron. TIPH did 
facilitate meetings between the HRC and Israeli engineers and architects with the aim of engaging them in reconstructing the 
Old City (PR V:7;VI:12;VII:9). According to Salam (a [internet site]), the Israeli engineering company Tahal obtained a $ 
570,000+ drilling contract in Hebron in 1996. Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, the Israeli signatory to the first TIPH Agreement and 
IDF Chief of General Staff at the time of the closing of the contract, later became Tahal’s chairman of the board. 
159 The 10th Periodical Report is a partial exception.  
160 Technically, Palestinian conciliation would not constitute a side-payment, but a genuine payoff of the game. 
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higher levels continued to believe in TIPH’s influence throughout the period of de-
escalation 1997-2000. After the eruption of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in late September 
2000, IDF hardly viewed TIPH as capable of inducing Palestinian conciliation, and 
IDF has relied on unilateralism to the extent of blowing up the PPF Headquarters, 
sacking police stations, and releasing prisoners.161  
 
The prospect of TIPH acquiring a position of patronage vis-à-vis rejectionist groups is 
problematic and would scarcely gain consensus among TIPH’s internal and external 
veto-holders. It is nonetheless clear that TIPH has had contacts with both the settlers 
and Hamas (TIPH Evaluation Report 1994:6). If such contacts ever proceeded to the 
point of exhorting moderation is doubtful. My impression is, that TIPH’s primary 
concern has been to present itself as something other than an enemy, thereby reducing 
the danger to its members. 
 
All in all, TIPH has not been able to inflate the peace dividend of Israelis directly. The 
asymmetry of the conflict has nonetheless made payments to the Palestinian side 
acceptable, in so far as there has been a chance of indirect payoff for the Israelis. 
When such benefits ceased to materialise, TIPH lost its relevance as a tool in the eyes 
of Israeli decision-makers.  
- TIPH as a Hostage I 
Has TIPH been able to strengthen the security of Palestinians through identification, 
i.e.: by making Israeli excesses against Palestinians impossible without simultaneously 
hurting TIPH - thereby turning IDF conduct in Hebron into an issue of foreign policy?  
 
A premise of the hostage function in a realist framework would be that Israel was at all 
concerned with its image in the TIPH-contributing countries. Thus, the widening of 
TIPH would seem a strengthening factor, while the disproportionate weight of distant, 
small countries, would seem an inhibiting factor. These are arguments in support of 
the hostage hypothesis: 
                                                 
161 The information that IDF has released prisoners was taken from the Internet site of the Palestine Solidarity Campaign, 
citing Mayor Natshe (PSC 31 January 2003). It should be treated cautiously. 
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- IDF released a curfew in 1994, just after the Danish Minster of Foreign Affairs had signalled disapproval, 
indicating sensitivity on the part of Israel to foreign protest; 
- In 1994, one TIPH observer stated his intent of shielding protesters physically, and an IDF Liaison Officer 
reported in his diary difficulties of holding IDF fire in such situations (Immanuel 1994b; Rodan 1995); 
- After repeated protests, and presumably high-level intervention, IDF soldiers ceased to point their weapons 
at observers; 
- Other decisive acts taken at the political level in Israel may very plausibly be linked to diplomatic 
pressure.162 
 
Still, substantial evidence goes against the “diplomatic path/hostage model”: 
- TIPH observers did not intentionally place themselves between IDF and Palestinian protesters after 1994; 
- TIPH observers were, at least since January 1997, ordered to avoid areas of shooting and stone-throwing; 
- IDF has returned fire against Palestinians operating near the TIPH HQ, and even hit the building;  
- Palestinians may have operated under TIPH guise; 
- Diplomatic protest has required time-consuming co-ordination, and there have been frictions over whether 
to follow up every incident meticulously, or whether to take general political developments into account; 
 
If TIPH observers neither acted as hostages, nor were considered immune, any hostage 
function would seem infeasible. It appears that IDF has not compromised on the 
security of their forces during ongoing operations for the sake of TIPH, while on the 
other hand, the Israeli government has made structural adjustments as a result of TIPH 
petitioning through diplomatic channels. 
- TIPH as a Spotlight 
To what extent has TIPH been able to attract world-wide attention to the plight of 
Hebron’s Palestinians, thereby eliciting pressure on Israel? 
 
Apart from 1994, TIPH has been cautious not to criticise authorities or agencies in 
public statements. Reports have been confidential. Yet, the mission has over years 
received a huge number of diplomats, journalists, politicians, etc., and has often given 
them a tour of the city (PR IV:3). It is highly probable that TIPH has drawn focus to 
the city that would otherwise not have been there. Although TIPH has been diplomatic 
in its references to Israeli policies, my impression is that most of what has been written 
about the city, at least if we exclude Israeli and American, articles, does not reflect 
well upon Israel. Just by catalysing interest, TIPH may indirectly have contributed to a 
discourse that is critical of Israel. Obviously, the critical attention of foreigners does 
not always amount to political pressure. To what extent the aroused dismay of visitors 
                                                 
162 Examples could be Redeployment in 1997; IDF withdrawals in 2001 and 2002; removal of settlers from land 
occupied in the wake of the November 2002 al-Jihad attack (See e.g.: .Aftenposten 26 November 1996; 19 
December 2002) and, finally; modifications of- and ease to the curfew in 2003. 
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is translated into palpable action, is a question I shall have to leave unanswered. What 
is clear is that even the intense pressure put on the Rabin Government after the 1994 
massacre was not enough to make Israel withdraw its settlers. Israel has since 
responded by accepting TIPH, by temporarily disarming some settlers, by redeploying, 
and by trying certain violators. However, these concessions were all possibly due, at 
least in part, to domestic politics. Today TIPH attracts very little attention.163               
 
The observers, when returning home, may influence public opinion. Some may rise to 
positions of power. According to Bjørnsgaard (2002 [interview]), 
“After they are done with their service, the observers tend to be sceptical of Israeli government policies. They 
take this home to their valleys and villages and disseminate their experiences.” 
 
On the other hand, there are factors limiting this effect: 
- Settlers use information on what former observers have written or said about Hebron to substantiate their 
claim that TIPH is an Anti-Semitic organisation (Wilder 2000; 2002 [Interview]; 2004); 
- When signing up for service, TIPH members pledge not to reveal information on incidents or persons that 
come to their attention, in their capacity as observers (TIPH Observer 2001; Indreberg 2004 [Interviews]). 
Assessing TIPH from a Humanist Perspective 
Does TIPH operate largely in the realm of drives - rather than that of interests? Below, 
gut explanations of TIPH’s success are scrutinised. The models are organised into four 
groups, namely hypotheses of fear, frustration/anger, imitation and norms.      
Models of Fear 
Whereas fear in the realist perspective is generally taken as a prerequisite for peace,164 
the humanist perspective sees fear mainly as a destabilising factor. May TIPH’s effect 
be attributable to its ability of reducing fear?  
- TIPH as a Diversion 
The Diversion model is meant to capture TIPH’s possibly reassuring effect upon 
Israeli soldiers in the streets of Hebron. Does TIPH infuse a certain familiarity in an 
otherwise unnerving environment, thereby reducing the stress level and deflating what 
could otherwise have developed into incidents?  
                                                 
163 According to Indreberg (2004 [e-mail]), HOM Kristensen, who led TIPH during 2003 had no contact with 
Israeli journalists during the last 9 months of his tenure. His contact with Palestinian journalists and journalists 
from the TIPH-contributing countries amounted to ca. 1 per month. From other countries, there were ca. 2 
interviews per month.  
164 A balance of power can only be stable in so far as the actors fear each other. The exception is situations in which actors 
are non-predatory, for example, Assurance games. 
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 Since I was not allowed to interview IDF soldiers, this hypothesis is very hard to 
assess. What is clear is that TIPH has often emphasised its presence per se, when 
asked about how it ameliorates the situation.165 The soldiers I observed appeared 
contained, and one greeted the TIPH team. Another asked me if I wasn’t afraid to be in 
Hebron - and declined to reply when I returned the question, after having answered in 
the affirmative. According to one TIPH member, conversations between soldiers and 
observers are rare - but amicable (TIPH Observer 2001 [interview]). The gun-pointing 
incidents in 1998-99 show that friendliness has not always prevailed, but it is perhaps 
too simple to assume that a cold TIPH-IDF climate would detract from the 
entertainment effect of observers upon soldiers.166 In any case, the employment and 
disposition of women within TIPH may be relevant in this perspective.167  
- TIPH as a Sugar Pill  
The sugar pill parable hinges on the notion of a placebo effect of peacekeeping: Does 
TIPH work simply because the Palestinians think it works? I.e.: Is the presence of 
observers misconstrued as a real protection, thereby reducing fear, stress and hostility - 
again resulting in fewer confrontations?168
 
The Placebo hypothesis is fascinating, because it means that Palestinian security could 
be improved simply by manipulation of Palestinians, not Israelis. Contrary to 
conventional logic, belief in security is antecedent to actual security. 169 What says the 
empirical evidence? 
 
Despite many references to appreciative Palestinians in TIPH reports, it is hard to 
build the case that TIPH’s effectiveness was due to inflated Palestinian confidence.170 
                                                 
165 See for example Ruggi (1996:9); Valve (2000:25); TIPH LO (2002 [interview]). 
166 For example, the placing of a dog’s scull on a TIPH flagstaff can hardly be counted as a good-spirited act, but its effect 
upon the acting soldier and his comrades may nevertheless have been one of enjoyment/exhilaration/relief. 
167 For an interesting gender-focused analysis of TIPH, see Hostens (2003). 
168 The visible symbolic victories of TIPH, such as Johansen’s redirection of the IDF lorry, the openings of roadblocks etc., 
are clearly relevant in this perspective.  
169 This model corresponds to Elster’s (1983) concept of non-standard causation. Security, like sleep, is a state that cannot be 
willed, and yet, a necessarily futile attempt to achieve it can make it come about – in a non-standard way (Elster 1983:43ff).  
170 According to Suzanne Ruggi, Journalist of The Jerusalem Times, “Spend five minutes chatting with Hebronites about 
TIPH in the marketplace and you will pick up the general feeling: ‘TIPH do nothing,’ or ‘They are just tourists who eat 
Kanaffeh.’”(Ruggi 1996:9). 
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Even at the time of its inception, TIPH was derided by Palestinian commentators for 
being impotent. The scant polling material and conversations with Palestinians during 
my field trip, further suggest that TIPH has had a lasting credibility deficit, and the 
mission has even been accused of spying for Israel.171 On the other hand, Lia (1998) 
comments on the polls that,  
The results of these polls were nonetheless better than one could predict. The polls covered all of Hebron while 
the TIPH mainly concentrated its operations in the Old City. Thus, only a minority of the Hebronite population – 
mainly the Old City residents could be expected to experience the benefits from the presence of the TIPH. 
Furthermore, the Palestinians had demanded the dismantling of the Jewish settlement after the massacre; when 
they got the unarmed TIPH, it was easily seen as a move designed to legitimate the Jewish enclaves in the City 
and preserving status quo. For this reason, many would arguably object to the TIPH presence, irrespective of its 
actual performance (Lia, 1998:59). 
 
Even if we accept that the polls gave an accurate description of the (conscious) 
assessment of Palestinians, one could maintain that the psychological impact of TIPH 
might have been at a deeper-, subconscious level, or that, even reassuring a minority of 
the citizens might have had a pacifying effect. The former line of argument is 
consistent with the thesis that the most perverse lie, is the one most likely to be 
believed. Seeing such overtly powerless observers being accepted by the PLO, one 
might have sensed that the regime contained more than met the eye. When 
improvements began to show, TIPH was credited.  
 
The second line of argument would imply that reassuring part of the populace would 
reduce the overall number of confrontations with the IDF in proportion to the quota 
reassured. This might be measured.  
 
Between January and October 1997, the proportion of Hebronite civilians expressing 
faith in TIPH’s ability to reduce incidents increased by 8.2%. The TIPH-reported 
number of clashes rose sharply in March, remained moderately high through July, and 
                                                 
171 In the autumn of 1998, TIPH summed up the findings of a poll thus: “Poll conducted among 500 Hebronites showed that: 
“There seems to be a lack of trust in TIPH’s ability to provide a feeling of security to the Palestinians. A majority of the 
people questioned believes that TIPH has not contributed to reducing the number of incidents between the Palestinians and 
the Israelis. This is mainly due to the fact that many Hebronites consider TIPH’s mandate as too weak and its means 
insufficient to meet their expectations” (PR IV:2). As for my conversations with Palestinians in Hebron in February and 
March 2002, their typical attitude towards TIPH would seem inconsistent. When asked about their opinion on TIPH, most 
would answer “good”. When asked about whether TIPH was able to improve the situation for the Palestinians of Hebron, 
most would answer “no”. When asked about whether TIPH might as well leave the city, most would answer “no”.   
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fell gradually towards October. All in all, clash intensity172 decreased by ca. 98.4% 
between March and October 1997. The IDF redeployment and the enlargement of 
TIPH was agreed on in mid-January, and the bulk of the expanded contingent was in 
place one month later. The fact that TIPH’s expansion preceded a steep rise in 
violence suggests that TIPH’s credibility gain by October was due to its increased 
visibility, rather than its pacifying impact.173 In other words, faith could be seen as 
unaffected by the number of incidents, and thus as the independent variable.174  
 
There are, however, other good reasons for questioning the placebo hypothesis. First 
of all, most clashes have involved only a limited number of stone-throwers, and data 
suggest persistent involvement by youth from surrounding villages in which the IDF 
presence is less heavy. Violence in locations of choice involving demographic 
segments is more amenable to rationalist explanations than to “emotionalist” ones. 175 
Moreover, the quantitative data offered by B’tselem indicate that TIPH’s main impact 
is traceable to situations in which Israelis have been killed. TIPH does not significantly 
reduce violence against Palestinians in day-to-day situations, but in situations of high 
tension, where retaliatory acts are likely. If the placebo hypothesis were true, we 
would expect the violence against Palestinians to follow a steadily falling slope over a 
long time-period, perhaps reverting to pre-TIPH levels once the “emperor lost his 
clothes”. The finding that TIPH’s effect is incidental, not general, does therefore 
contradict the placebo hypothesis. 
- TIPH as a Peacebuilder  
Has TIPH strengthened the security of Hebronites by furthering trust, understanding 
and integration between local civilians, Muslim and Jewish?  
                                                 
172 Here defined as ‘number of people involved in clashes divided upon number of days of clashes – by month’. Source: PR 
VII. (The numbers are approximate, as they were read off a diagram, not a table. The copy of the report, provided by the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was somewhat dark). 
173 The polls show that support for TIPH was higher in those parts of the city where TIPH was most active (TIPH Internal 
Memo, 19 November 1997:2). This could be taken as reflecting TIPH’s economic input or the socio-political composition of 
Hebron, rather than TIPH’s peacekeeping contribution. However, the question read: “Do you believe that by their being in 
the city of Hebron, the TIPH observers have provided a sense of security to the Palestinian citizens?” (TIPH Internal Memo 
14 October 1997). 
174 The counter-argument would be that, by October, respondents sensed de-escalation. With a limited memory, de-
escalation, not escalation, was associated with TIPH. Moreover, one should not ignore the possibility of a spurious 
relationship. For example, TIPH could have changed its modus operandi in a way that increased its visibility and at the same 
time reduced its report output, irrespective of the actual development on the ground. 
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Valve (2000:27) refers to activities of TIPH’s Community Relations Division as 
“peacebuilding”. However, her examples are all projects that were aimed solely 
towards the Palestinian community. Building confidence in TIPH was one objective of 
these programs, but they were hardly meant as a bridge between the Palestinian and 
Jewish communities.176 Thus, I would define them as humanitarian aid rather than 
peacebuilding. 
 
Yet it is clear that TIPH has initiated some programs of genuine peacebuilding. In 
1998, TIPH hosted a meeting between Israeli and Palestinian students, including 
lectures and debates on the situation in Hebron. TIPH also sponsored a “people-to-
people” agricultural project, and a renovation project for the Old City involving Israeli 
architects and engineers (PRs V:7;VI:12;VII:9).177 Significantly, though, these projects 
brought together local Palestinians with Israelis from Israel proper - not from Hebron. 
 
The Hebron security regime, of which TIPH was a part, might itself fall under the 
definition of peacebuilding. The pro-argument for such a classification would be that, 
it institutionalised a co-operative structure aimed at reducing violence. The counter-
argument would be that it contained no vision of further integration, making 
peacekeeping a more suitable label. TIPH did express a wish to present itself as an 
“agent of stability for both sides”, and to “embark upon a course of bridge-
building…”(PR I:14). In practice, this seems to have stranded on the opposition of the 
groups in question, but there has probably also been reluctance within TIPH and in the 
Capitals of the contributing countries, since it would mean condoning colonisation.  
All in all, TIPH’s effect is not due to integration at the community level.    
Models of Frustration/Anger: 
Is TIPH’s effect attributable to its ability of relieving frustration, defusing the anger 
that would otherwise have led Palestinians to affective violence?  
                                                                                                                                                        
175 It seems far-fetched to assume that young men should be more scared than the average citizen, and that those living far 
from the IDF concentration should be more scared than those living close to it. 
176 Another objective was probably to create support, and hence, security, for the mission members. 
177 Palestinian Environmental Authorities initially objected to the agricultural project (PR IV:2). 
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 Conventional psychological theory holds that pre-frustrated individuals, in any given 
situation are prone to aggress more intensely than non-frustrated ones (Mackal 
1979:15). Thus, TIPH could theoretically operate at two levels, i.e.: either by averting 
incidents through lowering the general level of frustration, or through deflecting 
outbursts of momentary rage, once they occur.  
- TIPH as an Air-Conditioning Machine 
The function of “cooling the atmosphere” was focal to the designers of the first TIPH 
Agreement (1994), as expressed in Article 1: 
In response to the unique situation created in Hebron in the aftermath of the massacre, a temporary international 
presence will be established … The TIPH will assist in promoting stability and in monitoring and reporting the 
efforts to restore normal life in the city of Hebron, thus creating a feeling of security among Palestinians in the 
city… 
 
Several TIPH I community projects were aimed at reducing stone-throwing (CAS 
1994:3f). “Tension” has remained a standard concept in TIPH reports, and although 
less expressed, the rationale of soothing Palestinian grievances in order to forestall 
clashes has likely inspired the choice of projects throughout TIPH III. The principles 
appear to have been,  
- Relieve needs, the most urgent ones first; 
- Offer people fulfilment through non-violent activities, i.e.: leisure, sports, education, economic- or material 
improvements; 
- Contribute to equality along the axes of gender, socio-economic status and health status (Confer PR II:16f).  
       
All these principles lend themselves well to psychological theories of 
frustration/catharsis (Mackal 1979, Maslow 1970, Hernes and Knudsen 1992). 
 
It is naturally hard to evaluate the peace-promoting impact of these projects in the 
absence of counterfactual history. Here are some sceptical remarks: 
- TIPH is a small organisation, and Hebron has a large population. 
- Most TIPH projects are short-term. The level of day-to-day frustration would arguably revert to normality 
after the project finished, unless lasting improvements were achieved; 
- Even if lasting improvements were achieved, it is not normal to stay satisfied without further improvements 
over time, or at least, the promise of further improvement; 
- In the Old City, the symbols of occupation are so pervasive, that one simply cannot get diverted; 
- Even if equality would mean less frustration to the emancipated, it would mean more frustration to the 
deposed, and reactions are foreseeable, possibly making the situation worse than it was.178 
 
                                                 
178 This opens the prospect that Islamic-, corporate-, organisational- and private opposition to TIPH was not ideologically 
motivated, but were in part expressions of interest, defending the status quo of Intra-Palestinian power-structures.  
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On the other hand, TIPH has engaged a large number of Hebronites in peaceful, 
developmental, projects, and has achieved practical solutions to individual and 
collective problems, without which life would have been considerably more 
frustrating. I doubt however, that TIPH has lowered the aggregate adrenaline level of 
the Palestinians enough to significantly reduce the propensity for violent 
confrontation. Moreover, Palestinians have reportedly in many cases become victims 
of violence without behaving aggressively first.179 Since such events are often followed 
by violent Palestinian protest, violence might be seen as a cause of Palestinian 
frustration, as much as a result.   
- TIPH as a Lightning Rod 
According to Buss (1966), violence should not be seen merely as a function of 
frustration. Subjects may be frustrated and angry, yet remain un-aggressive until 
exposed to painful stimulation or cues of attack (Mackal 1979:13ff). Might TIPH have 
diverted the aggression of Palestinians in specific confrontational situations, allowing 
them to work off their anger in a setting or manner that was less dangerous?  
 
TIPH reports indicate two typical friction scenes: 
- IDF checkpoints in and around the city; 
- IDF observation posts erected on top of houses in which Palestinians are living. 
 
TIPH has been particularly attentive to such scenes, and one car was designated to 
assist Palestinians with soldiers on their roofs (Valve 2000:25f). But the observers 
have not in general kept checkpoints and observation posts under constant 
surveillance. The data is not conclusive either on the tendency of IDF to conduct 
repeated, and according to TIPH, unnecessary, ID checks, or on the practice of ID 
confiscation/destruction. But the fact that these complaints do not appear in recent 
reports of Human Rights organisations might indicate an improvement.180 These are 
functions of relief that TIPH has probably served: 
- Being seen: Palestinians have in many cases known that their treatment was being observed; 
                                                 
179 See for instance, Smilden (1996); B’Tselem (2003a;b;c;d;e;f;g;h:8); Caton (2002); Fahel (1996); Filkins (2003); Hamad 
(2002); HRW (2001:32;35;37); Norsk Folkehjelp (2000:12); PR; Prusher (1996); Zananiri (1997) 
180 It is of course possible that these topics are no longer on the agenda because the curfew limits traffic anyhow, or because 
graver matters have taken precedence. 
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- Having a recourse: Palestinians have known that they had an immediately accessible instance of redress, 
however imperfect; 
- Being taken away: Observers have taken Palestinians from the trouble-spot for interviewing, thereby 
removing the cue of attack from sight; 
- Speaking freely: Observers have interviewed Palestinians, perhaps working as a substitute for psychological 
counselling; 
- Being taken seriously: Palestinians have been informed about the proceedings of their particular complaints.       
 
On the other hand, several factors have worked to inhibit these functions: 
- Formal and practical impediments to observation, such as number- and mobility of observers and 
restrictions of powers, notably the power to intervene; 
- Dependency of Palestinians on ID cards, which in the case of checkpoints are in the hands of the controlling 
soldier, deterring the Palestinian from turning to the observers for assistance; 
- IDF refusal to let observers talk to detainees (PR VI:14;19f);  
- Prohibitions on transporting non-TIPH personnel in TIPH cars;  
- Fear of consequence from talking to TIPH;  
- IDF reluctance to deal with alleged reports, leading TIPH in many cases to suggest that complainants turn to 
Israeli authorities for redress. 
 
It may be repeated that, anti-Palestinian violence in many cases did not arise in the 
context of ID-checks, and if it did, it did not always require aggressive attitude on the 
part of the Palestinian. Since September 2000, there has been very little Palestinian 
traffic in H-2. It seems that TIPH has had scant direct restraining effect upon 
Palestinian congregations intent on violent protest - the setting in which most injuries 
and killings have taken place.181 Settler violence remains a factor. Nevertheless, the 
food deliveries organised by TIPH might have averted mass disobedience of the 
curfew regulations, possibly preventing disaster. The “lightning rod” hypothesis 
remains moderately plausible.      
Models of Imitation:  
Imitation could take two forms: 
- The willed following of positive role-models; or; 
- The compulsive copying of examples whether they are perceived to be positive or not. 
  
Has TIPH succeeded in shaping the conduct of Israeli and Palestinian role models, or 
to erase, or substitute, violent images from the retinas of subjects?  
- TIPH as an Eraser 
Evaluating the former mechanism hinges on a differentiation between role models and 
followers – a hazardous task. The general imitation hypothesis, suggesting that 
                                                 
181 TIPH did probably in the 1990’es elicit PPF anti-insurgency. That effect would be indirect, and in so far as the moderation 
of violence were due to PPF enforcement rather than to the pacifying impact of facing  “fellow” Palestinians  rather than IDF, 
we would be dealing with rational mechanisms rather than emotional ones.  
 
 
112
subjects resort to violence because they have it fresh in mind, fits well with the finding 
that terrorist attacks often come in clusters.182 But in a local setting, concentrated 
violence might reflect conscious planning as well as spontaneous copying. Changes in 
IDF conduct may depend upon imitation/culture, but it could also reflect policy/orders. 
These are some relevant points:  
- TIPH did support psychological treatment for victims of the 1994 massacre and their families; 
- TIPH has done much to relate to schoolchildren, and has presumably communicated the message that war is 
for adults, a view unequivocally expressed in periodic reports; 
- Several reports indicate a positive trend in the behaviour of IDF during the course of each contingent, 
reverting to square one whenever new recruits arrived; 
 
The cyclic pattern of IDF behaviour is not necessarily due to imitation, but is 
explainable in a realist vein by the need of each new contingent to signal strength, or 
to Palestinian testing of the limits after rotations. Although TIPH has related much to 
children, it has probably been up against formidable odds:  
- To Palestinian boys, confronting the IDF has probably been the ultimate test of manhood. This means that 
the very pacification of role models detracts from their status as a role model;183  
- There are several indications that adults of both sides ensure that the memories of past injustices are passed 
on to younger generations and that some encourage, facilitate and even plan child activism; 
- Hebron has its own Ardoyne complex, meaning that Palestinian children merely by moving about in the 
most natural way are considered a security threat by settlers. The children thus become pieces in the political 
game whether they seek to be that or not; 
- TIPH has been viewed with suspicion by large segments on both sides, and mission members could hardly 
challenge the respective discourses of struggle without provoking sentiments.  
 
Violence in Hebron, whether physical, symbolic, or normative, is so omnipresent that 
TIPH has scarcely been able to remove it from the hearts and minds of subjects.  
Models of Norm Sensitivity: 
Has TIPH been able to influence subjects through the invocation or manipulation of 
pre-internalised norms, or by infusing them with new norms? 
- TIPH as a Hostage II 
The hostage model in the humanist perspective would focus on the potentially 
pacifying effect of norms as opposed to the rational estimation of consequence 
operative within the realist perspective. From an empirical point of view, however, 
                                                 
182 See Lia and Skjølberg (2000:12); Weimann and Brosius (1988:491ff).  
183 Alternatively, if manhood is taken as a status that cannot be lost, “men” might discourage youth from violence without 
losing in terms of social capital, but the youth would know that they were listening precisely because the speaker had already 
passed the “test”, and the effect of the urge of non-violence would constitute a double-communication with the opposite 
effect of the intended one. See Gilmore (1990) on the constitution of masculinity.  
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many of the same indicators apply. As noted, IDF officers and influential Palestinians 
have accused TIPH of espionage, and soldiers, settlers and Palestinians alike have put 
observers in lethal danger. Palestinians have undermined TIPH’s immunity.  
 
Theoretically, these arguments do not disprove the hostage function. The presence of 
observers may well have elicited extra caution from the majority of weapon-bearers in 
Hebron. When I dismiss the hostage function operative through pre-existing norms, it 
is based on the following reasoning: 
- TIPH has withdrawn from fire-fights, and has avoided inter-positioning in less violent clashes; 
- A settler spokesperson has described TIPH as “Anti-Semitic.” Some IDF officers, allegedly also a former 
Brigade commander, have accused TIPH of espionage. Such individuals should be expected to use relatively 
moderate language to voice the concerns of their ‘constituencies’. These statements could therefore be taken 
as ‘at least’ representative of the general view of the collectives in question. Enemy imagery typically 
reduces the normative inhibitions of individuals; 
- Live fire is used mainly in response to perceived danger. In such extreme situations, the presence of 
observers would scarcely influence the action of weapon-bearers.      
- TIPH as a Conscience 
To what extent has TIPH been able to appeal to the morality of IDF soldiers, thereby 
reducing the probability of life-threatening acts against Palestinians? 
 
There is much evidence of soldier confusion about how to relate to Palestinians, some 
examples of assistance, and even some expressions of radical sympathy.184 According 
to CPT (Internet site), several soldiers in Hebron claim to have considered 
conscientious objection. There would in other words be moral strings to play on for 
those concerned with security for Palestinians. On the other hand, stereotypes also 
appear quite commonly among soldiers and the stories of rather inspired humiliation, 
brutality, vandalism etc. go beyond what could be explained by necessity, prudence 
and fear.185 What appears to check all private sympathies, antipathies and diverse 
moral characteristics, save in a few extreme cases, is these men’s perception of orders. 
Although some effect of TIPH may quite plausibly be attributed to the observers’ 
ability of sensitising soldiers directly, the key to TIPH’s effect is probably to be found 
                                                 
184 For examples, see B’Tselem 2003h:8; CPT 19 February 2002;  
185 Reported/alleged examples of ‘inspired’ misconduct may be found in CPT 6 October 2000; Derfner (1998); 
Hamad (2002 [interview]); Johansen (2002b [interview]); Polhamus (2002); PR V:17; VI:23; Salam (b [Internet 
Site]); Examples of stereotypes may be found in CPT 16 August 2000; Gish (2003).  
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at higher level, i.e.: in the ability of TIPH to influence decision-makers, coupled with 
the soldiers’ respect or fear of those decision-makers.  
- TIPH as a Medal 
The medal model is meant to reflect the logic of honour distribution. Has TIPH been 
able to exploit a code of honour, existing among decision-makers in Hebron, in a way 
that has worked to limit the number of Palestinian casualties? 
 
Since IDF is responsible for law-enforcement vis-a-vis Palestinians in H-2, the IDF 
code of honour would be of primary interest. What are the fundamental criteria by 
which Israeli officers and soldiers appraise themselves?  
 
According to Ben-Ari (1998), the discourse of IDF soldiers in Hebron is based on one 
archetypal precept: the combat schema. The combat schema consists of a subject, 
placed on a battleground, and confronting an initially unknown set of enemies. The 
goal of the subject is to neutralise his environs, and fulfil whatever task he is ordered 
to carry out. In this setting, the mind must rule the body. It is required that the subject 
knows when and how to fire, but he must also know when not to fire, because excesses 
might reveal positions, drain supplies, and expose comrades to “friendly fire”. 
Precisely because the berserk state is seen to reduce the efficiency of soldiers, it has 
not been encouraged or valued by the IDF (Ben-Ari 1998:85). Furthermore, the 
combat schema’s imperatives of rationality, resoluteness and self-discipline carry over 
into the evaluation of soldiers in all sorts of activities, and particularly those that 
resemble combat, such as manoeuvres - and I hazard to add – clashes. Another crucial 
concept is gibush, literally crystallization, but in popular terminology connoting group 
cohesion, mutual loyalties (Ben-Ari 1998:97ff). It would seem then, that rationality, 
self-control and trustworthiness, particularly with respect to fellow soldiers, are 
principal criteria of esteem to IDF decision-makers in Hebron. The overall ideal is to 
maximise the efficiency of the fighting machine. 
A natural corollary would be that TIPH critique and proposals that could credibly be 
cast in terms of efficiency-, security- or well-being of soldiers would carry more 
weight with IDF commanders than appeals to more intuitive arguments such as 
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morality, decorum, status quo, agreements, international law, etc. This is quite 
evident. What is perhaps not as evident to the outsider, is that, TIPH, by contributing 
to moderation/discipline among IDF soldiers could be seen as actually furthering their 
instrumental quality as combat troops. That this notion is no far-fetched construction, 
but rather, is quite intuitive to Israeli officers, should be clear from the fact that Ben-
Ari is himself an officer, and his conclusions were based upon interviews with other 
officers, and participatory observation of his unit, stationed in Hebron for reserves 
duty during 8 years (Ben-Ari 1998:xi). In fact, fear that subverting civilians was 
eroding morale led Israeli officers to call for a larger ratio of Border Police in the 
occupied territories during the first Intifada (Peretz 1990:45).   
 
To what extent and in what ways has TIPH tapped into the habitus of IDF officers? 
First of all, the “professional/unprofessional” dichotomy has been the prime dimension 
of appraisal, and in TIPH discourse, there has obviously been a strong correlation 
between “professionalism” and restraint. Two points could be made: From a military-
realist point of view, it is by no means self-evident that restraint should be the norm, as 
the concept of “overwhelming force” has wide appeal in military circles. Thus, for 
cultural reasons, IDF officers may have been relatively receptive to the logic of 
restraint urged by TIPH. Secondly, the fact that TIPH has been led by police officers, 
not by military men, has meant that norms and standards of policing, not warfare, 
provided as their semi-instinctive basis of appraisal. Israel has long accepted that law-
enforcement standards are applicable to unrest in the occupied territories, so the 
significance of the police background of TIPH seniors lies first and foremost in the 
conviction and naturalness with which they have been able to argue as if IDF were 
dealing with civilians – not unprivileged combatants. While the Police background of 
TIPH seniors has likely heightened their attentiveness to riot control methods, relative 
to what could be expected of military men, it has probably reduced their attentiveness 
to international law issues, i.e.: the illegality of the settler presence and its corollaries. 
Another facet of the police habitus is a certain predisposition towards “law and order” 
(TIPH Observer 2001 [interview]). My contention is that, characteristics of both IDF 
and TIPH seniors have ensured quite compatible outlooks, enhancing communication 
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and collegiality and making co-operation rather than confrontation the instinctive 
mode of interaction. TIPH was well calibrated, in the sense that the kind of issues it 
was likely to press, were exactly those that local IDF officers were empowered to 
respond to. Once a promise were given or an intention stated by an Israeli officer, 
TIPH could criticise non-fulfilment in terms of inefficiency (i.e.: incompetence), rather 
than unreliability (i.e.: ingenuity). This could be important if we assume that IDF in 
Hebron prides itself not so much about the purity of its arms as the efficiency of ditto – 
an assumption quite plausible in the light of Ben-Ari’s analysis and available data.186
Conclusion 
TIPH has worked four ways: 
- By constantly evaluating soldiers and officers, who feel the cross-pressures between particularist and 
universalist ethics and are either uncertain about how their superiors would like them to behave, or know 
that they want them to behave moderately. Mechanisms: Fear of superiors and social pressure; 
- By influencing Palestinian leaders to signal conciliation, thereby eliciting limited Israeli concessions. 
Mechanism: Revision of risk assessments;  
- By affecting the cost-benefit calculus of Israeli politicians and commanders with respect to retaliation (What 
pays in Khan Younis does not pay to the same extent in Hebron). Mechanism: Revision of risk assessments; 
- By creating bonds at the personal level, and subsequently, by playing on the wish of Israeli decision-makers 
to be reasonable, efficient, and trustworthy. Mechanism: Social pressure. 
 
The relative importance of these mechanisms of influence has shifted considerably 
during TIPH’s time of operations. Access to the local IDF Commander is today all but 
shut, and the enforcement capabilities of PPF commanders, and hence, their credibility 
vis-à-vis IDF is heavily circumscribed. On the other hand, TIPH continues to observe 
soldiers and to appeal to politicians through diplomatic offices. 
                                                 
186 An interesting episode in this respect is the testimony given by then IDF Chief of General Staff, Lt. Gen. Ehud Barak, to 
the Israeli Cabinet after the yeshiva students’ incident of 16 May 1994. Although the yeshiva students had violated an 
understanding with the IDF to the effect that Israelis should not move about in the city unescorted and had fired upon 
Palestinians in up to half an hour before the IDF intervened, Barak chose to present the facts as though there had been co-
ordination of the walk and emphasised that IDF had caused most of the injuries (Immanuel and Keinon 1994; Makovsky 
1994). It seems a plausible interpretation that it was more important to appear efficient than to appear proportionate. Another 
indication is the IDF policy shift, shortly following HOM’s fax to the TIPH co-ordinator in Oslo on 13 June 1994, 
questioning the subordination of local IDF to higher level. (This does not precondition that Israeli intelligence was tapping 
TIPH’s fax, since Johansen (2002a [interview]) raised the same argument with Spiegel directly).        
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Chapter VII: Where Do We Go from Here? 
 
This thesis demonstrates the importance of method triangulation. While consistent 
with the Hypothetical-Deductive Method, the juxtaposition of humanism to realism 
could very easily have led to a misinterpretation of the quantitative data and a 
premature dismissal of the realist perspective. Only through the qualitative analysis did 
it become clear that the perspectives, which were presented as contradictory, are in 
fact complementary, and are both important for understanding the level and nature of 
violence in Hebron. Notably, among the explanations of TIPH’s effect that were 
deemed plausible in Chapter 6 there are both essentially social and essentially 
physical-coercive models, and the central one includes elements of both.  
 
These findings would seem most in tune with the realist perspective: 
- Statements by key figures on both sides indicate that violence is chosen or not chosen with a view to the 
future rather than to the past, and thus, that past grievances are pretexts rather than causes of violence;187 
- Settlers, who are freer to act than Palestinians, appear to be over-represented among those violent;188 
- There is a positive correlation on both sides between level of violence and involvement of elements from 
outside the city, although city residents would appear to have greater grievances; 
- Many offensive activities whether violent or non-violent seem to involve some degree of planning.189 
 
On the other hand, 
- There are acts which are very hard to explain in rationalist terms, i.e.: the actor could not soundly have 
believed that his/her act would yield a net benefit to him/herself in this world; 
- Øverkil (2004b [interview]), who has intimate knowledge of Hebron, is relatively independently placed, and 
has a police background, conceives of stone-throwing by young Palestinians in terms of  “spontaneous local 
expressions,” and explains them in terms of grievances;  
- The long curfew during the Al-Aqsa Intifada has been linked to increased violence within Palestinian 
families (Hübler 2002; Medmenneske 2003). Such violence would appear irrational, and there is little reason 
why persons who “lose it” at home, should not do so in front of Israelis, their perceived tormentors. 190       
- Children and, at least on the Israeli side, women, appear to be over-represented among initiators of low-level 
violence and other forms of provocation (PR I:13f; II:7; V:21; VI:11;20;24; VII:8;15; X:8) 
 
The prominence of children “on the frontlines” could be explained by relative 
immaturity/emotionality/irrationality. However, I suspect that children are active 
                                                 
187 See e.g.: Zananiri (1996); Benn and Alon (2002);   
188 See e.g.: PR II:18 
189 For instance TIPH reported of “preparations for stone throwing” (PR II:7f). 
190 One finding which may be interpreted to fit with both perspectives, but which I believe is most compatible with the 
humanist one, is the apparent difference in effect between Jewish and Palestinian days of significance upon the number of 
Palestinians killed. If the Palestinians were truly rational, their own holidays would not render them any more or less violent 
than other days and there would be no need for extra IDF security measures. Thus, if there is indeed an increased risk to 
Palestinians on such days, that could only be explained by either arousal among Palestinians or by increased violence-
proneness among Israelis. If the latter is the case, that may be explained by both perspectives. As noted, only killings by 
settlers increase significantly during months associated with Palestinian remembrance.  
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precisely because they are less likely to be subjected to harsh counter-measures. This 
is, of course, a realist conceptualisation in the sense that it is calculating, but it 
includes a crucial social element, namely the reluctance of the offended person and de 
facto authorities to punish - without which the calculation would come to naught.          
 
In essence, there are different forms of violence. Some violent acts are calculated and 
could hardly be forestalled through appeasement - only postponed. Other acts are 
spontaneous, and while they may be averted in the short run by physical control, such 
control will likely prove counter-productive in the long run. Thus, the findings from 
Hebron fit quite well with the curvilinear model presented by Hegre et al. (2000).191 . 
Israel has during the period ruled Hebron quite successfully by both harsh and loose 
regimes, but when the tactics have been blurry or there has been double-
communication between the military and political level, escalation has been the result. 
Palestinian conciliation has been possible under loose regimes only in so far as there 
has been a general feeling of moving towards a political solution.192 It seems a logical 
corollary that, contrary to what many Israelis believe, the Oslo process failed - not 
because it went too far too fast - but because it was too gradual/apprehensive.   
  
The good news is two-fold:  
1) The TIPH case shows that peacekeepers might be accepted in highly asymmetric conflicts; 
2) Once installed, it is possible for a very weak peacekeeping mission to affect a very strong belligerent. 
 
The establishment of TIPH might, and I believe should, be understood in terms of 
multiple power asymmetries (Touval 2000). But the success of TIPH, admittedly 
partial, has probably depended on social mechanisms. This leads us to one caveat: 
Although TIPH has to some extent worked, it is not guaranteed that a replica could 
function in another context. Moreover, it should be remembered that TIPH has not 
been able to change the strategic scenario radically. Hebron was, and remains, 
dominated by Israelis. It is even possible that TIPH has deflected some pressure from 
Israel on the issue of a larger peacekeeping force in the West Bank.  
                                                 
191 Confer Chapter 3, page 30. 
192 Examples of loose regimes successfully forestalling Palestinian-initiated violence could be found in the 
summer and autumn of 1996 and from the beginning of 1999 until summer 2000. 
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Appendix 1: Legal References Relevant to Reported Israeli Practices  
 
Below, these acronyms are frequently used: 
 
BPUFFLEO:  Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (Not legally  
binding on Israel); 
CCLEO:  Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (Not legally binding on Israel); 
FGC:   Fourth Geneva Convention Relevant to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (De  
jure applicability denied by Israel, but insisted on by the international community. Israel has 
offered to apply the “humanitarian articles” unilaterally, without specifying which they are). 
HR:  1907 Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Legally binding 
on Israel); 
UDHR:  Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Applicability denied by Israel as to the occupied 
territories. Legal scholars and human rights activists maintain that Human Rights are indeed 
applicable, but the Israeli view is supported by reservations in other conventions of Human 
Rights).193  
 
Some Articles of the FGC are marked with an asterisk (*). Such articles are not among those mentioned in FGC 
(1949 Art. 6(3)) to be of continuing validity after one year has passed since the general cessation of hostilities. 
However, Israel has never invoked Art. 6(3) in order to justify any act conflicting with other privileges of the 
FGC. On the other hand Israeli officials have referred to the al-Aqsa Intifada as a “war.”  Moreover, Art. 6(4) 
states: “Protected persons whose release, repatriation or re-establishment may take place after such dates [i.e.: 
one year after general cessation of hostilities] shall meanwhile continue to benefit by the present convention.” 
 
Table 13: Legal References Relevant to Reported Israeli (Mal)practices in Hebron.   
 
 Policing Paradigm War Paradigm TIPH 
reference 
Source of 
reported 
practice 
Criticised 
by TIPH 
within the 
available 
Periodic 
Reports? 
The presence of Israeli civilian 
settlers in the occupied territories 
as such 
 FGC, Art. 49 
(6);146(3)* (See 
also HR Arts. 
23(h); 55 and 
FGC, Arts. 
2(1);7;8;47) 
 Many 
sources, 
including 
author’s 
observation 
No 
Non-eviction, delayed eviction, or 
insufficient eviction, of settlers 
from occupied houses 
CCLEO, Arts. 
1;2; UDHR, Art. 
17 
HR, Arts. 
43;46;47;52; 
FGC, Arts. 
29;33; 
PR IV:12f B’Tselem; 
TIPH 
Yes 
Confiscation of private property UDHR, Art. 17194 HR, Arts. 23(g); 
46;47;51;52; 53; 
FGC Art. 
33;147* 
 B’Tselem  
Non-intervention in cases where 
settlers kill, injure or harass 
Palestinians or steal or destroy 
their property 
CCLEO, Arts. 1; 
2; UDHR, Arts. 
3;7 
HR, Arts. 
23(g);28;43;47;
51; FGC, Arts. 
27;29;32;33;  
PR 1:12; II:13; 
IV:10; 
V:12;18; 
VI:25; VII:19 
B’Tselem; 
TIPH 
Yes 
Extraction of natural resources for 
the benefit of Israeli settlers 
 HR Art. 47;52; 
FGC, Arts. 33; 
55* 
 B’Tselem No 
                                                 
193 See for example Article (4)1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR 1966), 
Article 15(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, and von Glahn (1957:98). All these sources are 
cited in INSICJ (1981:75). 
194 Expropriation of private property is normally seen as legitimate in an internal context (von Glahn 1996:202). 
 
 
121
Exacerbating water shortages in 
various ways, apparently only for 
Palestinians 
 FGC, Art. 
55*;56* 
 Pacheco; 
Salam; TIPH 
 
Destruction of property, in non-
combat situations;   
 HR. Art. 23 (g); 
FGC Arts. 
33;53;147* 
 B’Tselem; 
Keller; 
Urquhardt 
 
Barring of Palestinians from their 
houses in order to secure the 
settlements; 
UDHR, Art. 17(2) HR, Art. 46; 
FGC 
Art.33;147*  
PRs I:13; 
II:13f; IV:10; 
VII:22; X:12 
TIPH Yes: “Dif-
ferential 
treatment” 
Banning on house reconstruction 
for the same reason; 
  PRs I:13; 
II:13f; IV:10; 
V:18; VII:22; 
X:12 
TIPH Yes: “un-
equal law-
enforce-
ment” 
Placing of a Police Station 
responsible for complaints from 
Hebron in a settlement outside the 
city; 
 FGC Art. 27 
(See also HR, 
Art. 43).  
PR II:16; 
VII:18 
Salam; TIPH Yes 
The placement of an internment 
area directly in front of a 
settlement 
 FGC, Art. 
28*;34;49(5); 
83*;88* 
 Author No 
Lengthy curfews and closures of 
streets and the whole city; 
UDHR, Arts. 
13;14;20;23 
HR Art. 50; 
FGC Arts. 
27195;33;34; 
52(2);78*  
PR II:9; 
V:11ff; VI:4f;  
Author; 
B’Tselem; 
HRW; TIPH 
Yes:“Right 
to freedom 
of move-
ment” 
Non-provision for persons under 
prolonged curfew 
UDHR, Art. 
22;25 
FGC, Art. 81*   Not as 
such, but 
stresses 
economic 
conse-
quences 
Unequal law 
enforcement/Preferential 
treatment of Jewish settlers  
UDHR, Arts. 
1;2;3;7 
FGC Arts. 
3(1);13*;27 
PRs I:12; 
II:13; 
IV:10;14;25 
V:12; VII:22 
X:8 12  
B’Tselem; 
HRW; 
TIPH;  
Yes. 
Improper and dangerous use of 
tear-gas and stun grenades 
  PR:VI:21; 
VII:12;14  
Banat; 
B’Tselem; 
TIPH. 
 
Corporal punishments (beatings), 
lengthy detentions in the sun 
without water; Degrading and 
humiliating treatment 
BPUFFLEO, Art. 
15; CCLEO, Art. 
2;5; UDHR, Arts. 
3;5;9;11(1) 
HR, Art. 23 (c); 
FGC, Art. 
3(1)a;c);32;   
PRs I:11; 
II:10f 
V:11;14; 
VI:22; VII:14; 
WS 11:2;  
B’Tselem; 
CPT; 
Hamad; 
Johansen; 
TIPH; 
Yes: 
“beating, 
kicking, 
slapping, 
harassment 
Other non-physical harassment by 
soldiers196
CCLEO, Art. 2; 
UDHR, Art. 5 
FGC, Art.27 PRs I:13 
II:3ff;10f; WS 
11:1; 
Derfner, 
Salam, 
TIPH,  
Yes: 
“possibly 
harassing” 
Confiscation of ID cards UDHR, Art. 15197  PR II:12  B’Tselem; 
TIPH; 
Yes. 
Mingling between soldiers and 
settlers in military positions;198
 FGC Art. 28*199 PR IV:9; 
V:18; X:6f;10 
Author; 
TIPH 
unequal 
law-
enforceme
nt 
                                                 
195 Confer Pictet (1958: 199ff;282f). 
196 Such harassment includes name-calling, threats, littering (including feces), shooting at water tanks, theft, deliberate slow 
working on checkpoints (in some cases leading to deaths). 
197 The text of the Article reads, “1. Everyone has the right to a nationality. 2. No one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality” (UDHR 1948, Art. 15). 
198 For example, TIPH recurrently reported seeing soldiers mingling with settlers (often children) on observation posts and 
checkpoints (PRs IV:9; V:18; X:6f;10). TIPH objected to this practice, out of concern that the practice provoked Palestinians, 
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Indiscriminate/Disproportionate 
use of force, endangering and 
sometimes killing civilians who 
did not participate in fighting; 
BPUFFLEO, Art. 
5;7;8;9; CCLEO, 
Art. 3; UDHR, 
Art.3   
HR, Art. 23 
(e)*; 25*; 
PRs 
II:8;12;V:15; 
VI:21f; 
VII:12;14; 
X:6;   
CPT; 
B’Tselem; 
HRW 
Yes 
Allowance of settlers, including 
presumed minors, to wear arms; 
  WS 6:1; PR 
I:15; 
Johansen; 
TIPH  
Yes 
Hindrance of medical aid and fire 
rescue operations and firing at 
ambulances and a hospital;200
BPUFFLEO, Art. 
5(c); CCLEO, 
Art. 6; UDHR, 
Art. 25 
HR, Art. 27; 
FGC Arts. 16-
23*;56* 
PRs I:13; 
II:4;9f 
V:11f;20; 
VI:27; Press 
Release 29 
June 2002 
CPT; TIPH; Yes 
Hindrance of education. UDHR, Art. 26 FGC, Art. 50* PR V:21; 
VII:15 
CPT Not 
explicitly 
Seizure of schools in order to use 
them as military positions  
 HR, Art. 56; 
FGC, Art. 50*; 
PR II:4; 
VII:15 
B’Tselem; 
CPT 
Not 
explicitly 
Defence of illegal settlements;  FGC Arts. 28*; 
29; 49 (6); 
  No 
The use of armed, non-uniformed 
State agents;201
 HR Art. 1; 
23(b);  
PRs II:14; 
VI:19 
Tabari; 
Banāt; CPT; 
TIPH 
No 
Imprisonment of convicted 
persons outside the occupied 
territory 
 FGC, Arts. 49; 
76 
  No 
Assassinations BPUFFLEO, Art. 
9;10; UDHR, Art. 
3 
HR, Art 23(b); 
FGC, Art. 
3(1)d);27;29;(68
);71;75; 
 B’Tselem; 
CPT 
No 
Recruitment of collaborators, 
including threats 
 HR, Art. 44; 
FGC, Arts. 
31;51 
 Lia; Salam No 
Alleged: Indecent exposure of 
women 
 FGC, Art. 27(2) WS 10:1 CPT; 
Unnamed 
Palestinians 
 
Breaking-up of non-violent 
crowds in public places; 
BPUFFLEO, 
Arts. 12;13;14; 
CCLEO, Art. 3; 
  TIPH  
                                                                                                                                                        
as it reinforced the impression of unequal law enforcement. Nowhere in the reports does it figure as a war crime in terms of 
human shielding. Perhaps part of the reason for this omission can be found in the lack of positive law, forbidding the use of 
“own” civilians as human shields. However, it should not be difficult to base the argument on customary international law. 
199 The text of Art. 28 reads, “The presence of a protected person may not be used to render certain points or areas immune 
from military operations.” I believe that setters are not protected persons, according to the convention (Confer Art. 4 and 
Pictet (1958:45f) However, Human Rights organisations and officials of various states condemn attacks upon settlers (en 
masse), on the argument that they are non-combatants (Confer e.g.: B’Tselem 2000:20f). If that is so, Art. 28 should logically 
apply (Compare Pictet’s commentary on Art 28 to the commentary on Art. 34, prohibiting the taking of hostages. While the 
commentary on Art. 34 refers strictly to indigenous civilians of the occupied territory, that is not clear with Art. 28). 
200  The available reports do not claim that live fire was directed at ambulances, only rubber bullets (which may also be lethal 
- confer PR II:8). On the other hand, Ambulance personnel were commanded at gun-point. The FGC (1949 Art. 23) allows 
the occupant to search medical transports, in order to rule out that they are being used for military purposes. Accusations of 
Palestinian abuse of Ambulances abound. There have also been charges of Israeli abuse (Se e.g.: Tabari 1996). The shelling 
of the hospital took place during my stay in Hebron, and I have not read any TIPH report about it. However, TIPH observed 
the incident, counted 17 grenade hits on one side of the hospital, and marked the building with a large, illuminated, Red 
Crescent (Øverkil 2004b [interview]). Although the building was previously unmarked, and therefore not protected under the 
FGC (1949, Arts 18;19), it had been in place long enough to be known as a hospital to the Israeli forces that opened fire on it. 
These forces were, moreover, positioned deep within H-1, not far from the hospital, and in eye-view’s distance of the TIPH 
HQ. Judging from the militia activity around the TIPH HQ, it is likely that Palestinians were also conducting military 
operations near the hospital. The incident, I believe, could serve as case for an interesting legal analysis.  
201 No available TIPH report says explicitly that TIPH has observed under-cover agents, but there are references to “special 
police” and “Shabak”, i.e.: the Israeli General Security Service, whose officers are generally operating in plain clothes (CPT 
PRs II:14; VI:19; Tabari 1996). 
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CCPR Art.; 
UDHR, Art. 20 
Use of force against stone-
throwers 
BPUFFLEO, Art. 
4; CCLEO, Art. 3 
FGC, Art. 3;5 PR II:8  Yes: “may 
seem 
dispro-
portionate” 
Disregard for religious practices, 
closing of mosques 
UDHR, Art. 18 HR, Art. 46; 
FGC Art. 
27;58*; 
PR II:4;14f; 
VI:16; VII:15f  
TIPH Yes 
Use of ambulances for military 
purposes 
 HR, Art. 23(f);  Tabari? No 
Failing to inform detainees of the 
charges against them. (…and also 
keeping this from TIPH). 
 FGC, Art. 
71(2);  
PR IV:4; 
VI:19f; VII:14 
  
Pal forced to place stones around 
suspicious plastic bag  
 
 FGC, Art. 27; 
34;40(2);51(2) 
WS 10:1 TIPH No report 
to parties 
available 
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